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CMPAIGNS OF 1862 AND 1863. 



CAMPAIGNS 



1862 AND 1863 



ILLUSTRATING 



THE PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 



BY 

EMIL SCHALK, 

AUTHOR OF "SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.' 



SECOND EDITION. 



PHILADELPHIA : 
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO. 
1863. ^ 
1W. 



(^T ' 



,S;^1 



Entered, according to act of Congress, in the year 1.SG3, by 

J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO., 

In the Clerk's OfBce of the District Court of the United States for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 



PREFACE. 



Few years of military annals are so fertile in events as 
that which has just expired. Full of varied chances, the 
year 1862 ought to teach us a great lesson. It ought to 
remind us that "The great principles of war cannot be 
violated with impunity." It may be interesting as well 
as useful to investigate the causes, both of the great dis- 
asters which have befallen our armies, and of the successes 
which they have achieved. 

By passing in review the different operations, and by 
discussing .them from a strictly military stand-point, . we 
may so perceive the errors of the past campaign as to 
be able to avoid similar ones in the campaigns to come. 
These reasons have induced ^e to write a military review 
of the campaign of 1862, and even to discuss operations 
which will probably take place in 1863. 

Presumptuous as it may appear to undertake such a 
task, I am encouraged to do so by the remarkable man- 
ner in which events coincided with a similar discussion 

(V) 



VI PREFACE. 

given by me, in a work entitled " Summary op the Art 
OF War," and written at the end of 1861. 

I discussed in that work operations which were after- 
ward made by our generals. I pointed out the correct 
line of defense against these operations, and showed the 
results. The Rebels adopted this defense ; the results 
were as I had shown they would be. The present work 
may therefore be considered as a kind of treatise on 
grand war, and as a sequel to my " Summary of the Art 
of War." 

I hope the reader will judge it with indulgence, and, 
while perusing it, take into consideration that my only 
sources of information were the reports published in our 
newspapers, and such maps as may be found in any 
library. 

E. S. 
January, 1863. 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

Introduction • 9 

I. Principles of Strategy 10 

Base of Operation 11 

Lines of Communication 13 

Lines of Operation 13 

Oifensive Operations 15 

Defensive Operations 18 

Wars of Conquest, or Great Invasions ii2 

II. Geography of the Southern Confederacy 33 

Left Zone 35 

* Mountains ^ 35 

Rivers 37 

Towns 41 

Lines of Communication 41 

Center Zone 47 

Upper Center Zone 47 

Mountains 48 

Gaps 49 

' Rivers 49 

Towns 51 

Lines of Communication 51 

Lower Center Zone 54 

Rivers 55 

Towns 66 

Lines of Communication 57 

(vii) 



Vin CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Movement of Troops in the Lower Center Zone 58 

Right Zone 60 

Rivers 61 

Towns 61 

Connections of the several Zones 63 

III. Application of the Maxims laid down in Chap- 

ter I. to the Theater of War constituted by 
the Southern Confederacy 64 

IV. Campaign of 1862 88 

Review of this Campaign /. 125 

Operations in the Right Zone 130 

Operations in the Center Zone 131 

Operations in the Left Zone 154 

V. Campaign of 1863 210 



CAMPAIGNS OF 1862 AND 1863. 



The discussion of events recently passed, and fresh in 
everybody's memory, is a difficult task, as impressions of 
all kinds are still alive, and passions on the subject are not 
entirely subdued. It is therefore necessary, before entering 
on the discussion of the past campaign, to establish a sound 
basis, or rather to give the reader a correct idea of what in 
war is to be considered right and what wrong. 

For this, sound knowledge and thorough understanding 
of the great maxims of the art, and a familiar acquaintance 
with the great geographical features of the theater of the 
contest, are absolutely indispensable. We will, consequently, 
devote a few chapters to the principles of strategy, as ap- 
plied to great wars of invasion ; and we will consider the 
geography of the Southern Confederacy, in so far as it has 
an influence on military operations. 

We hope that our readers will carefully peruse those 
chapters, though they may be somewhat dry, as the whole 
of the reasoning to come will be based upon, and will have 
reference to, what has been laid down in them. 

2 (9). 



10 PRlNCirLES OF STRATEGY. 



PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

In order to understand the following pages, it is neces- 
sary to give a short exposition of the principal maxims of 
strategy. These maxims are deduced from the modes of 
operation in the field adopted by the great captains of all 
ages ; they furnish the rules of action in offensive or defen- 
sive campaigns. 

War has existed nearly since the creation of the world ; 
the history of every country commences with war and the 
feats of its heroes. The objects for which war is waged 
have been in all ages nearly always the same. The prin- 
ciples on which it is conducted have remained unchanged 
from the first, although, with the progress of civilization, 
the understanding of those principles becomes more general, 
and the manner of fighting dififerent. 

The most complete discussion of the principles of strat- 
egy is to be found in Gen. Jomini's works, especially in 
his "Art of War." This work, though a standard one of 
its kind, is intended only for the military student, and re- 
quires considerable knowledge of military history before 
reading it. This is the reason why, instead of referring 
simply to his work, I present the following compact and 
easily understood treatise, which, however, will also be found 
in substance in my "Summary of the Art of War.''^ 



BASE OF OPERATIOX. 11 

Three great principles may be laid down as belonging to 
the entire science of war. They are — 

1. To concentrate all disposable forces, and to act with 
the whole of them against a part only of the enemy's 
forces. 

2. To act against the weakest part of the enemy ; against 
bis center if his forces be not united, and against his flank 
or rear, if they be concentrated. Also, to act against his 
communications without endangering our own. 

3. Whatever plan of operations has been decided on, it 
should be executed with the utmost promptness, so that the 
object may be attained before the enemy can prevent it. 

Simple as these three great maxims may appear, their 
application is nevertheless of the greatest diflBculty. In 
fact, this application varies with every new tract of land 
upon which we enter ; with every different position of the 
enemy, with every variation in the disposition of his forces 
and of our own army. In all these cases the circumstances 
vary, but the principles upon which to act remain the same; 
and it is in the right application of these maxims to circum- 
stances that the qualities of a great commander are dis- 
played. 

Before going farther, let us give here a few definitions 
and explanations. 

Base of Operation. — On opening a campaign we must 
have a line for the concentration of our troops, whereon to 
place our depots and magazines, and from which to advance 
to execute our different plans. This line is called the base 
of operation. The choice of this line is of the utmost im- 
portance, for the result of a whole campaign may depend 



12 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY, 

upon it. Let a b c d he the theater of war. Now if a c 
and a b belong to us, and b d be the sea, or the frontier of 
some great neutral power, the army of the enemy has but 

Fig. 1. d 




one line of retreat left, viz., c d. We may choose ab ov ao 
for our base. In choosing a b, the enemy's army wonld 
always have its retreat to c d free ; but in choosing a c, we 
may advance from i^to F', cut the army A from its commu- 
nications, and force it into the corner b, where it would be 
obliged to surrender. The campaign of 1806 may serve as 
an illustration: b d, in this case, represents the North Sea; 
a b the Rhine, a c the Maine, and c d the Elbe ; c d was the 
only retreat for the Prussian army A^ The French army F 
advanced from F to F', defeated the Prussian army A at 



tl. 



LINES OF OPERATION. 13 

Jena, and threw it back on the North Sea, where the rem- 
nant of it surrendered. 

Or if a 6 is our base, and -^'S- 2. 

c d that of the enemy, we 
might advance from in to c _---'''' 

without fear of being driven ^,,-- 
from our communications, 
while the enemy would even 
be endangered by advancing 
on the straight line m n, be- 
cause we would always be 
able to retreat to a ; but the 
enemy having only a small 

base, will expose his own communications as soon as he 
tries to act on ours. 

Lines of Communication are called the lines or roads 
joining us with our base, or to another army co-operating 
with us on the same theater of war. 

Lines of Operation. — If the choice of the base of opera- 
tion is of importance, that of the line of operation is still 
more so. We call line of operation the main road or direc- 
tion which is followed by the principal body of the army. 
If there is but one army on the same frontier, the line will 
be simple ; if there are two armies, there will be a double 
line of operation. 

The interior line of operation is the line which two or 
more armies would follow, if attacked from different sides 
by different armies, but so that they would be enabled to 
unite before the various corps of the enemy could do so. 

2* 



14 



PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 



The way from a to h, in Fig. 3, would be the interior line ; 
the way from c to d, the exterior line. 

We call the lines of two or more 

Fig- 3. armies or army corps, starting from 

^ l^:^ distant points and meeting together 



1> 



Fig. 4. 



in one, concentric lines. (See Fig. 
4.) Divergent lines leave one point 
to arrive at two or three distant 
points. If leaving a, ah and a c 
are divergent lines ; if h and c, they 
are concentric ones. 

If an army is placed between two 
hostile armies, so that it can defeat 
either of them before they are able 
to effect a junction, its position is 
called a central one. 

Besides the definitions already 
given, we call strategic points and 
lines all such points and lines on 
the theater of war the occupation of which may be of im- 
portance during the war. 

We call lines of defense all those lines which we choose 
for defense, or which by the natural configuration of the 
ground admits of an easy defense. It is evident that the 
line must be a strategic one — that is, it must be so situated 
that by its occupation we prevent the enemy attaining his 
object. 

Each theater of war can be divided into the three zones 
— right, left, and center. 




OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. 15 

As general maxims of strategy, we may enumerate the 
following : — 

1. To turn to the best advantage the respective directions 
of our base of operation and that of the enemy. 

2. To choose the one of the three zones of the theater 
of war on which we can cause the greatest disasters to the 
enemy with the least risk to ourselves. 

3. In order to well direct the lines of operation in de- 
fense as well as in attack, the interior lines are always to be 
adopted. In defense, these lines ought to be concentric ; in 
attack, which is just the reverse, they ought to be divergent. 

4. No. 3 implies that we ought to choose our lines so 
that we can always unite our divisions before the enemy 
can unite his, and that with our united force we ought to 
beat him in detail. 

5.' To act with the utmost activity and speed. 

It remains to be shown how these rules are to be applied 
to oflFensive and to defensive operations. 

Offensive Operations. — Whatever be the geographical 
configuration of the theater of war, it can be divided into 
three zones — right, left, and center — as we have already 
seen ; but a choice is to be made as to which of the three 
zones is to be the scene of operations. 

Circumstances may be such that one, two, or even all 
three zones may be employed: in the first case, we should 
have a simple line ; in the two others, several lines of 
operation. 

1st. If there is but one line, two cases may occur — either 
that the enemy occupies a very extended line, or that he 
liolds" a concentrated position. In the first case, the most 



16 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

advantageous point to act on is the center, which we should 
break with our whole force, and then defeat each of the 
wings separately. 

In 1796 Napoleon, when opposed to Beaulieu, whose 
line was extended from Genoa to Ceva, broke through the 
center of the Austro-Sardinian army at Montenotte, with 
his entire force, and then defeated the two wings, one after 
the other, in the engagements of Milesimo, Dego, and 
Mondovi. 

In 1809, when opposed to the Archduke Charles, whose 
army also formed a very extended line, he acted in a simi- 
lar way, and defeated successively the Austrian forces in the 
battles of Abensberg, Landshut, Eckmiihl, and Ratisbon, 

In the second case, if the enemy keep his forces con- 
centrated, the manoeuvre against his center is rendered im- 
possible, or at least disadvantageous, and we should then 
see if au attack on one of the other two zones does not 
present the chance of our acting at once on the enemy's 
communications, without endangering our own. 

Figures 1 and 2 will show how this is possible. When 
once on the enemy's communications, we cut off his line of 
retreat ; to return to his base he is obliged to force his way 
with the bayonet ; if he fails in this attempt and is defeated, 
he will be forced to surrender. Examples of such operations 
are to be found in the campaigns of 1800, 1805, and 1806. 
In 1805 Mack, with an Austrian army, near Ulm, was 
turned by Napoleon and obliged to capitulate. This result 
was obtained in consequence of the position and extension 
of the two bases of operation. Fig. 2 will explain this, 
by supposing that a b forms the base of the French, and 



OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. 17 

that they advance from a to n, and that they cut the Aus- 
trian army, which has advanced in the direction of m, from 
its base c d. The case of the campaign of 1806 is ex- 
plained under the head of base of operation, illustrating the 
meaning of Fig. 1. 

Should the enemy, however, maintain such a position 
that neither the manoeuvres against his center nor against 
his communications are possible, it will be necessary to 
resort to stratagems which shall induce him to make wrong 
movements, divide his troops, extend his lines, etc. For 
instance, we may give our whole army such a position, or 
we may, before the commencement of operations, place the 
several corps of our army in such a manner that they can 
act with the same facility against two or more points very 
distant from each other. The enemy is thus obliged to 
divide his force, and our first position must be chosen so 
that we may, by a few hidden and forced marches, unite 
our whole army on the decisive point; having carried 
which, we can then defeat the enemy in detail. 

2d. If we form two lines of operation, we should follow 
divergent lines — that is, we should place our armies be- 
tween thos^ of the enemy, and transport our main body 
alternately from one army to the other. The enemy's 
armies being isolated, cannot unite, and must fall under the 
blows of our superior force. 

The plan of the campaign of 1800, as devised by Na- 
poleon, is the finest example of this that can be offered. 

Melas, with a large army in Italy, had arrived at a short 
distance from the French frontier; Kray, with another 
army, threatened the Rhine. Moreau, near Basle, was to act 



18 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

against Kray, and the reserve army, disposed on the Swiss 
frontier, was to act in Italy. Napoleon's plan was for 
Moreau to pass through Switzerland, cross the Rhine at 
Shaffhausen, cut oflf Kray from his communications, and 
thereby destroy his army, while Napoleon himself crossed 
the Alps by the passes of the Great St. Bernard, Simplon, 
St. Gothard, and Spliigen, and arrived in the rear of Melas. 
Moreau did not entirely conform to Napoleon's plan ; he 
crossed the Rhine near Basle, where he was already in pos- 
session of a tete-de-pont, and, therefore, the campaign in 
Germany was not so decisive as that in Italy. Melas found 
himself turned, and was obliged to fight at Marengo, front 
against Austria; he was defeated, and consequently com- 
pelled to enter into a convention with Napoleon, by which 
the latter obtained the western portion of Italy as far as the 
Mincio. The battle of Marengo, and indeed the whole of 
Napoleon's manoeuvres, took place only after he had received 
a reinforcement of fifteen thousand men from Moreau. 

Defensive Operations. — We may act on the offensive 
even though the war be a defensive one for us. This will 
always be the case when we are ready to take the field be- 
fore the enemy can; or when his dispositions are faulty, 
his army corps dispersed, etc., or when our numerical 
superiority is very great. The initiative is always advan- 
tageous, and the defensive only should be taken in case of 
inferiority in strength. 

The defense, as well as the offensive, can act on simple 
or on several lines of operation ; the plan of it is always 
more or less intimately connected with the configuration 
of the ground than that of the attack. In the defense, the 



DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS. 19 

natural or artificial obstacles of the country should supply 
the deficiency of men, either in strategical or in tactical 
operations. When acting on simple lines, and opposed 
only to one army, but that one superior, our own army 
should retreat, availing itself of all the natural obstacles of 
the theater of the war, such as rivers, mountains, etc.; it 
should organize small bodies for acting in the rear of the 
advancing enemy to endanger his convoys, and force him 
to send large detachments to cover them. 

In making those detachments, the invading army becomes 
smaller the farther it advances, while, on the other hand, the 
defending army generally becomes stronger the nearer it ap- 
proaches the center of its country. If by this the difference 
in force is decreased^ and the chances rendered more equal, 
the army for the defense should pass to a vigorous offensive, 
either by uuexpectedly attacking the enemy, or by awaiting 
him in a well chosen and strongly fortified position. 

The campaign of 1812 is a fine example of such a defense. 
Napoleon entered Russia with 450,000 men. The Rus.sian 
army retreated, defending only the town of Smolensk. Owing 
to the many corps Napoleon was obliged to leave behind to 
cover his communications, and to the losses already sus- 
tained, he arrived at Borodino with only 132,000 men. The 
Russians awaited him there with in,000 men, in a partly 
fortified position. What was impossible against an army 
of 450,000 men could be tried against one of 132,000. 

When the enemy has chosen two lines of operation, we 
may be inclined to take but one line of operation, and bring 
our army into a central position between his armies; so as to 
fall with our whole force on the first of his corps that pre- 



20 PRINCIPLES OF STRATKGY. 

sents itself, and then defeat the other. At tlie siege of 
Mantua, in 1196, Napoleon, being informed that Wurmser, 
who had advanced from the Tyrol against him, had divided 
his forces and was descending one bank of the Lake of 
Garda with his main body, while Quasdanowitch was de- 
scending the other, raised the siege of Mantua, advanced 
and stationed himself at one end of the lake, thereby gain- 
ing a central position, and, separating Wurmser from Quas- 
danowitch, the latter was defeated at Lonato and the former 
at Castiglione. 

When obliged to form several lines of operation, we 
should arrange them in the following manner : — 

If, for instance, 100,000 men are to resist an invading 
army of 150,000, divided into three armies of 50,000 each, 
we should divide our force also. We form three corps of 
observation, each numbering 15,000 men. We keep the re- 
maining 55,000 in reserve, and transport them successively, 
by interior lines and forced marches, to the three army corps, 
and form every time a large army of 10,000 men, who should 
defeat the 50,000 opposed to them. The two remaining 
corps of observation, if pressed by their opponents, retreat, 
defending every inch of ground, but refusing open battle, 
till they are in turn reinforced by the reserve. In those 
cases the defense loses ground, but soon regains it. 

If the enemy has formed double lines of operation very 
distant from each other, we should also form two lines, and 
retreat on concentric ones ; when we arrive at such points 
that our armies are only a few days' march distant from each 
other, we should leave a corps of observation before one of 
tke enemy's armies, in order to mask our movements, and, 



DEFENt^IVE OPERATIONS. 21 

with our main body, reach by forced marches our other 
army, unite with it, and defeat the enemy by our superi- 
ority; we then return to the first army, the fate of which 
will not rema;in long undecided. 

In 1796 the Archduke Charles, in Germany, defeated the 
armies of Jourdan and Moreau by retreating in concentric 
lines from the Rhine to the Bohemian frontier, where he 
united part of his two armies ; he first defeated Jourdan 
at Amberg and Wurzburg, and then Moreau at Emmen- 
dingen and Schlingen. 

During the war of 1T58-1162, Frederick the Great was 
attacked by a Russian, Austrian, and German imperial army. 
He resisted those three armies by disposing his own on in- 
terior lines. He always transported the mass of his troops 
to the endangered point by means of those interior lines, 
and defeated the different hostile armies one after the other. 

In the years 1813 and 1814 Napoleon, in his defense, 
likewise acted on interior lines. 

These different rules have reference only to the movements 
and operations of one or more armies when once in the field, 
but they do not give the great ensemble of a war, nor do they 
reflect any light on the manner in which wars of a different 
character are to be conducted. The entire plan of a cam- 
paign would be different if the war were a civil one, a re- 
ligious one, a distant conquest, or an invasion. There is but 
little resemblance between the campaigns of 1806 and those 
of the Peninsular war, though both were wars of conquest. 
The configuration of the theater of war, the character of the 
people, their government, and political circumstances being 
different, other means and plans became necessary. Wars of 

3 



22 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

.conquest and occupation being those which at the present 
moment interest us most, we will devote a few pages to 
them, and see how they have been carried on at different 
times by great captains. 

Wars of Conquest, or Great Invasions. — The manner 
of making war, or even of conducting great invasions, has 
passed through various stages in the course of time. 

Most of the wars recorded in ancient history were wars of 
conquest, in which entire populations were launched against 
others. Yery early, however, we find the commencement of 
military organization, and even standing armies. By-and-by 
more and more complete systems were introduced. In the 
classic times of Greece, those of Philip of Macedon, and of 
his great son, Alexander, in the times when the Roman eagle 
began to spread its powerful wings over the then known 
world, the art of war attained to a perfection which has been 
surpassed only in modern times ; and even the great masters 
of the art in later ages sought for wisdom and instruction 
in the deeds of the illustrious captains of antiquity. 

The degeneracy of the Roman empire, the immense emi- 
gration of uncivilized hordes, the overthrow of Roman 
civilization, soon brought the art of war back to its child- 
hood. In the time of the Crusades it is distinguished prin- 
cipally by the employment of large masses of combatants 
and brute force, which sometimes attains success, though 
void of art or skill. 

All the great States of Europe, held by kings or empe- 
rors, were divided into a number of principalities, large or 
small, governed by petty chieftains, on whose good-will 
the chief rulers were more or less dependent. The conse- 



WARS OF CONQUEST, OR GREAT INVASIONS. 23 

quence was, that all the governments of Europe were so 
much occupied in preserving internal order, that great in- 
vasions became almost impossible. 

The times of Charles V., Francis IL, and Henry IV. re- 
vived the art of war, and we see great captains appearing 
on the stage ; but the political systems and circumstances of 
Europe did not change. In the times of Louis XIY. and 
Louis XV. we find wars, even by great captains, conducted 
in a slow and methodical manner, whence it was called 
"methodic warfare." Armies at that time lived in tents, 
camped, had vast magazines around and near them, and 
could not exist without an immense bakery close to their 
heels. 

This was the state of affairs at the commencement of the 
French Revolution ; but here the revolution made itself felt 
also. Immense armies being created, for which scarcely the 
necessary armament could be found, still less tents, camp 
equipage, and provision trains, it became necessary to 
quarter these armies in the towns and villages, in order to 
shelter and nourish them, and subsist them on the inhabit- 
ants. Movement was not only rendered easier by this sys- 
tem, but became a necessity, as no district could nourish for 
any length of time so great an accumulation of men. Con- 
sequently methodic warfare changed at once to rapid, daring 
marches, and manoeuvres on a grand scale. The old indis- 
pensable bakery gave way to the famous Roman maxim, 
"War must nourish war." 

The adoption of this great principle changed, as by magic, 
the entire system of warfare. Armies which had hitherto 
marched only five or six miles a day, now marched twenty 



24 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

or twenty-five. Where small operations, such as the taking 
of a fortress, or the conquest of a province, had satisfied the 
ambition of a general, we now see armies made to traverse 
hundreds of miles, and push right into the heart of an 
enemy's country. , 

Campaigns became more extended and more decisive. In 
a word, the reins were loosed, and intelligence, courage, 
enterprise, youth, and vigor were launched, without re- 
straint, against the enemy. The system of quartering or 
living on the inhabitants of the land forms the basis of all 
great wars of conquest or Invasion ; unless it be adopted, it 
is impossible to conquer an extensive country possessing 
large and organized armies. 

Let us draw a comparison between the efficiency of two 
armies — the one acting according to the principles of me- 
thodic warfare, and being furnished continually from its base 
of supply and its magazines, the other acting according to 
the principle, "War must nourish war." 

In the first case, provisions for several days must always 
be carried with the army ; immense supply trains have to 
follow ft J bad roads — which would, however, have sufficed 
for the passage of troops — become impassable, in conse- 
quence of the transit of the immense number of heavily- 
laden wagons. Everywhere there is stoppage in the ad- 
vance and starting of troops, obstruction of roads, delay, 
and disorder. As soon as the provisions in the wagons are 
consumed, or nearly so, the army halts. With immense 
trouble and cost, a fresh supply of provisions is obtained after 
a number of days ; the army starts anew, but only to come 



WARS OP CONQUEST, OR GREAT INVASIONS. 25 

to another halt as soon as its wagons are emptied again. 
But, then, another difficulty arises; the army is already so 
far from its base that the supply by wagons becomes impos- 
sible; the number of days the wagons require to be en route 
is too great; and in the mean time the army runs the risk 
of perishing from hunger. The consequence is, that an 
operation, whatever may be its strategic advantages, cannot 
be carried out, if it does not offer extraordinary means of 
communication with the base of supply ; and it follows that, 
instead of choosing the most advantageous strategic lines as 
lines of operation, the most comfortable and convenient lines 
^f communication are selected as the principal strategic 
direction to be given to the armies. In other words, the 
quartermaster and the commissary are in reality the com- 
manders. The army cannot march where they forbid, nor 
can it move until they are ready or want to be so. 

It is scarcely necessary to remark that, in consequence of 
the slow marching and the frequent halts in order to main- 
tain the supply of provisions, the enemy gains ample time 
to prevent the success of any plan of operation, not to men- 
tion the inducement which such large wagon trains offer for 
cavalry raids in the rear of the army. Do away with this 
system of feeding the troops, and movement will become a 
necessity ; the most advantageous strategic lines of operation 
can be chosen ; there is no stoppage, except by the enemy ; 
but this resistance is, under such circumstances, such. as a 
general would desire. In other words, all that is impossible 
when following the old system, becomes possible with the 
new. Where two men can plant their feet, an army can 

3* 



26 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

march ; and instead of months of operations, the campaign 
will take only as many weeks, or perhaps days. 

I do nor wish to advocate here a system of great and 
legally-organized robbery, which takes from the country- 
man all he has without any indemnification. I advocate 
only a reasonable and well-organized system of requisition, 
paying liberally for all it obtains, but furnishing the 
army with all the principal provisions from the country 
through which it passes. The greater the distance an 
army marches in one day, the more plentifully it may be 
supplied. 

All wars of invasion or conquest, from the earliest times 
down to the most modern — from the Romans to Napoleon — 
were based upon, and rendered possible by, this principle 
alone. Successful wars of conquest are therefore synony- 
mous with rapid and energetic operations. Let us pass in 
review some of the principal. 

Conquering a country, means successfully fighting its de- 
fenders ; subduing a country, means occupying it. Fight- 
ing means concentration, occupying means division of forces. 
Here is evidently the difficulty of wars of conquest. As 
long as only the army of the invaded country takes part in 
the struggle, an occupation is scarcely necessary till this 
army is reaJly destroyed ; but the moment the war against 
the invader becomes national, and the population takes part 
in it, matters become different and more difficult. In this 
latter case, the operating or field army should not be reduced 
by detachments, but the troops necessary for the occupa- 
tion should be sent from the base of operations. 



WARS OF CONQUEST, OR GREAT INVASIONS. 2t 

Three systems have been principally employed for the 
conquest of a country. The first, is to march several 
armies from the circumference into the center of a country ; 
the second, is to conquer it by subduing and occupying one 
province after another; the third, is by marching one large 
force, on a single line of operation, right into the center of 
a country, and when arrived there, spreading it out in all 
directions, like a fan, forming interior lines, dividing th'ereby 
the enemy, and forcing him to act on exterior lines. It is 
the very inverse of the first system. 

The first system, viz., that of acting with several armies 
from the circuhiference against the center of a country, has 
been spoken of above in treating of offensive and defensive 
operations. We have seen that, though each of the invad- 
ing armies may be stronger than the one opposed to it, the 
defense has the advantage ; because it acts on interior lines, 
and can unite its forces before the invading armies can 
unite theirs on the exterior lines, on which they are obliged 
to act. 

The campaigns already mentioned of Frederick the Great 
—those of 1193, of IT 96 in Germany, and of 1814— show- 
to what disasters such concentric operations may conduct. 
However, it would be wrong to reject this system entirely; 
there are several cases in which it may be used with advan- 
tage. There is no danger in having several lines of opera- 
tions in the three following cases : '1st. When each of the 
invading armies is equal in number to the whole defending 
force. 2d. When the invading armies are very large, so 
that the whole of them could not operate on one line, as 



28 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

was the case in 1813, in the campaign in Saxony against 
Napoleon. 3d. When the power attacked has no regular 
military system, and is not far advanced in the art of war. 

The second system, that of conquering one province after 
another, is slow but sure. It was the great maxim followed 
by the Roman republic, and is identical in principle with 
that of dividing the enemy's forces and acting with the 
wholS of our force against every one of its divisions sepa- 
rately. The conquered province is organized, receives an 
administration from the conqueror, and serves as a base of 
operation against the next or adjacent province. 

This system, however, is generally only possible against 
States or people not well united, and suflFering from inter- 
nal dissensions. Napoleon made frequent use of it too; 
his kingdoms of Westphalia and of Italy, and the organ- 
ization of the Rhine Bund, were applications of the Roman 
system of conquest, only executed in a much shorter time 
than was usual with the Romans. The only defense against 
such a system is the perfect union of all parts of a nation, 
and the full determination to resist the invader and every 
infraction of the country's rights. 

The third and last system is evidently the most scientific, 
and best suited for rapid and decisive invasions. It was 
used by Cesar in his Gallic war, and by Napoleon in most 
of his continental invasions. It consisted in concentrating 
for the battle and dividing after it, so as to destroy all 
smaller resisting armies and complete the victory. The 
following is the plan of operations : — 

The army, in one compact mass, enters the enemy's coun- 



WARS OP CONQUEST, OR GREAT INVASIONS. 29 

try, where it at first finds resistance. This, by the great 
superiority of numbers, is overpowered; the road into the 
heart of the invaded country is thrown open ; the victorious 
army follows it with impetuosity; and, arrived in the center 
of the theater of War, fills up the whole area by spreading 
out in all directions. All local resistance is broken; the 
smaller army corps of the invaded country, being pushed 
back in all directions, and separated from each other by 
the heavy mass of the ' enemy's forces acting on interior 
lines, cannot offer any resistance of moment; and thus a 
country, rich in all kinds of resources, may be obliged to 
make an ignominious peace with an enemy more skillful, 
bat not stronger than itself. 

The campaigns of 1805, 1806, and 1809, and also the 
campaigns of 1808 in the Peninsular war, are models for 
similar invasions. The ultimate success of those plans is 
founded on a first great victory obtained by rapid and un- 
expected manoeuvres. The defense against an attack so 
directed may be of two kinds, either of which may be 
adopted according to circumstances. In both cases, the 
grand necessity is to avoid a first disaster. 

The campaign of 1812 is an example of one of those cases 
of defense. The defensive army retreats, being continually 
reinforced; the invading army, by advancing, is propor- 
tionally weakened. When an equality or superiority of 
force has been obtained, the defense passes to the offensive; 
and the greater the effort of the invading army at first — 
that is, the longer the line of operation, and consequently 
its line of retreat — the surer will be its total destruction. 



30 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

The retreat from Moscow is a proof of this. In 1809 Na- 
poleon, in the first onset, obtained but a partial success — 
that is, instead of destroying, he only defeated the armies 
of the Archduke Charles in the battles of Landshut, Eek- 
miihl, and Ratisbon. The bloody check he received a short 
time afterward at Esslingen was the consequence of this 
imperfect success. Had Napoleon, in the Russian cam- 
paign, been able to destroy the Russian army at first — and 
he tried hard to do so — the disasters of Krasnoi and the 
Beresina would not have happened. 

*A11 countries do not ofi'er the facility of retreating in- 
definitely, like that possessed by Russia. Those that do 
not, must have recourse to other means. The surest is an 
extended system of fortifications similar to the famous Aus- 
trian quadrilateral in Italy. Fortifications forming double 
tetes-de-pont are points of strategic importance; and form- 
ing at the same time large intrenched camps, they cannot 
be passed or taken in a hurry by an invading army. The 
defending army, basing itself on one or other of these for- 
tifications, can attack the front, flank, and rear of the in- 
vaders. Large corps of observation must be left before 
these works, or a regular siege must" be undertaken. Time 
is gained, and this is what the defense principally requires, 
in order to collect its means and to commence offensive 
operations against the invading army, for which this system 
of fortification, as well as the necessitated division of the 
enemy, oflFers the best chance of success. As already said, 
in operating on this plan, a first disaster must be avoided, 
as well "as in the case mentioned before. 



WARS OF CONQUEST, OR GREAT INVASIONS. 31 

All these invasive wars are, or ought to be, undertaken 
by greatly superior armies. Brilliant manoeuvres, like those 
of Jena and Ulm, were only executed with vastly superior 
numbers. In general, there exists a relation between the 
extent of a country, its geographical features, and the num- 
ber of troops necessary to invade it, or, at least, to render 
strategic operations successful. The larger and flatter a 
country is, the less marked features it possesses ; the greater 
the number of roads passing through it in all directions, 
the less applicability will the maxims of strategy have. 

In his campaigns in Russia, we see Napoleon continually 
baffled in his strenuous and repeated efforts to capture or 
destroy even a part of the Russian army, though his army 
was immense — not less than 450,000 men. The country 
was still greater ; Russian and French columns passed and 
repassed each other without being informed of it till too 
late. In Spain we find similar effects arising from similar 
causes. In Italy, on the contrary, nearly every operation 
was a success ; the reason being that the roads were com- 
paratively few, the theater of operations limited, and the 
strategic features of the country remarkable. 

We might enumerate many campaigns whose failure is 
attributable to the fact that the number of troops was in- 
sufficient for the extent of the theater of war. The Rus- 
sian and Peninsular campaigns are of the number; so are 
the campaigns of the English in America. 

The number of troops depends not only upon the extent 
and the geography of the country, but also upon the more 
or less warlike character of the population, political influ- 



32 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. * 

ence, etc. As a general rule, I believe it may be laid down 
that, for a great invasion, the front of operation should ex- 
tend entirely over at least one zone of the theater of war; 
and in this front, the different columns of march should be 
at proper supporting distance from each other. — (See Lo- 
gistics, pages 1'73-182, "Summary of the Art of War.") 

After having passed in review the geographical features 
of the Southern Confederacy, we will apply the different 
principles, maxims, and rules just laid down to the present 
war; and thereby give a more exact idea of the mode in 
which wars of conquest ought to be conducted. 



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GEOGRAPHY OF THE SOUTUEllN CONFEDERACY. 



II- 

GEOGRAPHY OF THE SOUTHERN 
CONFEDERACY. 

The Southern Confederacy, at the outbreak of the war, 
consisted of the States of Yirginia, North and South Caro- 
lina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. 

The principal boundaries were, on the east, the ocean; 
on the south, the Gulf of Mexico ; on the west, Mexico, 
and the Territories ; and on the north, the Ohio and the 
Potomac. The Mississippi, in its upper course, formed the 
line of separation between Missouri and Hlinois. 

Those boundaries inclose an immense tract of land, and, 
at first, one is at a loss to determine ^t which point to at- 
tack the colossus. Strategy, for its appliance, however, 
demands an analysis of the country similar to that which 
the surgeon undertakes of a limb for his anatomical studies, 
or a chemist of a mineral substance. All that seems com- 
plicated is, by such an analysis, divided and separated into 
its elements ; and the confusion which the ensemble at first 
creates in our mind passes away and gives place to more 
enlightened and properly digested views. 

The great features of a country are furnished by its bound- 
aries, and by the form and direction of its mountain chains 

4 



34 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY, 

and its rivers. Those three elements combined generally 
determine the direction of the principal lines of communi- 
cation as well as the situation of the chief centers of pop- 
ulation. 

We have already seen that every country or theater of 
war can be divided into three distinct zones — right, left, 
and center. In most cases the natural lines of separation of 
these three zones are strongly marked. One of them always 
offers greater strategical advantages than the other two, and 
we should, therefore, select it to carry on operations in. 

Considering then this zone as a theater of war by itself, 
it may in its turn be subdivided into right, left, and center 
zones. Let us in this way divide the Southern Confederacy 
and see what we obtain. 

Looking at it from north to south, we detect at once 
some prominent features. To the right we see the Missis- 
sippi dividing it and separating a large part from the main 
body of it. To the left we remark a long mountain chain 
separating the country this side of the Mississippi into two 
parts. 

The country beyond the Mississippi, composed principally 
of Missouri, Arkansas, and Louisiana, forms the Right Zone 
of the whole theater of war. The large river separating it 
from the rest of the Confederacy renders communication 
with this latter difiBcult, and may even interrupt military 
operations entirely. 

The country east of the above-mentioned mountain chains, 
called the Blue Ridge and the Alleghanies, forms the Left 
Zone. It is principally composed of Virginia, North Caro- 
lina, and South Carolina. The mountains form the north- 



GEOGRAPHY OP THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 35 

west boundary, the Potomac the northeast, the Savannah 
the southwest, and the ocean the southeast boundary of 
this zone. 

Finally, the country between the right and the left zone 
forms the Center Zone of the theater of war. It is com- 
posed of Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, 
Georgia, and Florida ; its boundaries are the Ohio, the 
Mississippi, the Gulf of Mexico, the ocean, and the Savan- 
nah River. 

» 

We have to consider these three zones in detail. 

Left Zone. — This zone forms a kind of quadrangle, two 
sides of which are formed by the Savannah River and the 
Potomac line from Harper's Ferry to Cape Hatteras. The 
other two sides are formed, the one by the coast from Cape 
Hatteras to the mouth of the Savannah, the other by the 
mountains from Harper's Ferry to Pickens. 

This zone is about 400 miles long," and about 250 wide. 

The direction of the two long sides of the quadrangle, 
that is of the coast and the mountains, is from northeast to 
southwest. 

Mountains. — The mountains which form the boundary of 
this zone are part of the long mountain chain passing nearly 
through the whole of the northern continent. Commencing 
at Montreal and Quebec, they run in a nearly continuous 
chain from northeast to southwest as far as the north of 
Georgia; there they change their course, taking a direction 
from east to west, and falling gradually as they approach 
the Mississippi. 

The characteristic of this mountain chain is that it is 
formed by a number of long and parallel ridges ; there are, 



36 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

comparatively, very few offshoots having a course at right 
angles to the main direction. 

These parallel Tidges are very numerous in the north of 
Yirginia. Some of them form between them wide and fer- 
tile valleys. In the south of Virginia and the east of Ten- 
nessee they become fewer and approach each other nearer, 
forming thereby long and narrow valleys. 

Most of these valleys are watered by rivers, nearly all of 
which are rapid ; many of them rapid and deep, as, for in- 
stance, the Shenandoah, the Upper James River, the Hol- 
ston, etc. etc. 

The communications from one valley to another, over the 
mountains, are few, and generally difficult. There are, how- 
ever, a number of roads by which one can pass from West- 
ern Yirginia into Eastern Virginia or North Carolina. 

The most important and most continuous of these ridges 
is the chain which, under the name of Loudon Heights, Blue 
Kidge, etc., runs nearly without interruption from one end 
of the left zone to the other. West of this chain is a large 
number of parallel chains ; east of it is one range more, 
commencing with the Kittoctan Mountains on the Potomac, 
and having its termination in the Bull Run Mountains, Pig 
Nut Mountains, Southwest Mountains, Carter's Mountains, 
Buffalo Ridge, etc. etc. 

The number of gaps in Blue Ridge Mountain is small ; 
the principal ones are Vestal, Snicker's, Ashliy's, Manassas, 
Chester, Thornton's, Swift Run, Simon's, Brown's, Rockfish, 
White's, Robenton's, Petit's, Bufford's, Daniel's Run, etc. 
etc. The eastern ridge, being formed by the isolated hills 
or ridges above named, has as many gaps as there are 



GEOGRAPHY OP THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 3^ 

ridges. With the exception of Thoroughfare Gap, in Bull 
Run Mountains, there is no other worth mentioning. 

Of the valleys formed by these mountains three are of 
great importance. First, the Shenandoah valley; then, the 
valley formed by Blue Ridge and the Eastern Mountains, 
commencing with Loudon valley and going down as far as 
Lynchburg; and, thirdly, the valley in which the railroad 
from Lynchburg to Chattanooga is laid down. 

The greater portion of the country in this zone is hilly, 
with the exception of the districts near the sea-shore, where 
large plains and swamps are to be found. 

Rivers. — Besides the Shenandoah, there are some smaller 
streams situated in the valleys parallel to the Shenandoah 
valley. Those in North Virginia are tributaries of the 
Potomac; they are, with the exception of the Shenandoah, 
of little importance. The upper part of the James River 
runs for a certain length in the valleys behind Blue Ridge, 
and so does the higher part of the Roanoke. The rivers in 
the valleys of South Yirginia take a southwesterly course ; 
they are tributaries of the Tennessee River. 

All the other rivers having their rise in the mountains 
have a course more or less parallel to the Potomac ; that is 
to say, running from the mountains nearly direct to the sea 
in a direction parallel to the two smaller sides of the quad- 
rangle forming the left zone. Most of these rivers form at 
their mouths long and deep bays, some of them penetrating 
for eighty or more miles into the interior of the country. 
The Potomac, the Rappahannock, the York, and the James 
Rivers, Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds and Port Royal en- 
trance, deserve to be mentioned. These bays offer to ships- 

4* 



38 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

of-war and transports great facilities for penetrating into 
the interior, and may be advantageously made use of in 
military operations. 

The principal rivers, beginning with the north, are — 

1. The Potomac — navigable for the heaviest kinds of ships 
as far as Alexandria, and for somewhat lighter ships up to 
Washington. Above Washington it is fordable in several 
places. From Washington to Harper's Ferry the Poto- 
mac averages several hundred yards in width. ^The banks 
are generally hilly. 

2. Bull Run — already notorious in the history of this 
war. This river is, in the dry season, passable in most 
places, but it may, nevertheless, serve as a defensive line 
against an enemy coming from the north, and has already 
been used as* such. It rises in the Bull Run Mountains, 
and its whole course is about forty miles, but the lower 
part assumes somewhat of the character of a bay, and is, 
therefore, difficult to cross. 

3. The Bap2Mhan7iock takes its rise in the Blue Ridge 
Mountains; it has a total length of about one hundred and 
thirty miles, of which, however, about seventy are to be con- 
sidered as a bay. The river is navigable up to Fredericks- 
burg. Ten miles above it divides, and is called the Hedge- 
man River and the Rapidan ; both are fordable at a great 
many points, and trestle bridges may be constructed at 
nearly any point without much difficulty. The banks are 
hilly, and at some parts are so even to the v/ater's edge, 
but in other parts leaving plains between the river and 
the ascent. Some excellent defensive positions are to be 
found, as, for instance, those near Fredericksburg. 



GEOGRAPHY OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 39 

4. The York River — navigable up to West Point; there 
it divides into the Mattapony River and the Pamunkey River, 
which latter, in its turn, is formed by the junction of the 
North Anna River and the South Anna River, The entire 
length of the whole water-course is about one hundred and 
twenty miles. The springs are situated in the Southwest 
Mountains. All three rivers are available for defense. 

5. The Chickahominy. — An army coming from Fred- 
ericksburg, and marching to Richmond, would have to cross 
this little creek, which has already obtained great celebrity 
in the campaign of the past summer. Its swampy banks 
and moving ground render the construction of bridges a 
matter of great difficulty. 

6. The James River is a large river, navigable up to 
Richmond. Its course is about four hundred miles. It 
cuts through the Blue Ridge, and rises in one of the west- 
ern ridges. The banks are very hilly, and may be easily 
defended. The James River and the York River, this 
last and the Rappahannock, and this again with the Poto- 
mac, form three large peninsulas, about fifty miles long 
and ten to twenty miles wide. From Richmond to City 
Point, about eighteen miles in a straight line, the James 
River has a nearly southern course. At City Point 

*l. The Appomattox River empties into the James River. 
The Appomattox is navigable up to Petersburg ; its course 
is parallel to that of the James River, has a length of about 
one hundred miles, and rises near Clover Hill. 

8. The Chowan River divides into the Nottaway River 
and the Meherin River ; its whole course amounts to about 
one hundred and twenty miles. The Chowan River empties 
into Albemarle Sound. 



40 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY, 

9. The Roanoke, a considerable river, is formed by the 
junction of the Dan and the Staunton Rivers, both rapid 
mountain streams ; the former rises in Blue Ridge, the lat- 
ter in North Mountain. The entire course of the Roanoke 
is about 300 miles ; it empties into Albemarle Sound, and 
is navigable for Sound craft as far as thirty miles, and for 
boats still farther up. 

10. The Tar River empties into Pamlico Sound. 

11. The Neuse River empties into Pamlico Sound, 
has a length of about 180 miles. Navigable up to New- 
bern. 

12. The Cape Fear River empties, near Wilmington, 
into the ocean; the depth of water at the bar is from 
twelve to fifteen feet. The length of its course is about 
280 miles. Its course is much more southerly than that of 
the James River. 

13. The Great Pedee River empties, near Georgetown, 
in Wingaw Bay. Its course is nearly north to south, and 
its length about 380 miles. It is navigable by steam-boats 
up to Cheraw ; above this place there is a fall of fifteen feet 
in eighteen miles. 

14. The Santee River is formed by the junction of the 
Catawba and Congaree. The length of its course is about 
400 miles. Steam-boats ascend as far as Camden and Co- 
lumbia ; and by means of canal-boats navigation is carried 
on up to the mountains. It has very swampy banks, and 
empties, near the Great Pedee, into the ocean. 

15. The Edisto River empties near Charleston. Its 
length is about 200 miles. 

16. The Savannah empties into Tybee Sound. The 



GEOGaAPHY OP THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 41 

length of its course is over 400 miles. The direction of its 
course is from northwest to southeast. It rises in the 
mountains .of North Carolina, and is formed by the junc- 
tion of two branches. It is navigable for steamers up to 
Augusta, and for large ships up to Savannah. 

Most of the rivers mentioned above are subject to rapid 
rising; and, in consequence of the bays which many of 
them form, the tide is felt at a great distance inland. 

It is easy to see that these rivers could be used with 
advantage as lines of defense against an enemy coming 
from the north. 

The principal towns are — 

In Virginia. — Harper's Ferry, Winchester, Staunton, 
Woodstock, Leesburg, Warrenton, Gordonsville, Lynch- 
burg, Fredericksburg, Richmond, Petersburg, Norfolk, and 
Portsmouth. 

In North Carolina. — Wilmington, Fayetteville, Raleigh, 
Newbern, Greenville, and Smithville, etc. 

In South. Carolina. — Columbiaj Charleston, Georgetown, 
Beaufort, and Pickens. 

Some of these places are of a certain strategic import- 
ance. For instance, Winchester, Gordonsville, Lynch- 
burg, Fredericksburg, Richmond, Petersburg, Wilmington, 
Charleston, and Pickens. 

Lines of Communication. — We have to distinguish those 
running parallel with the different rivers — that is to say, 
joining the mountains with the sea-shore — and those run- 
ning parallel with the mountain chains. To the first class 
belong, to a certain extent, all the navigable rivers, besides 
the railroads from — 1. Manassas to Woodstock, 60 miles. 



42 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

2. Staunton to Gordonsville, 55 miles; and to Sexton Junc- 
tion, 40 miles; total, 95 miles. 3. West Point to Richmond, 
30 miles; to Lynchburg, 112 miles; and to Chattanooga, 
420 miles, total, 5G2 miles. 4. Norfolk to Petersburg, 80 
miles; and to Lynchburg, 110 miles; total, 190. 5. Nor- 
folk to Suffolk, 20 miles ; to Weldon, 60 miles ; to Clarks- 
ville, 55 miles; and to Danville, 48 miles ; total, 173 miles. 
6. Beaufort, N. C, to Goldsborough, 90 miles ; to Raleigh, 
48 miles ; and to Greensborough, T5 miles ; total, 213 miles. 
1. Wilmington to Columbia, 180 miles ; and to Pickens, 
140 miles; 320 miles. 8. Charleston to Augusta, 120 
miles ; to Chattanooga, 300 miles ; total, 420 miles. 

Besides these railroads, there is a great number of turn- 
pikes and roads running in the same direction. The gi;eat- 
est number of these roads have for their object the uniting 
of the sea-ports with the interior of the country. 

The number of railroads passing through the country in 
a longitudinal direction is more restricted. We can only 
name those from — 1. Fredericksburg to Richmond, 60 
miles; and Wilmington, 240 miles; total, 300 miles. 2. 
Richmond to Salisbury, 220 miles ; to Columbia, 140 miles ; 
and to Charleston, 125 miles; total, 485 miles. 3. Wil- 
mington to Florence, 100 miles; and to Charleston, 110 
miles ; total, 210 miles. 4. Charleston to Savannah, 100 
miles. 5. Lynchburg to Chattanooga, 420 miles. 

Also in this direction there is no want of turnpikes and 
other roads. These roads, though bad and very different 
from a French imperial turnpike, are, nevertheless, passable 
by troops of all arms ; and as there are a great number of 
parallel roads — perhaps more than in any European coun- 



GEOGRAPHY OF THE SOUTnERN CONFEDERACY. 43 

try of equal magnitude — large armies may be moved in 
parallel columns with ease and celerity, supposing, how- 
ever, that the season is not too wet. . 

In the direction of the longitudinal roads there is one 
thing worthy of remark, and of high strategic importance. 
It is this : that most of these roads end at the sea-coast. 
The direction of the Richmond and Wilmington, or Rich- 
mond and Charleston Railroad line, for instance, is not par- ■■ 
allel with the mountain chain or the sea-coast, but cut diag- 
onally across the country. The result is, that an army placed 
at or near Lynchburg would prevent, by marching straight 
south, any Rebel army placed at Richmond and trying to 
escape, from doing so. An army moving south from Lynch- 
burg would arrive at Georgetown or Charleston ; an army 
moving south from Richmond would arrive at Wilmington. 
If both armies have moved with equal speed, the latter 
would therefore find the ^enemy established on its line of 
retreat, and itself thrown back on the sea in case of defeat. 

As a general observation, it may be said here that the 
country of this zone is suflSciently populous to sustain an 
army on its through march, if moved on parallel roads. 

After having thus passed this zone in review, let us ex- 
amine what facilities or difficulties it offers to the operations 
of a large army. To facilitate* this investigation, let us 
consider it as a theater in itself, and divide it accordingly 
into three zones — right, left, and center. 

These three zones are strongly enough marked to be dis- 
tinguished at once. Blue Ridge Mountain, with its few 
gaps, effectually separates the principal mountain district 
from the rest of the zone. All west of the Blue Ridge 



44 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

will therefore be the right zone of our restricted theater of 
war. The more eastern ridge, formed by the Kittoctan, 
Bull Run, and Southwest Mountains, separates the valley, 
running from Berlin, on the Potomac, down to Lynchburg, 
on the James River, from the eastern part of Virginia. 
This valley therefore forms the center zone. Finally, all 
east of the center zone will be contained in the left. 

Now, an army can operate in one of these three zones 
alone, or in two combined. 4-^ army operating in the 
right zone can do so by taking the Potomac as a base of 
operation, and advancing along the valleys ; or, by taking 
the Ohio as a base, and passing through Western Yir- 
giuia or Eastern Tennessee over the mountains. An army 
taking the Upper Potomac as a base of operation, and 
advancing along the valleys, would probably find little dif- 
ficulty in doing so. We have seen the whole Rebel army 
marching from Martinsburg dowji these valleys, and main- 
taining itself there for a long while. 

To use the position of this zone to advantage, the first 
necessity is evidently to have continual control of the 
mountain gaps leading into the center zone. The mount- 
ains themselves are most of them steep, rugged, and 
wooded, and can only be crossed by these gaps, which are 
easily defensible. In all parts of these valleys an army 
on a rapid march might find enough to subsist on. 

An army marching from the Ohio, as a base of operation, 
into "Virginia or North or South Carolina, would find more 
difficulties, as it would have to cross a number of parallel 
ridges, as well as to pass through districts thinly inhabited, 
and where provisions consequently are scarce. But even this 



GEOGRAPHY OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 45 

might be accomplished with an army not too large, and com- 
posed of good material, considering that the main distance 
over the mountains is not over seventy or eighty miles ; and 
ought, therefore, to be accomplished in from four to five 
days. 

An army operating in the center zone has still greater 
facilities for moving than in the right. In this zone all the 
rivers have their source, and are therefore inconsiderable, 
and do not form obstacles of any importance to an advanc- 
ing army. The possession of the gaps to the right, as well 
as to the left, is of the utmost importance ; and remember- 
ing this, it would appear that a combined movement in the 
two zones — right and center — would be most advantageous, 
considering that all the gaps would then easily fall. 

The strategic importance of Lynchburg, at the end of 
the valley forming this zone, we have already noticed, when 
speaking of the lines of communication. An array marching 
through this zone may be maintained in it, if no long halts 
be made in any particular place. A number of parallel 
roads facilitates the movement of a large army in marching 
in parallel columns. The roads are of the character already 
spoken of. 

Both right and center zones offer difficulties the moment 
the army is to be provisioned from its base of operations, 
the Potomac ; though even there arrangements may be 
made and intermediary depots created which would facili- 
tate its subsistence. 

An army operating in the left zone can operate in two 
ways : either by marching down from the Potomac — that is 
to say, taking the Potomac as the base of operation ; or by 

5 



46 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY, 

making use of the maritime facilities, and by disembarking 
a large force at any point of the coast. 

The first plan — that of marching from the Potomac down 
to the Savannah in the left zone, which is near the sea-coast — 
has this disadvantage: it offers the enemy all strategical 
and tactical advantages ; the fifteen rivers to be crossed are 
so many lines of defense. On the other hand, the deep and 
large bays facilitating navigation in this zone, would facili- 
tate the provisioning of an army. 

The second plan — that of disembarking a large force ou 
any point of the coast — would experience, in a southerly or 
northerly movement, the same tactical and strategical diffi- 
culties as an army moving from the Potomac, as a base of 
operation, would, though the number of those difficulties 
may be reduced ; but others, growing out of the very nature 
of such a combined — that is to say, half naval and half mili- 
tary — operation, would arise;- and as a whole, the difficulties 
would probably not be less in the one case than in the 
other. 

There are other considerations rendering the use of this 
zone less convenient than that of the two others ; they will 
be explained in discussing the operations of the campaign. 

We may remark here that an expedition may be accom- 
plished with comparative ease, considering the nature of the 
coast, and that the provisioning of troops would be greatly 
facilitated by it. Most, or nearly all, of the important 
cities of the main left zone are on its left ; even the capital 
of the whole Confederacy is situated there. These seem 
great inducements for its choice as the principal zone of 
operation. How far this is correct, we shall see. 



GEOGRAPHY OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 4*7 

Center Zone. — This zone is formed, as we have already 
seen, by the States of Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, 
Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. The Big Sandy River, 
Cumberland Mountains, Savannah River, and ocean are 
the boundaries on the east ; the Gulf of Mexico on the 
south ; the Mississippi on the west ; and the Ohio on the 
north. 

This zone has a peculiarity which must be noticed and 
well understood; for the success of all military operations 
depends upon it. It is, that this zone is divided into two 
entirely distinct parts by the Tennessee River, each part 
forming a theater of war in itself. The upper part, com- 
prising Kentucky, Tennessee, and a small portion of North 
Alabama, is inclosed between the waters of the Tennessee 
River, the Ohio, and the Big Sandy Rivers. The Tennessee 
River nearly describes a semicircle. Where it rises, it runs 
parallel with the mountains — that is, from northeast to 
southwest. At Chattanooga it changes direction, following 
a clear westerly course ; and at Florence it turns northward, 
and keeps in this direction to its mouth. The country in- 
closed by it and by the Ohio, we will call the upper center 
zone; and the country south of the Tennessee, or rather the 
remainder of the center zone, we will call the lower center 
zone. The lower center zone is principally distinguished 
from the upper one by the course of its rivers, which all run 
southward and empty into the Gulf, instead of emptying 
northward, as those of the upper center zone do. Let us 
consider these two parts of the center zone separately. 

Upper Center Zone. — If we give to this zone part of 
Western Virginia, we form a kind of quadrangle, which, in 



48 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

a strategic point of view, presents great resemblance to the 
main left zone. In fact, one of the long sides of the quad- 
rangle is formed by a mountain chain, the same which we 
have already encountered in the left zone ; the other long or 
parallel side is formed by the Ohio, which plays the same 
part that the sea plays in the left zone. It is a natural ob- 
stacle to all movements of troops, except for the party having 
entire control of it. The two smaller sides are formed by 
the Lower Tennessee and the Big Sandy Rivers. The west- 
ern part of this zone is very mountainous. 

Mountains. — The Blue Ridge and its parallel ridges, on 
entering this zone, take a course a little more westward than 
in the north and west of Virginia. The Blue Ridge forms 
still the ridge at the east ; the other parallel ridges, forming 
four main chains, are: Unaka, Great Smoky, Iron Mount- 
ain, Ray's Mountain, Clinch Mountain, and Cumberland 
Mountain. West from Cumberland Gap, the Cumberland 
Ridge becomes wider, and forms a kind of table-land. The 
m ain ridge also takes a more southerly direction, and there- 
by encounters the Tennessee River near Chattanooga, where 
the river breaks through it. South from the Tennessee, the 
mountains take a westerly direction, and lose themselves in 
smaller hills ; forming, however, the separation between 
rivers running north and south. 

From the Cumberland Mountains a number of offshoots 
start at right angles to the direction of the main chain; 
these advance far into Kentucky. Some of them form a 
kind of. table-land. They give to the whole country a 
mountainous and rugged appearance; and they form par- 



GEOGRAPHY OP THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 49 

allel valleys, most of which are watered by the tributaries 
and confluents of the Licking and Kentucky Rivers. 

Gaps. — The principal gaps are the Curaberland Gap, be- 
tween Tazewell and Lafontaine, and some gaps in Great 
Smoky Mountain ; one, for instance, near Ashbyville, the 
other, where the Little Tennessee River breaks through this 
mountain. 

The main chains or ridges form long valleys, in which 
the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, or their principal 
confluents, run for a long distance. 

There are no other mountains of importance in this zone. 
The western part is undulated, and in some places even flat, 
though bordered by ranges of hills which might, perhaps, 
serve as defensive positions, but which are, in fact, of no 
strategic importance whatever. 

Rivers. — All the rivers of this upper center zone are 
tributaries of the Ohio. The main direction of the course 
of these rivers is from southeast to northwest, or rather 
northwest by north. However, the quasi-circular course of 
the Tennessee is more or less common to the other rivers, 
especially to those emptying into the Lower Ohio. Hence 
the Cumberland Gap is a kind of center, whence one might 
enter any of the valleys formed by the different rivers with- 
out being obliged to traverse the latter. In other words, 
most of the river valleys radiate more or less in the direc- 
tion of the Cumberland Gap, the Ohio forming the circum- 
ference. The principal rivers are — 

1. Big Sandy River, forming the boundary of Kentucky 
against Western Virginia. It rises in the Cumberland 

5* 



50 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

Mountains, and has a course of about 120 miles. It runs 
in a valley formed by offshoots of the Cumberland Mount- 
ains, having a direction southeast by south and northwest 
by north. A road leads from the Ohio to Marion or Abing- 
don, on the East Tennessee and Virginia E-ailroad. 

2. Licking River empties opposite Cincinnati. It rises 
in the Cumberland Mountains. Its course is somewhat more 
westerly than that of the Big Sandy River. It also runs in 
a valley formed by offshoots from the Cumberland Mount- 
ains. Its whole course is about 180 miles. It is navigable 
for boats for about 100 miles. 

3. Kentucky River. — This is larger than the other two. 
The upper part of its course runs nearly west, and the lower 
nearly north. It rises in the Cumberland Mountains. The 
length of its course is about 250 miles. It is a rapid stream, 
in a deep, rocky bed, with steep banks. "^ At high water it 
is navigable with steam-boats up to Frankfort, Ky., and 
with boats some 80 miles higher up. 

4. Rolling Fork and Salt River unite together, rise in 
the middle of the State, carry a great amount of water, and 
are navigable for boats for about 100 miles. 

5. Green River shapes its course according to that of the 
Tennessee River. It rises in the middle of the State; has 
very deep water. Steam-boats run up as far as Bowling 
Green, and for boats it is navigable nearly to its springs. 
Its entire length is about 225 miles. 

6. Cumberland River rises in the Cumberland Mount- 
ains. Its course is shaped to that of the Tennessee • River, 
the latter forming an exterior, and the Cumberland River 
an interior arc. It empties into the Ohio near Smithland, 



GEOGRAPHY OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 51 

about 15 miles from the mouth of the Tennessee. The 
length of its course is about 600 to tOO miles. It is navi- 
gable for steam-boats as far as iS'ashville, or about 160 miles, 
and in the wet season, with Ligh water, as far as Burkes- 
ville. With boats it is navigable much higher up. 

7. Tennessee River is formed by the junction of the 
Clinch and Holston Rivers, rising in the Alleghany Mount- 
ains of Yirginia. Of its course we have already spoken. 
Its entire length is about TOO to 800 miles. It is navigable 
up to Florence, which is about 200 miles, and by boats it 
is navigable even up to the mountain district. 

The principal towns are — 

In Kentucky. — Covington, Louisville, Frankfort, Lex- 
ington, Lebanon, Bowling Green, Burkesville, Hopkins- 
ville. 

In Tennessee. — Dover, Clarksville, Nashville, Murfrees- 
borough, Knoxville, Tazewell, Chattanooga. 

In North Alabama. — Florence, Athens, Huntsville. 

Principal Lines of Communication. — The principal lines 
of communication, running from northeast to southwest, 
are: 1. The Ohio. 2. The East Tennessee and Virginia 
Railroad, or from Memphis to Chattanooga, 300 miles, and 
from this place to Lynchburg, 420 miles ;" total, 720 miles. 

Besides these two principal lines, there are smaller ones, 
such as the railroad from — 1. Lexington to Louisville, 75 
miles. 2. Memphis Junction to Dover, 90 miles. 3. McMinn- 
ville to Tullahoma, 40 miles. 4. Tracy City to Fayetteville, 
45 miles. 

Of communication from north to south, we have to men- 
tion, besides the lower course of all the tributaries of the 



52 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

Ohio, the following railroads: 1. Cincinnati to Lexington, 
90 miles. 2. Louisville to Nashville, 115 miles. 3. Heuder- ^ 
son to Nashville, 130 miles. 4. Nashville to Decatur, on 
the Tennessee, 110 miles. 5. Nashville to Stevenson, 100 
miles. 

A great number of turnpikes and other roads exist, tray- 
ersing the country in all directions. Many of them run 
parallel to the different rivers, and therefore radiate in the 
direction of Cumberland Gap, or even of Chattanooga. 
This conformation renders these two points of great stra- 
tegic interest. 

Among the principal turnpikes and ordinary roads are 
those running along the valleys, and parallel to the Cum- 
berland Mountains, besides the road from Tazewell to Lex- 
ington, and all those crossing the mountain chain. These 
roads are much the same as those of Virginia. The coun- 
try in general is fertile, and in certain parts — for instance, 
the Kentucky valley — is very much so. It is therefore 
possible to maintain an army on its through march, if this 
army makes no long stoppage in any particular place. 

If we consider now this upper center zone as a theater of 
war in itself, we should, in order to discuss the facilities of 
moving troops, have to divide it into three zones, as we did for 
the left main zone. Here, however, nature has not made the 
divisions so marked as in the first zone. Nevertheless, we 
can easily find such divisions as will suit our purpose, viz. : 
1. The country east from Kentucky River, besides the whole 
mountain district, forms the left. 2. The country between 
Kentucky and Green River forms the center. 3. The coun- 
try between Green River and Tennessee forms the right. 



GEOGRAPHY OP THE SOUTHERN CONEEDERACY. 53 

Of these three zones, the latter or right is evidently the 
most accessible or easy to pass through. Two rivers, navi- 
gable up to the end of this zone, besides the Henderson and 
Nashville Railroad, form as many good lines of communica- 
tion for an army having the Lower Ohio as a base of opera- 
tion. In marching south into Tennessee, it is only necessary 
to have control of the two rivers by means of gun-boats. 
Large numbers of troops may be very rapidly transported 
on these two rivers ; and this is a great advantage, besides 
the facility of being supplied by three roads which also join 
the main road from the center zone, being the Louisville and 
Nashville Railroad. 

The center zone offers the same advantages for supplying 
troops, except that in moving them forward they could not 
be transported by water. This zone meeting the right zone, 
could, for supplying the army, make use of the means of 
transportation belonging to the latter. 

By marching in the center zone, however, a certain num- 
ber of rivers would have to be crossed, which might serve a 
retreating enemy as lines of defense; and, in fact, have al- 
ready been used as such. Combined operations in the left 
and center zones, however, would render this defense useless. 

The most difficult to operate in, but probably the most 
important, is evidently the left zone. Full of mountains, 
rivers, without railroads, and only bad roads to march on, 
this zone offers, besides these disadvantages, a nearly im- 
passable barrier, in the Cumberland Mountains, to an army 
advancing from north to south ; and an army marching from 
Big Sandy River, parallel with the Cumberland Mountains, 
in the direction of Nashville, has a number of parallel 



54 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

ridges and rivers to cross. Could, however, such an army 
penetrate into the parallel valleys, such as the Cumberland, 
the Clinch, and the Holston, its advance would find no (or 
only small) difficulties, except, perhaps, in so far as pro- 
visioning is concerned. 

The operations in this part of the upper center zone 
could only be carried on upon a limited number of roads ; 
but precisely, in consequence of this small number, they (the 
operations) would be the more decisive. To pass from the 
left to the right zone — that is, from Chattanooga to Nash- 
ville, or the reverse — several roads may be found ; but the 
Tennessee River, as well as several of the parallel chains, 
must be passed. 

The Lower Center Zone is composed of part of Tennes- 
see and Kentucliy, and the whole of Mississippi, Alabama, 
Georgia, and Florida. The Savannah, Atlantic, the Mexi- 
can Grulf, the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the Tennessee in- 
close it between their waters. 

There are no mountains of importance in this zone, ex- 
cept in the north of Georgia, in which the end of the Blue 
Ridge Mountains is to be found. From the highest point 
of this zone the fall is in all directions. We also see the 
principal rivers rise there, and take a southeasterly, south- 
erly, southwesterly, and some, in their higher course, even 
a nearly westerly direction. Hilly offshoots of the highest 
part of this zone form the water-line between the Ohio and 
the Gulf. 

The country in the north of Georgia consists partly of 
table-land, and the eastern ridge is still called the Blue 
Ridge. The remainder of the zone is partly undulating, 



GEOGRAPHY OP THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 55 

partly flat. The country is watered by a great number of 
rivers, most of them running in a southerly direction, with 
the exception of some of the smaller tributaries of the Mis- 
sissippi, which run from east to west. The principal rivers 
are — 

1. The Ogechee River. — Its course is parallel to that of 
the Savannah. It empties itself into Ossabaw Sound. Its 
Jength is about 180 miles, of which about 40 miles are navi- 
gable for small vessels. 

2. The Alatamaha empties into Alataraaha Sound. It 
is formed by the junction of the Oconee and Ocmulgee, both 
of which rise in the northern portion of the State. Their 
total length is about 300 miles ; and they are navigable for 
steam-boats as far as Macon and Milledgeville. 

3. The Santilla empties into St. Andrew's Sound. It 
passes through a swampy region, and is navigable only for 
light boats. Length about 15^ miles. 

4. The Suwanee empties into the Gulf of Mexico near 
Cedar Keys. Its length is about 250 miles. 

5. Apalachicolu empties into St. George's Sound. It 
is formed by the junction of the Flint and Chattahoochee 
Rivers. The latter rises in the 'Blue Ridge Mountains, and 
passes through the whole of this zone. It is navigable up 
to the Falls of Columbus, about 250 miles. The whole 
length is about 500 miles. Flint River rises in a hilly 
country sou^h of the Chattahoochee, where also the Oconee 
and Ocmulgee rise. Its course is about 300 miles; navi- 
gable for about T5 miles. 

6. The Ghoctawhatchee River empties into the bay of 
the same name, and is about 200 miles long. 



56 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

T. The 3Iobile River is formed, about 50 miles above the 
Bay of Mobile, by the junction of the Alabama and Tom- 
bigbee. This latter receives a large confluent, the Black 
Warrior. Steam-boats go up on the Black Warrior as far 
as Tuscaloosa, 280 miles from its mouth ; and on the Tom- 
bigbee as far as Columbus, on the Mississippi, a distance of 
300 miles. The whole length of the Tombigbee is about 
450 miles. The Alabama is navigable for steam-boats as fai> 
as Montgomery, about 300 miles. 

8. The Pascagoula empties into the Mississippi Sound. 
It is navigable for about 100 miles. Its whole com*se ex- 
tends over about 200 miles. 

9. The Pearl River rises in the center of the State of 
Mississippi. It has a course of about 300 miles, and emp- 
ties into the outlet of Lake Pontchartrain. 

10. The Mississippi forms the western boundary of the 
zone. 

Emptying into the Mississippi, and having partly a west- 
ward course, are — 

11. The Homochitto River. 

12. The Yazoo River, running, for a great distance, nearly 
parallel with the Mississippi. 

13. Big Black River. 

14. Hatchie River. 

15. Forked Deer River. 

16. Obion River. 

The principal towns are — 

In Western Kentucky and Tennessee. — Columbus, 
Paducah, Hickman, Paris, Huntingdon, Jackson, Bolivar, 
and Memphis. 



GEOQRArUY OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 57 

In Mississippi. — Jackson, Natchez, Vicksburg, Colum- 
bus, Aberdeen, Holly Springs, Jacinto, Pearlington, Shields- 
borough, Mississippi City, Biloxi, Pascagoula. 

In Alabama. — Montgomery, Tuscaloosa, Mobile. 

In Georgia. — Milledgeville, Augusta, Savannah, Colum- 
bus, Macon, Athens, Atlanta, Griffin. 

In Florida. — Pensacola, Tallahassee, Apalachicola, San 
Augustine, Key West. 

Principal Lines of Communication. — Most of the rivers 
serve as lines of communication in a direction from north to 
south. Besides these, there are railroads running in the 
same direction : — 1. Paducah to Union City, 55 miles. 2. 
Cairo to Grand Junction, on the Memphis and Charleston 
road, 135 miles. 3. Cairo to Corinth, 150 miles. 4. Cairo 
to Memphis, 160 miles. 5. Memphis to New Orleans, 390 
miles. 6. Grand Junction to Grenada, 90 miles. T. Corinth 
to Mobile, 320 miles. 8. Montgomery to Pensacola, 165 
miles. 9. Chattanooga to Atlanta, 120 miles. 10. At- 
lanta to Montgomery, 150 miles. 11. Atlanta to Savannah, 
270 miles. 12. Macon to Albany, 100 miles. 13. Talla- 
dega to Selma, 90 miles. 14. Augusta to Savannah, 120 
miles. 

Running in a direction from east to west, we find — 1. 
Memphis to Chattanooga. 2. Vicksburg to Jackson, to 
Marion, 130 miles. 3. Marion to Cahawba, 90 miles. 4. 
Water communication from Cahawba to Montgomery, 70 
miles. 5. Montgomery to Augusta, 300 miles. 6. Mont- 
gomery to Savannah, 360 miles. 7. Savannah to Chatta- 
hoochee, 300 miles. 8. Savannah to Tallahassee, 240 miles. 

6 



68 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

9. Brunswick to Waresborough, 60 miles. 10. Jackson- 
ville to Tallahassee, ITO miles. 11. Jacksonville to Cedar 
Keys, 120 miles. 

A great number of turnpikes and other roads exist, pass- 
ing through the country in all directions, and permitting 
movement of troops, as well from north to south as from 
east to west. 

This zone has a great extent of coast. Possessing a num- 
ber of bays and sounds, it is therefore admirably suited for 
combined naval and military operations. In mentioning the 
rivers, we have named the most important of these bays and 
sounds. Be it, however, remarked that most of the bays in 
the Gulf of Mexico are shallow, with sandy banks, and do 
not admit vessels of great draught. 

Movement of Troops in the Lower Center Zone. — Con- 
sidering this as a theater of war by itself — and it is large 
enough for that — we may, as we did before, subdivide it into 
right, left, and center. But here the question arises, are we 
to place ourselves on the Savannah as a base of operation, 
or on the Tennessee ? In the first case, the region along 
the Tennessee would form the right, the coast district the 
left, and the country between the two the center zone. 

Taking the Tennessee for our base, the State of Missis- 
sippi would form the right, Alabama the center, and Geor- 
gia the left. The marching of troops in the three last zones 
from north to south would probably not find very great dif- 
ficulties. The troops might, in most cases, follow the course 
of the rivers; besides, simultaneously with a march from 
north to south, gun-boats of light draught might penetrate 
the rivers, and establish communications with the sea, thereby 



GEOGRAPHY OP THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 59 

facilitating the provisioning of the army, and at the same 
time the passage of the river. 

The right zone seems particularly favorable for such oper- 
ations, considering that the Memphis and New Orleans, and 
the Corinth and New Orleans Railroad, the Mississippi, and 
the Tombigbee may serve as so many lines of communica- 
tion with the base on the Tennessee or the Ohio, as well as 
with the sea. 

Bat the center zone also offers facilities. Good roads exist 
from Decatur to Columbia, a distance of only one hundred 
miles, or six days' march; thence to Pensacola is railroad 
communication, and to Mobile water communication. 

Operating at the extreme right, though it would perhaps 
be greatly facilitated by a flotilla in the Mississippi, might 
encounter difficulties in the number of the tributaries of the 
Mississippi which would have to be crossed. Operating at 
the extreme left would be difficult, iu consequence of the 
swampy condition of the country. 

It should be remarked, however, that little would be gained 
by marching simply from north to south in this zone, consid- 
ering its length and width — from the Upper Savannah to 
the Mississippi about four hundred miles, and from the 
Lower Savannah to the Mississippi about six hundred miles 
— an army, after having marched south a certain distance, 
would then have to march east or west, and would find 
itself in the same position as an army taking the Savannah 
as a base of operations. 

An army marching from the Savannah to the west, might 
march in the neighborhood of the Tennessee ; or, at all 
events, as far north as possible. The nearer the Tennessee, 



60 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

4 

the easier, probably, the movement. What renders a move- 
ment from east to west, or west to east, diiBcult in this zone, 
is the number of large rivers which an army would have to 
cross. The nearer to the springs of these rivers, therefore, 
the movement takes place, the easier it will be executed. 
An operation to the left — that is, near the sea-coast — would 
only be possible when supported by a large flotilla; and 
even then it would be slow, and productive of small results. 

Operating in the center zone would offer as many difficul- 
ties as operating in the left. In marching, therefore, from 
east to west, an army could only act to the right — that is, 
near the Tennessee — or, perhaps, take a slanting direction, 
starting from the extreme right, and marching diagonally 
through the country — from Pickens, for instance, in the di- 
rection of New Orleans. Thus, only a comparatively small 
number of rivers would have to be passed ; and, besides, the 
distance is reduced, and communication might soon be opened 
with the sea as well as with the center of the base of oper- 
ation — that is, the Savannah near Augusta. 

The Eight Zone consists of the country west of the Mis- 
sissippi, and is formed mainly by the States of Missouri, 
Arkansas, and Louisiana. The main feature of this zone is 
the great abundance of rivers. A mountain chain runs from 
north to south, parallel to the Mississippi, from Helena, 
near this river, up into Missouri. It is called Crowley's 
Ridge. The country between this ridge and the Mississippi 
is almost one large swamp. In fact, the abundance of water 
in this zone creates a great number of swamps. 

The principal direction of the course of the rivers is from 
northwest to southeast. They are all the tributaries or 



GEOGRAPHY OP THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 61 

confluents of the Mississippi. This zone being of compara- 
tively little importance, we give only the principal features 
of it without many details. 

The principal rivers are — 

1. The Missouri River. 2. The Francis River. 3. 
The White River. 4. The Arkansas River. 5. The Red 
River. 

An immense number of smaller rivers, or confluents of 
the above named, or emptying direct into the Mississippi, 
traverse the country in all directions. The lower portions 
of this zone — Arkansas and Louisiana — are unhealthy, 
in consequence of the many swamps. Its extent, from 
north to south, is about seven hundred miles; and from 
east to west, from two hundred and fifty to three hundred 
miles. 

The principal towns are — 

In Missouri. — St. Louis, Jefferson City, Hannibal, Pal- 
myra, St. Charles, Booneville,- Lexington, and Blooming- 
ton. 

In Arkansas. — Little Rock and Yan Buren. 

In Louisiana. — Barataria, Bayou Sara, CarroUton. New 
Orleans and Baton Rouge, though in Louisiana, belong, in 
fact, to the center zone. 

The principal lines of communication, besides the Missis- 
sippi, Missouri, Arkansas, and Red Rivers, are the railroads 
from — 1. Hannibal to St. Joseph. 2. Hudson to St. Charles. 
3. St. Louis to Georgetown, from east to west. 4. St. 
Louis to Wynesville, from east to west. 5. St. Louis to 
Pilot Knob, from north to south. 6. Memphis to Little 

6* 



62 PRINCIPJ.ES OF STRATEGY. 

Rock, only partly finished. 7. Vicksburg to Marshall, in 
Texas, not entirely Gnished. 8. New Orleans to Franklin. 
This zone possesses some continuous and parallel roads, 
from Missouri south to Louisiana ; and also a number of 
roads from east to west. An army operating in it would 
have to contend with many obstacles. In Arkansas, a large 
army, even if only on a rapid march through, would proba- 
bly find difficulties in obtaining subsistence. In marching 
from north to south, it would have to cross a great number 
of rivers, which afford many lines of defense to the enemy, 
and render an advance against a vigilant foe nearly impos- 
sible. Only along the different navigable rivers would troops 
be able to move with security and ease. Missouri, however, 
must be excepted ; it is already more populated than the 
other two States. Louisiana, also, is probably easier to 
pass through than Arkansas. 

It should be observed that this zone has no large center 
of population, or large arsenals or manufactories. More- 
over, the total population being small, it will be seen that 
no large army can maintain itself for any length of time 
in this zone, unless based on the Mississippi or some of the 
other navigable streams, by which it could be fully supplied 
from the North, or any other place. In other words, a large 
Rebel army, thrown into this zone, having no longer control 
over the Mississippi or center zone, could probably not sub- 
sist for a long period of time ; or, at all events, it could not 
carry out any campaign of importance. It would be obliged 
to disperse. 

Having thus passed in review the different zones of which 
the whole Ihoater of war is composed, there remain bnt a 



GEOGRAPUY OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. 63 

few words to say as to the connection of those zones with 
each other. 

The left zone and the upper center zone are contiguous. 
They are linked together by the mountain chain. How- 
ever, the communications are comparatively few. East* 
Tennessee and Virginia, and the Charleston and Chatta- 
nooga Railroad, and a restricted number of turnpikes or 
ordinary roads, are all that join East Kentucky and Ten- 
nessee with Yirginia and North and South Carolina. 

The communications between the left and lower center 
zone are better. The Charleston and Augusta, and the 
Charleston and Savannah Railroads, besides the river, may 
be crossed at a great number of points. 

The communication between the northern and southern 
center zone is across the Tennessee. The party command- 
ing the river may cross at any point from one zone into the 
other. Chattanooga forms on the Tennessee a kind of 
tete-de-pont ; besides which, some roads over the mount- 
ains exist, joining North Georgia with East Tennessee 
and Kentucky. 

The communication between the center and the right 
zone ex^Jjj now only at Yicksburg, which thereby becomes 
a point of great strategic importance. The Mississippi 
River is much too large to be crossed in any other way 
than by steam-boats; but the party possessing them may 
cross at many points. 

What has been said about the geography of the theater 
of war is, I believe, sufficient to enable the reader to under- 
stand well the different operations carried on in it; and 
which will be discusRod in the following chaptei*. 



64 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 



III. 

APPLICATION OF THE MAXIMS LAID DOWN 
IN CHAPTER I. TO THE THEATER OF WAR 
CONSTITUTED BY THE SOUTHERN CONFED- 
ERACY. 

Whatever be the causes of this great rebellion, we can- 
not but admit that, at the present moment, the war has lost 
all resemblance to those wars which a government haa 
sometimes to undertake against its rebellious subjects. It 
has entirely assumed the character of a war carried on 
between two powerful neighbors. The military operations 
must therefore be conducted like those which have for 
their object the conquest and occupation of a large coun- 
try possessing great and disciplined armies. 

We have said above that, according as the war is na- 
tional, or merely governmental as regards the invaded coun- 
try, so the operations, and especially the mode of occupying 
the country, have to be different. In the present case, 
though perhaps as regards the South the war may be called 
national, there is no danger of such effects or results as 
generally attend national uprisings, because the whole male 
population able to bear arms is already enrolled in the 
regular armies, and the country, being thus stripped of ita 
defenders, is void of all material for resistance, except 
where those armies happen to be. Occupation becomes, 



r~ 



A 



J 



APPLICATION OP MAXIMS. 65 

therefore, a secondary affair; and our main object should 
be the destruction or breaking up of the Rebel armies. 
This successfully accomplished, and all resistance thereby 
destroyed, the downfall of the Confederate government be- 
comes a matter of course, as well as the surrender and 
occupation of the Southern towns and sea-ports. 

Grand operations in accordance with the geography of 
the theater of war and those maxims which we have, in the 
first chapter, under the head of "Wars of Invasion," laid 
down as the " third system," will alone be able to bring 
about the destruction or breaking up of the Rebel armies, 
an object which, as we have just said, must be accomplished 
before attempting anything else. 

"Success is in the legs of the soldier,^' was a saying of 
Marshal Saxe ; and if this be true for every kind of war, 
it is more especially so for great wars of conquest. Move- 
ment, continued, rapid movement, is the secret for obtain- 
ing success; and what soldiers can accomplish in that 
respect, may be seen in the campaigns of 1805, 1809, 1812, 
and 1814, etc.* 

* In 1805 Napoleon's army was at Boulogne for the grand expe- 
dition against England, when the war with Austria broke out. Na- 
poleon marched his army to Ulm, thence to Vienna, and thence to 
Austerlitz, making a total distance of 333 leagues, or 1000 miles. 
From Boulogne to Vienna, 900 miles, was one continuous march. 
In 1809 Napoleon's guard was in Spain, at Madrid and Valencia. 
When Napoleon was obliged to make preparations for the Austrian 
war, his guard marched, in nearly one continuous route, from 
Madrid to Vienna, a distance of not less than 666 leagues, or 2000 
miles. In 1812 the army marched from the Rhine to Moscow, a 
distance of 600 leagues, or 1800 miles; equal to the distance be- 
tween Washington and Galveston, in Texas. 



66 rRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

The distance which the troops of Napoleon were gen- 
erally obliged to march was from twenty to thirty miles a 
day. The distance now adopted ia European armies as 
an ordinary day's march is seven leagues, or twenty-one 
miles. These rapid military operations, by which alone 
great successes are to be obtained, are, however, only pos- 
sible when carried out on the plan that the invading army 
shall subsist on the country invaded, 

I know that there is a great difiference in this respect be- 
tween this country and Europe. In Europe, at a distance 
of every two or three miles, thickly populated villages are 
to be found, where a sufficient stock of provisions is ac- 
cumulated to nourish any army on its passage through. 
All marches are so arranged that the troops stop for the 
night in some village or town in which they can be quar- 
tered, and where the citizens have to lodge and feed them. 
No tents and camp equipage, and no provision wagons are 
required ; and it is evident that, under these circumstances, 
rapid movements may be executed. 

In this country, contiguous villages or towns are the ex- 
ception ; a number of farms may be met with, but the quarter- 
ing of troops on these farms or in towns is out of the question ; 
therefore camping remains a necessity here. But in regard 
to providing for the army, matters are diflferent ; the number 
of farms, and the stock of cattle and other provisions accu- 
mulated in them, are sufficient to provide for an army corps, 
if it only marches fifteen to twenty miles a day. It is prob- 
able that an army of 100,000 men, marching on one road 
only, would, with difficulty, find sufficient provisions; but 
marching in three or four columns, on three or four parallel 



APPLICATION -OF MAXIMS. 67 

roads, the thing could certainly be done. Nothing but a 
good administration or organization for collecting the pro- 
visions and paying for them is required. Based on such a 
system of living, and freed of part of its immense wagon- 
trains, an army in this country may march on an average 
from seventeen to eighteen miles with ease. 

The difference between this country and Europe in the 
difficulties of operations becomes more marked in the wet 
and cold season. In Europe, operations never become im- 
possible. The difficulties of marching may be greater in 
the bad season, the sanitary state of the army may be less 
satisfactory, still operations may be carried on; for after a 
march, or after rain or cold, the soldier at all events finds 
in the evening a dry, warm place, and something to eat. 
This cannot be said of operations in the wet and cold sea- 
son here. After a march in the rain, wet to the skin, the 
soldier arrives at his camping place; no fire can be made, 
or is of any use, because to be near the fire is equivalent to 
remaining in the rain. The soldiers in this state have to 
pitch their small tents; for beds, they have to use the wet 
ground; and for supper, a wet cracker. 

There are few constitutions able to resist such treatment. 
Marches in the snow and cold are nearly quite as bad, and 
it is evident that such circumstances must produce sickness 
and demoralization among the troops. Besides all this, 
the roads in bad weather very soon become impassable. 
One day's rain is sometimes sufficient to render useless 
roads which are excellent when dry. Therefore, if any re- 
gard is entertained for our armies, winter campaigns ought 
to be undertaken as little as possible in this country. All 
energetic operations should be reserved for the dry season. 



68 rRINCIPLES jOF fciTIlATEGY. 

Being convinced that none but grand strategic opera- 
tions can finish this war in a speedy and brilliant manner, 
and being also convinced that these operations cannot be 
carried on without the adoption of a thorough and sound 
system of requisition, I will assume, in the following appli- 
cation of principles to the theater of war, that the troops 
have to move only under such favorable; conditions. 

We have seen that the theater of war is divided by natu- 
ral lines into three or four zones, distinctly separated from 
each other, and forming, in consequence of their great ex- 
tent, theaters of war by themselves. To attack these three 
zones at the same time with equal means, would evidently 
lead to a great division of force. It is also easy to see that 
these three zones are of very different political as well as 
military importance, besides being of different extent. 
Nothing good could therefore be expected from a plan 
throwing equal forces into the most and the least important 
of these zones. On the other hand, the armies raised to 
carry on this war are so large that it would be impossible 
to use them all in one zone. We must therefore adopt 
several lines of operation, and act at least in two zones 
simultaneously. But then we should do what Napoleou 
did in all his wars against Austria, where he had two lines 
of operation — one in Italy and one in Germany. The 
main force, the main effort, and the decisive operation were 
always made in one zone, to which all that was done in the 
other zone was subordinate. 

In 1805 and 1809 Prince Eugene operated in Italy; but 
his operations were secondary to those of Napoleon in the 
valley of the Danube. 



APPLICATION OF MAXIMS. 69 

These secondary lines of operation are great diversions ; 
the enemy opposes them, and engages thereby a force dis- 
tant from the really decisive point. The decisive blow is 
struck, and those forces distantly engaged are very often 
unable to take any further part in the struggle, so much are 
they thrown out of the way. 

We may, by acting in this manner, operate in the three 
zones simultaneously ; and it remains to determine the 
relative importance of these three zones, and the number 
of troops which, according to their importance, is to be 
engaged in each of them. 

Of the three zones, it is easy to perceive that the right 
one, formed by the country west of the Mississippi, is the 
least important. The entire population is small ; the com- 
munications with the center zone are few; the country is in 
great part unhealthy and difficult to operate in ; insufficient 
lines of communication ; insufficient means of provisioning; 
few large towns containing manufactories. All these defects 
combined make its occupation of little value. Moreover, 
the distance from the two seats of government is too great. 
Events and news having to travel so far are stale when they 
arrive. Lastly, the war in the two other zones would in no 
way be affected by the total occupation or conquest of this 
zone. To operate in it requires, therefore, only a compara- 
tively small corps, the main object being to cover the frontier 
of Illinois, and to keep the upper part — that is, Missouri — 
clear of Rebels or guerrillas. 

The left zone is the very reverse of the right one. Most 
of the largest towns in the North are near the left zone, 
which itself contains the capital of the Rebels, and quite a 

1 



to PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

number of their largest cities. Washington, Baltimore, and 
Philadelphia are contiguous or only a few days' march dis- 
tant. Besides containing the seats of the two belligerent 
governments, this zone acquires special interest and import- 
ance from entering higher into the Northern territory than 
any of the other parts of the Southern Confederacy, and 
thereby becoming more offensive than any of the others. 

The center zone is, in importance, between the two. No 
strategic, decisive point is there. The extent of it is very 
great; and operations, with a complete result, could only be 
carried on by very large armies. If, therefore, this zone be 
chosen as the main theater of the war, the government would 
be obliged to hold in the left zone a very large army for its 
own protection ; an army which would become entirely use- 
less in the campaign, as it would have only a defensive 
character. 

There can be no doubt, therefore, that what has been said 
is sufficient to establish the fact that the left zone is the 
main zone for decisive operations, and we will endeavor to 
show that its geographical formation is such that it is really 
well adapted for carrying them out. The army operating in 
the center zone will be secondary to that of the left zone, 
and should only serve as a kind of diversion. 

Comparing what has been said, under the head of "Base 
of Operation, fig. 1, with the left zone, we shall find that it 
exactly corresponds with the case stated there : a b would 
represent the Potomac ; b d, the Atlantic Ocean ; a c, the 
mountain chain, or the frontier of Western Virginia; and 
c d, the Savannah. If we succeed in placing our army along 
a c, we should be able to act or take hold at any moment of 



APPLtOATION OP MAXIMS. • Tl 

the communications of the army A, which has for its only 
retreat the line c d, or the Savannah. The very moment a 
Rebel army permits a Union army to act from the mountain 
district against its communications, or, what is better, to take 
hold of them, so as to force it to fight, forming its line of 
battle parallel with the sea, and facing the Blue Ridge — 
that is, forming its line of battle parallel with its natural 
line of retreat to the Savannah — this Rebel army, in case 
of defeat, will not only be beaten, but, by a rapid pursuit, 
will be obliged to surrender, as it will be thrown back in the 
direction of the ocean, an obstacle which soon stops all 
further retreat. 

The possession of the mountain district is therefore, for 
the holding of the left zone, a necessity; and still better, 
it is a necessity for the possession of the whole theater of 
war. In fact, this chain of mountains is like a wedge driven 
from the North right into the very heart of the theater of 
war. It is the only elevated part of it, and dominates it in 
all directions. It is like a bulwark, or, better still, like the 
citadel of a large fortress, of which the walls are formed by 
the parallel ridges, the ditches by the rapid streams in the 
valley, and the doors by the gaps. 

Take the whole fortress — that is, the whole South — but 
leave this citadel untouched, and it will be the same as if 
nothing had been taken. In these mountains the Southern 
armies can rally, and, as by their occupation they maintain 
a decidedly central position, combined with the facility of 
debouching in any place, they can throw themselves, with 
their whole force, on all the surrounding fragments of our 
armies, and beat them in detail. 



72 PEINCIPLE8 OP STRATEGY. 

Take this bulwark — this key of the whole Southern Con- 
federacy — first, and the very reverse will take place. Our 
armies are then in the central position, and are able to throw 
themselves on the fragments of the Southern armies with 
their united forces. 

The conquest of the South, after the occupation of this 
citadel, will not even be a matter of time. Resistance would 
be useless, and surrender would be the natural consequence. 
Ought we not be able to carry this natural fortification, 
with two sides backing our territory on the Potomac and 
Western Virginia, and with an open door like the Shenan- 
doah valley? 

Supposing, therefore — as it was at the commencement of 
the war, or even of 1862 — that the entire theater of war was 
still intact, and that we had to start on the first campaign, 
we should act in accordance with the importance of these 
three zones. We should place only a small corps in the 
right zone ; in the center zone we should concentrate a very 
large army, disposed near the Ohio, between Louisville and 
Cincinnati, and between this latter town and Burlington, at 
the mouth of the Big Sandy River. On the Potomac, also, 
we should concentrate a large army between Harper's Ferry 
and Washington. 

We should commence operations in the right zone to 
attract attention there; and then we should push, at all 
hazards, a sufficiently strong column from Louisville in the 
direction of Nashville, with the positive order to carry any 
obstacle in its advance. As soon as this movement was in 
full execution, we should concentrate at Burlington, by rapid 
movements, the bulk of the army placed near the Ohio, and 



APPLICATION OP MAXIMS. t3 

march it, by forced marches, thence along the Big Sandy 
River, in a straight direction, on the Chattanooga and 
Lynchburg Railroad, so as to hit this road near Wytheville 
and Liberty. At the same moment this Ohio army started, 
the Potomac army ought to start. 

Some strong demonstrations ought to be made against 
Centreville, a place where we suppose the Rebel army to be, 
as, in fact, they were at the commencement of 1862. The 
right wing of the Potomac army ought to move, by forced 
marches, up the Shenandoah valley; and the center and 
left wing should do the same in the parallel valley, between 
Blue Ridge and Bull Run Mountains. 

From Berlin, on the Potomac, to Lynchburg and Liberty 
is about ten days' march ; and from Burlington, on the Ohio, 
to Liberty is about the same distance. The marches of 
these two armies ought to be arranged in columns similar 
to those employed by Napoleon in his manoeuvres of 1805 
and 1806. (See " Summary of the Art of War," pp. 1Y9 
and 180.) 

The object of this manoeuvre is to gain the left flank of 
the Rebel army; and it will be seen, by measuring the dis- 
tance, that if the Rebel army is induced to stay one day 
longer after the start has commenced, in consequence of the 
demonstrations against its front, its left flank will be gained 
either immediately by the Potomac army, or somewhat later 
by the Ohio army, which, in fact, arrives in its rear. In 
both cases the Union armies must only keep pace with the 
retreating Rebel army, and advance direct to the south, and 
they will force the Rebel army to surrender near Wilming- 
ton, in consequence of the line of retreat of the Rebels end- 

1* 



74 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

ing there on the sea-coast, and the way westward being 
closed by Union forces. (See Plate II.) 

The double advance of these two armies — one on the left 
flank and the other right against the base of operation of 
the Rebel army — renders all resistance in Virginia useless, 
and makes it even a military fault. The stopping a day to 
give or receive battle from the army of the Potomac, would 
carry the Ohio army one day's march in advance, and the 
ruin of the Rebel Virginia army would be certain ; for it 
cannot afford to lose one day, as we have shown. 

It must, however, be said that, in order to render this 
manoeuvre — that is, the adoption of two lines of operation 
in one zone — a safe one, it is necessary that the Ohio and 
the Potomac armies should each be strong enough single- 
handed to accept battle from the whole Rebel army ; and 
there would be no difficulty in that, considering that the 
Ohio army, threatening by its position the center zone, 
would have obliged the Rebels to keep a large army there. 
Moreover, the United States fleet, by making repeated at- 
tacks and descents on different points of the coast, would 
compel them, in order to protect their sea-coast towns, to 
have sufficient forces distributed along them, which would 
also have absorbed a large number of troops. 

The instant one of the Union armies has gained the left 
flank of the Rebel army, the latter may be obliged at any 
moment to fight a battle under conditions similar to those 
imposed on the Prussians while at Jena — that is to say, de- 
feat would be equivalent to destruction. On the other hand, 
suppose the Union army is defeated, it would lose, perhaps, 
a few thousand prisoners, and be thrown back on its base of 



APPLICATION OP MAXIMS 15 

operation ; but the defeat would in no way be decisive, as it 
-would be if inflicted on the Southern army. 

Evidently the Rebel army would try to avoid such a 
catastrophe; and could only do so by retreating immedi- 
ately to the Upper Savannah. The Union army, continuing 
to push its right wing forward, is a few days afterward rein- 
forced by the Ohio army, and it becomes apparent that this 
one march along the right of the left zone will carry the 
whole left zone in twenty or twenty-five days, even if it does 
not accomplish the destruction of the Rebel army at first 
contained in it. 

How difiScult the escape of the Rebel army would be, 
may be imagined, when we consider the embarrassment 
of the enemy in understanding so grand an operation be- 
fore it is fully developed, and of resolving at once upon a 
counter-operation equally grand, leaving, perhaps, a well- 
fortified position, which their adversaries, to judge from 
their demonstrations, seemed disposed to attack. The dif- 
ficulty for the Rebel commander would be to distinguish, 
amid the noise of battle, in the continually succeeding news 
and dispatches, the true from the false. Melas, Mack, and 
the Duke of Brunswick, all three in their day, showed that 
the task was above their strength. 

After the junction of the two armies, they would •march 
on, always along the right of the left zone, one of the two 
holding the mountains — that is to say, moving along the 
valleys. By considering, now, the upper center zone, it will 
be seen that this same march which carries the left zone, 
carries also the upper center zone. In fact, of this zone, 
which nearly forms a quadrangle, the Rebels hold, or did 



16 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

hold, only one side, and this is the side extending from 
Florence to Lynchburg. 

The Lower Cumberland and Tennessee could always be 
passed by Union gun-boats, and a retreat by the Rebels 
against the lower part of these two rivers would be impos- 
sible. Nor could the Ohio and the Big Sandy Rivers serve 
as lines of retreat. A Rebel army in Kentucky or Tennessee, 
in order to retreat, must therefore pass south, between 
Nashville and Cumberland Gap. This last side of the quad- 
rangle the Union army is closing by its advance along the 
valleys. 

We have said that the small army pushed, by way of di- 
version, from Louisville in the direction of Nashville, should 
advance at all hazards. This force should attack the main 
Rebel army in Tennessee, having orders to fight any Rebel 
force it might encounter. It would attack this army and be 
beaten. The Rebels would probably pursue it, which would 
carry them farther north — that is to say, away from the de- 
cisive point, or only opening left for this retreat, and which 
the Union army is about to close. 

In this zone it would therefore be, as in the left, one day 
lost might witness the destruction of the whole Rebel force 
of Kentucky and Tennessee. If the Rebel army has not 
fallen back into Alabama before the Union army arrives at 
Chattanooga, it will be forced to fight a battle, facing south- 
ward, against superior numbers; and in case of defeat, it will 
be thrown against the Ohio or Lower Cumberland, where it 
would finally be obliged to lay down its arms. 

By measuring the distance, it will be found that if the 
Rebels would arrive before Louisville when the Ohio army 



APPLICATION OF MAXIMS. 7t 

arrives at Liberty, or, better still, Wytheville, on the Lynch- 
burg and Chattanooga Railroad, this latter army can pre- 
vent their returning into Alabama. The defeat of the sec- 
ondary Union force left in Tennessee would thereby have 
occasioned the destruction of the Rebels. 

Plate II. will better explain the movement than all 
that can be said about it. The same time — that is to say, 
twenty to twenty-five days from the first start — would 
therefore have sufficed to clear also the upper center 
zone entirely of the enemy's army. There remain but the 
operations against the lower center and against the right 
zone. 

The Union armies having arrived at the north of Georgia, 
and occupying the table-land commanding the whole of the 
lower center zone, would have to commence operations 
against it ; but here matters would be very different, accord- 
ing to the previous successes of the two Union armies. If 
they should have succeeded in destroying one, or even both 
Rebel armies, or in crippling them seriously, no difficulty 
would be experienced in the lower center zone ; but if both 
Rebel armies — that is, that of Kentucky and that of Yir- 
ginia — should have succeeded in escaping intact, the matter 
becomes very serious. 

The best that could be expected, in the latter case, is a 
campaign like the second half of the campaign of 1809, with 
its bloody battles of Essling and Wagram ; and the worst 
that might take place would be like that of 1812, with its 
disasters of Krasnoi and the Beresina. Both these two 
campaigns or invasions were based on the same principle 
as that we are discussing. In the first, the enemy's army 



YS PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

was only partly crippled at the onset ; in the second, it re- 
mained intact. 

If the Rebel armiy should have been seriously crippled 
or partly destroyed in the previous operation, its resistance 
in the lower center zone could only be of short duration and 
without result. In fact, these retreating fragments of Rebel 
armies could only go in the direction of Florida or of the 
Mississippi. In the first case, the best thing to do would 
be to push them right into Florida, and to let them perish 
there. In the second case, one part of the Union army 
would follow the retreating Rebel army in the rear, the 
other and larger part following on the flank by advancing 
always in the more northerly region of the lower center 
zone. All rivers which would serve as lines of defense 
against the army following in the rear are carried, or, 
better, turned by the army advancing on the flank ; and 
however strong a position of defense the Rebels would have 
chosen, it would always be untenable, on account of being 
continually outflanked. This army then would be obliged 
to cross the Mississippi, and once in the right zone, the war 
might be considered as virtually ended. 

But if, on the contrary, the Rebel armies should have 
escaped intact our rapid manoeuvres, they would be able to 
unite and to form a body of great strength. The Union 
armies, in their rapid advance, have been greatly dimin- 
ished. Stragglers and sick have thinned their ranks ; a 
number of detachments, to occupy important towns, to se- 
cure and establish communications with the sea, have made a 
still larger reduction ; and if these two armies have started 
with a grand total of 400,000 men, their ultimate number. 



APPLICATION OP MAXIMS. T9 

after their three weeks' campaign, would probably not ex- 
ceed 250,000 men, if even this number could be brought 
together. The Rebels, on the contrary, by taking up every 
detachment, by uniting all fractions, might bring together a 
much larger force ; and if at this moment the Union army, 
animated by its previous successes, were to go headlong 
against the united Rebel army, the result might be a com- 
plete disaster, as no fresh base of operation, and no new 
plan of refuge would have been secured. A pursuit over a 
line of from 500 to 600 miles would ruin any regular army, 
still more so a volunteer one; besides, most of the detach- 
ments which have been made would be lost. 

The Union army should therefore come to a halt, to take 
breath and to establish a new base of operation, or even 
two ; one along the Savannah, and one along the Tennessee. 
Gun-boats should enter the Savannah River, and command 
it as far as Augusta. This latter town should be partly 
fortified to form a secure tete-de-pont. The passages over 
the Tennessee River should be secured, teles- de-pont estab- 
lished, the railroad lines to the north reopened, and, finally, 
stragglers and reinforcements brought in to replenish the 
army. Then operations may be recommenced. The plan 
would be the same here, where the united Union forces would 
have to contend with the united Rebel armies, as in the left 
zone, viz., to throw the Rebels back upon the sea. In a cam- 
paign of this description, in which good generals would be 
opposed to each other, as might be concluded from the pre- 
vious movements of both parties, all would depend on who 
makes the first fault. However, the final result, if the two 
temporary bases of operation are well secured, cannot be 



80 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

dubious. The superiority of numbers would be with the 
North ; and each of the three States would fall, one after 
the other — Georgia first ; then, taking the Chattahoochee as 
a fresh temporary base of operation, Alabama could be 
carried up to the Tombigbee, which river, in its turn, would 
serve as a base of operation against Mississippi. 

That the whole campaign we have here laid down is 
really a correct application of the rules of strategy to the 
geography of the theater of war, may be easily verified by 
recapitulating them : — 

1. The principle of engaging the main force on the de- 
cisive point has been strictly followed. Two large armies, 
two-thirds or more of the whole disposable force, were united 
for the purpose of operating in one zone, which was at the 
same time the decisive one. 

2. The plan of the threatening of many and distant points 
in the first disposition, and the formation of interior lines by 
uniting quickly the difi"erent army corps, has also found its 
application. The army of the Ohio threatened the whole 
upper center zone ; its rapid movement to the east brought 
it to a junction with the Potomac army, with which it held 
interior lines, or a central position against the Rebel forces 
in Yirginia and Kentucky. 

3. The formation of two lines of operation in one zone 
was necessitated and according to rules. It forced the 
enemy also to the adoption of two lines, or a division of 
force ; besides, it would have been impossible to move the 
whole army on one line ; and as each of the two Union 
armies was superior to the Rebel army both had to deal 
with, and as, at the same time, the lines of operation con- 



APPLICATION OF MAXIMS. 81 

ducted to a junction beyond the reach of the enemy, the 
application of the principle must be considered safe and 
justifiable. 

4. The strategic direction of the line of operation, or the 
choice of the base of operation for the left zone, was such 
that the enemy was forced to retreat, to leave an immense 
territory in the hands of our armies, or to fight a battle in 
which defeat was for him equivalent to destruction; whereas 
defeat for us meant nothing more than the sacrifice of a few 
thousand men and the loss of time — therefore the choice of 
the line of operation was decisive against the enemy, but 
not against us. 

5. Finally, the strategic direction of the line of operation 
in reference to the entire theater of war was such that it 
conducted us right into the heart of the theater of war; 
dividing the Rebel forces continually, and always holding a 
crushing superiority in a central position. 

In comparing this imaginary campaign with that of 1800, 
devised by Napoleon for the invasion of Italy and Germany, 
it will be found that the mountain region passing through 
the South plays the same role in the former as Switzerland 
did in the latter. By advancing to Shatfhausen, and there 
crossing the Rhine, and by entering Italy through the Alps, 
of which he held the gaps. Napoleon took, in the rear, the 
lines of Kray and Melas, in the valleys of the Danube and the 
Po. The left zone would be, in our theater of war, what 
the valley of the Danube was, and Kentucky and Tennessee 
what the valley of the Pp was in the campaign of 1800. 

It is evident that such operations, aimed right at the de- 
struction of the enemy's armies, are decisive; that all towns, 



82 rniNciPLEs op strategy. 

sea-ports, etc. fall as a matter of course; and that, applied 
to the South, from two to two and a half months would be 
all that should be required to carry them through. 

However, against every attack there is a defense, and 
there are several in the present case. Nearly all brilliant 
manoeuvres or successes in war are based on a blunder of 
the enemy; on a slight fault in his position; on a slight 
deficiency in his vigilance; neglect in the transmission of 
dispatches; on the dull comprehension of a general; on 
his natural slowness or rashness, etc. 

Operations which might be undertaken with brilliant suc- 
cess against mediocre generals, would turn out disasters if 
conducted against a master of his art. Therefore, suppos- 
ing that at the outset of the campaign the left flank of the 
Rebels could have been gained, is supposing that their first 
position was faulty, as in fact it was on the plains of Ma- 
nassas or Centreville; it is supposing that they lost time, 
one or even two days, after the movement on the Upper 
Potomac had begun, before they commenced their retro- 
grade movement ; it is supposing that they did not under- 
'stand at once the meaning of the whole movement; that 
they had not studied their theater of war, nor the rules of 
strategy; it is supposing many things more, which, after the 
proof of their abilities that they gave us in 1862, we are 
not permitted to suppose any longer. 

The plan of defense worthy of the plan of attack, would 
have been to dispose a large reserve army along the rail- 
road, between Chattanooga and Lynchburg; to send out 
from this great concentrated force two smaller armies, like 
two feelers, one in the direction of Louisville or Cincinnati, 



APPLICATION OF MAXIMS. 83 

the other in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap. At the 
first movement of the Potomac or Ohio army, these two 
armies retreat, closely defending, step for step, and forming, 
finally, a junction with the main Rebel force. This main 
army throws itself between the two Union armies, and, from 
its central position, tries to defeat first one and then the 
other. 

The Union armies, in this case, should have followed a 
similar course to that pursued by the allied armies in 1813, in 
Saxony, acting on exterior lines against Napoleon, who was 
forming interior lines. They always refused battle when 
the main army under Napoleon advanced against them, but 
advanced boldly the very moment this army had left and 
nothing but the army of observation remained opposed to 
them. They thereby so closely approached and wearied the 
army on the interior lines, by the numerous counter-marches 
necessary, that at the battle of Leipsic those three armies, 
acting on exterior lines, arrived in time, and took part in 
the fight. 

In this first case of defense, we have supposed that the 
Rebels acted strictly on correct principles ; that, from the 
simple concentration of our troops, they guessed at once 
the whole plan of operations, and took the necessary steps 
to prevent its execution. 

Had they not been so circumspect — that is, had they been 
surprised in the first moment — but then, as soon as they un- 
derstood the movement, taken the necessary steps to prevent 
disasters, their defense would have presented another aspect. 
Their first care would have been to reach intact the Upper 
Savannah with one army, and Cumberland Gap and Knox- 



84 



PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 



Fig. 5. 




APPLICATION OP MAXIMS. 8& 

ville with the other, iu order to form in those localities a 
junction of all their disposable forces, and to act as we have 
already described above, when speaking of the attack in case 
the Rebel armies escaped. It need be further remarked 
only, that the Rebels should, after this, try to hold the table- 
land of North Georgia; should try to prevent the estab- 
lishing of temporary but secure bases of operation, on the 
Savannah and Tennessee, by our troops; or should give 
these latter no time to obtain reinforcements, etc. 

The third and last mode of defense, and for a small force 
perhaps the surest of success, would be a system of fortifi- 
cations and of teles- de-pont round Richmond. Such a sys- 
tem would quickly put a stop to all rapid operations; it 
would prolong the war, and, perhaps, baffle the greatest 
exertions of the attacking forces. 

The James and Appomattox Rivers offer extensive facili- 
ties for the adoption of a similar plan. Fig. 5 will show 
which of the places on those rivers would be the most ad- 
vantageous to fortify. These fortifications would form a 
system similar to the Austrian quadrilateral in Italy. It 
might be objected that for the defense of works so exten- 
sive, a great number of men would be required ; and that 
these being taken from the army, would diminish its effi- 
ciency. This is, to a certain extent, true ; but here, as in 
all similar cases, probably convalescents, recruits, or men 
too old for active service, but not for the defense of a 
fortification, would be made use of 

The main fortifications, as they all form tetes-de-ponl, 
should be strong ; the guns in embrasures, and not en bar- 
bette; the corps-de-place should be sui'rounded by a nura- 

8* 



86 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

her of forts flanking each other, and able to contain, 
camped between them, a large army. The system of forti- 
fication, in one word, should be what is called the German 
system. 

Supposing now that both sides of Richmond, as well as 
Petersburg, were fortified in this way, both forming double 
tetes-de-pont and large camps, with a similar system of forti- 
fication existing on the Appomattox, just above City Point, 
and that this was joined to one on the James River, above 
City Point, as shown in the figure ; that, finally, similar 
works existed above Richmond, between Goochland C. H. 
and the latter town, as well as on the Appomattox, where 
the Richmond and Lynchburg Road crosses it. Supposing 
all these works existing, and certainly part of them do 
already exist, a large Rebel army might take shelter at any 
moment in the middle of them ; and by basing itself now 
on one, now on the other of the fortifications, it' could take 
any position, any front, without any possibility of being cut 
from its base. 

The defense of the fortifications should be conducted like 
that of Sebastopol — that is, aggressive in itself to a certain 
extent — and the field army should not leave the attacking 
or invading army one instant in repose. The time the 
Rebels would gain by a similar defense should be employed 
in the concentration of their entire force, so as to drive the 
Union army back. 

It should also be remarked that this system would force 
the Union army to leave the advantageous direction of its 
line of operation, and to base itself on the James or Pa- 
munkey Rivers, which is equivalent to giving up all decisive 



APPLICATION OP MAXIMS. 8t 

operations iu the main left zone. The formation of a for- 
tified double tele-de-pont at Lynchburg migjit perhaps also 
prove an advantage. 

It would be impossible to discuss here the operations 
which might take place in consequence of such a system of 
defense ; we may remark that they might be brilliant, and 
some of them, perhaps, entirely new. What can be done, 
under similar circumstances, is shown by Radetzky's ma- 
noeuvres, in 1848, in the Austrian quadrilaterals. 

Before closing this chapter, I wish to repeat once more, 
that the whole of the above reasoning is only based on such 
a knowledge of the theater of war as I could derive from 
common maps. There may be several mistakes in the geog- 
raphy, or in the application of the principles laid down to 
a geography which is not correct. The reader, in this case, 
must be indulgent, and only consider that what has been 
said is already more than sufficient to show, in its general 
form, the application of the rules of grand war to the thea- 
ter of operations formed by the Southern Confederacy. 

We will now pass on to the campaign of 1862. 



88 TRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 

Before entering on the discussion of this campaign, I 
will give a short and simple narrative of it. I have no other 
sources of information at my disposal than the accounts 
published by the press of the country, and hence some of 
the details, as well as some of the dates and figures, may 
have been incorrectly stated. 

The reader must excuse such mistakes, if there are any ; 
the more so, as the description of the campaign is not in- 
tended for a history, but merely for the text of a strictly 
military criticism. Besides, I design merely to discuss the 
great movements, and not to enter into details of battles or 
of smaller operations. It will therefore be of little or no 
importance if some of the petty details should have been 
omitted or inaccurately set down. 

To render the discussion more easily understood, and to 
give a view of the whole of the past campaign, I have added 
a map on which will be found the positions of the armies, 
and the principal lines of operation of these armies during 
the campaign of 1862. 

The year 1861 had closed with enormous preparations 
for this campaign. With recruiting, manufacturing of 
arms, organizing regiments and armies, the latter months of 
1861 had passed away; and the new year found an immense 



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CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 89 

array aud navy, created from almost nothing, ready to take 
the field. The fear of foreign intervention, called forth by 
the Trent affair, had subsided; and we find the principal 
actors in the great drama everywhere engaged in giving 
the last touches to the vast preparations and armaments 
just ready to be launched against the Southern Confederacy. 

The fleet had taken the advance of the army, and was 
already fully engaged in accomplishing its part in the great 
struggle. The blockade and shutting up of the Southern 
harbors was in full operation at the beginning of 1862. 
Up to the middle of January nothing of importance took 
place. Skirmishing, reconnoitering, and foraging were 
the order of the day, until the 12th of January, when the 
campaign was really opened by the starting of General 
Burnside, with four brigades, numerous transports, and 
gun-boats, from Fortress Monroe for an unknown destina- 
tion. 

In the West this start was soon followed ; concentration 
of troops had taken place in Missouri, in Illinois, near 
Cairo, and in North Kentucky, on the Louisville and Nash- 
ville Railroad. Numerous iron-clad river gun-boats had 
been constructed to act on the Mississippi, Ohio, and Ten- 
nessee, etc. On the 19th of January the first clang of bat- 
tle was heard in the West, and the first Union victory was 
gained by General Thomas over General Zollikoffer, at 
Mill Springs, near Somerset, Ky. 

The river navy, determined not to be behindhand with 
the army, in its turn commences with a brilliant exploit. 
Flag-officer Foote captures Fort Henry, on the Tennessee 
River, on the 6th of February, which fort was designed to 



90 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

close this river to any Union advance; and he then as- 
cended the river as far as Florence. 

In Missouri, the Union army, under General Curtis, ad- 
vances against Springfield, a position held by the Rebel 
General Price; another army, under General Pope, nears 
New Madrid ; General Grant advances vrith his troops in 
the direction of Fort Donelson, along the peninsula formed 
by the Cumberland and the Tennessee Rivers ; General 
Buell pushes forward to encounter the Rebels at Bowling 
Green; and smaller corps advance in the direction of Cum- 
berland Gap. 

The whole West, over a distance of 600 miles, is in 
motion, and the motto is everywhere "forward." Fort 
Donelson, situated on the Cumberland River, below Dover, 
is attacked by General Grant's army, and, after a severe 
fight, and the escape of part of its garrison, it surrenders, 
on the 16th of February, leaving 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners 
and immense quantities of material of war in the hands of 
the victors. 

Pressed in front by General Buell, outflanked by the gun- 
boats, and General Grant's army ascending the Cumberland 
and the Tennessee Rivers, the Rebel troops in Kentucky 
begin to fear for their communications ; they evacuate Bow- 
ling Green, Clarksville, and even Nashville, taking position 
at Murfreesborough, under General Johnston, about twenty 
miles south of Nashville, which latter town is occupied by 
General Buell and his army on the 24th. 

General Grant proceeds to Savannah, on the Tennessee 
River; the evacuation of Columbus, one of the strongest 
barriers to the passage of the Mississippi, becomes a neces- 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 91 

sity for the Rebels, if they do not wish to see their com- 
mnnications endangered. They accordingly retreat to Jack- 
son, Tenn., on the 3d of March, where they form a junction 
with the troops already assembled under General Beaure- 
gard. 

New Madrid and Island No. 10 were the only obstruc- 
tions left in the great river; but they soon fall. New 
Madrid is evacuated by the Confederates, and occupied by 
General Pope's troops on the 13th of March ; and Island 
No. 10 surrenders to the same, after a long bombardment, 
on the 1th of April. With it, the last barrier of the Upper 
Mississippi is thrown down, and the higher part of this 
river is reopened to Northern navigation. 

In Missouri, in the mean time, events had occurred too ; 
Price receded before the advancing Union force into Ar- 
kansas; Springfield is occupied by Federal troops, who 
soon follow the Rebel general along the road to Fayette- 
ville. But Price, being reinforced by Arkansas and Texas 
troops, and a body of Indians 5000 to 6000 strong, form- 
ing a total of about 30,000 men, the whole under the com- 
mand of General Van Dorn, does not remain any longer 
on the defensive, and advances from Fayetteville to encoun- 
ter the Federal array under General Curtis, numbering from 
30,000 to 40,000 men. 

General Curtis is apprised of the advance of the Rebels, 
and concentrates his force at Pea Ridge, near Sugar Creek. 
The Rebels, on their march to this latter place, leave the 
main road from Fayetteville to their right, and having 
gained the same latitude as the Union army, they move to 
the east, and thereby turn the position of the latter. They 



92 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

form their line of battle in the rear of the Federal troops, 
aud force them to face northeast in the engagement which 
ensued. On the 8th of March the battle is fought, and, 
after a severe struggle, the Rebels are dislodged and obliged 
to retreat, in consequence of a flank movement executed by 
General Sigel. They manage, however, to escape, though 
our army was on their line of retreat. 

General Grant, in Tennessee, had moved his army to 
the left bank of the Tennessee River, and encamped at 
Shiloh, near Pittsburg Landing. His force .consisted of six 
divisions, namely, Hurlbut, Prentiss, Sherman, McCler- 
nand, Smith, and Wallace's. General Beauregard, mean- 
while, being joined by the troops coming from Columbus, 
under General Polk, and by a corps coming from Mobile, 
under General Bragg, took a position near Corinth; and 
concluded, with General Johnston at Murfreesborough, an 
arrangement, according to which they were to form a junc- 
tion of all their forces, aud defeat General Grant before he 
could be succored by General Buell from Nashville. 

This plan was put in execution by means of the Charles- 
ton and Memphis Railroad. Several unexpected incidents, 
so frequent in war, besides bad weather, obliged the Rebel 
leaders to postpone their attack for two or three days. 
General Buell, meanwhile, was moving from Nashville to- 
ward Shiloh, to form, in his turn, a junction with General 
Grant. Finally, on the 6th of April, the battle took place. 
General Grant's troops were somewhat taken by surprise ; 
they rallied, however, very quickly, and were, only after a 
resistance lasting nearly the whole day, and attended with 
very heavy loss, obliged to seek shelter under their guu- 
boatti. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 93 

The different delays in the attacli had given General 
Buell time to arrive ; not, however, early enough to gain 
the battle fought on the Gth, but another battle, which was 
to be fought on the Tth. After a very severe engagement, 
the Rebels were finally obliged to fall back, which they did 
slowly and in good order, the loss and exhaustion on both 
sides being such that no immediate pursuit took place. The 
loss of the Rebels is stated to have been about 10,000 ; that 
of the Union forces was heavier, including several thousand 
prisoners. 

General Beauregard retreated to Corinth, where he took 
up a fortified position. To fight the array under his com- 
mand, a junction of the different Union armies, commanded 
by Generals Pope, Grant, and Buell, became necessary, and 
was also effected under the command-in-chief of General 
Halleck. This large Union army slowly advanced against 
Corinth, of which place a kind of siege was undertaken ; 
but scarcely were the preparations for a determined attack 
completed, when, on the 30th of May, the Rebels disap- 
peared, leaving their intrenchments in the hands of the 
Union troops. They retreated toward Grenada, at which 
place they took up another position unmolested by the 
Federal army. 

The occupation of Corinth, Memphis, and all the terri- 
tory between the Mississippi and Tennessee was the conse- 
quence of this retrograde movement. The occupation of 
Memphis was hastened by gun-boat operations on the Mis- 
sissippi. Several naval engagements had taken place be- 
tween Federal and Confederate gun-boats, when, on the 
2tth of April, Flag-officer Farragut commenced the bom- 

9 



94 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

bardment of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, below New Or- 
leans, on the Lower Mississippi, and, by j^assing above these 
forts, forced the City of New Orleans to surrender on the 
28th of April, The next day the forts followed the ex- 
ample of the city, and hauled down their colors. 

After the occupation of Memphis, which took place in 
June, only one obstruction to the navigation of the Missis- 
sippi remained, and this was Yicksburg. Great activity 
reigned on the river; gun-boats ascended its different afflu- 
ents searching for Rebel steamers, cutting off the communi- 
cations of the Rebel armies, and exploring the country. 

Vicksburg also was attacked by the fleet, but resisted 
all attempts to capture it; and, after a bombardment last- 
ing over a month, the siege was raised on the 25th of July. 
After the raising of this siege, nothing of importance took 
place in the West up to the invasion of Kentucky by Bragg. 
A few attacks by small bands were made on the Union 
forces at Baton Rouge, Murfreesborough, and several other 
places ; raids were executed by Rebel cavalry or guerrillas 
in the interior of the already occupied territory of Missouri, 
Tennessee, and Kentucky, and these kept the Union troops 
alive. 

The only incident worth mentioning is the retreat of 
General Curtis, who had, after the battle of Pea Ridge, 
penetrated into Arkansas, but found himself obliged to fall 
back, and was followed by the Rebel Generals Hindraan 
and Rains. He reached Helena, on the Mississippi, on the 
6th of July, and with it safety. 

Such were the events of the Western campaign, which, at 
least at its outset, may certainly be called brilliant. Every- 
where the stars and bars had given way before the old flag. 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 95 

In the East, at the beginning, matters were progressing 
quite as satisfactorily. 

General Burnside, as we have seen, sailed on the 12th of 
January from Fortress Monroe. He arrived on the Itth 
at Cape Hatteras, N. C. On the 8th of February, he at- 
tacked Roanoke Island, which surrendered after a sharp 
fight, leaving 3000 prisoners in the hands of the victors. 
From this point, as a base of operation, a number of expedi- 
tions are undertaken up the different rivers emptying into 
Pamlico or Albemarle Sound. On the 20th, Winton, on 
the Chowan River, is taken ; on the 14th of March, a fight 
takes place at Newbern, on the Neuse River; on the 21st, 
Washington, on Pamlico River, is occupied; and on the 23d, 
Morehead is entered by General Parks's troops. 

Not less fruitful of success is the more Southern theater 
of war in the beginning of the campaign. The force at 
Port Royal, S. C, placed under the command of General 
Hunter, attacked Fort Pulaski, yvhich, after a bombardment, 
surrendered to the batteries on Tybee Island on the 11th of 
April, Jacksonville, and, somewhat later, also Pensacola, 
both in Florida, are occupied by Union troops. An attack 
on Charleston, on the 19th of June, however, fails, in con- 
sequence of a fight on James Island, where the Federal 
troops were repulsed with loss. Soon after this event, part 
of the troops in this section, consisting of General Stevens's 
division, were embarked, and sailed for Fortress Monroe, 
where they arrived on the ITth of July. 

During the time when the events described above were 
transpiring in the West and the South, the army of the 
Potomac, under General McClellan, was not idle. On the 



96 PRINCIPLES OF STHATEGY, 

7th of February, Romney, in Western Virginia, is entered 
by the Federal troops under General Lander ; and on the 
2 4th of the same month, operations commence in the Shen- 
andoah valley, with the occupation of Harper's Ferry by 
G eneral Banks. Charlestown, Martinsburg, and Bunker Hill 
are occupied a few days later. On the 8th of March, Col. 
Geary moves from Lovettsville to Leesburg; and on the 
12th, General Banks enters Winchester and Berry ville. 

These movements on their left flank, determine the Rebels 
to abandon their fortified positions at Centreville and Ma- 
nassas, which places are entered by the Union troops on 
the 10th and 12th. From these two places, cavalry is pushed 
forward in the direction of Aquia Creek and Warrenton ; 
they find the Rebels on the Rappahannock ; Warrenton is 
still held by their cavalry. 

In the Shenandoah valley, the forward movement is con- 
tinued. After fighting a battle at Winchester with the 
Rebels under General Jackson, in which the latter were 
repulsed, the Federal troops enter Strasburg on the 23d of 
March, and Woodstock on the 1st of April. On the 17th 
of March, another great movement was undertaken ; the 
embarkation of the main body of the army of the Potomac 
for Fortress Monroe was commenced at Alexandria. 

This movement was being executed, when at Fortress 
Monroe, and in fact in the whole country, the greatest ex- 
citement existed in consequence of the appearance of the 
Rebel steamer Merrimac in Hampton Roads. On the 8th of 
March, this vessel, a large, old steam-frigate, which had only 
been half destroyed when the Union authorities left Norfolk 
at the outbreak of the rebellion, came out of Norfolk harbor 



CAMPATGv OP isea. 97 

transformed into an iron-clad war vessel. She entered 
Hampton Roads, and pursued a course directly toward two 
United States frigates — the Cumberland and the Congress 
— anchored at the entrance of the James River. Without 
heeding the shower of bullets sent against her from the 
two frigates, she runs into the Cumberland and sinks her. 
The Congress, in her turn, is attacked, and, after a short, 
heavy, gun action, takes fire and hauls down her colors. 

In the evening of this eventful day, the ^Monitor, an iron- 
clad steamer of the North, but of a different conptruction 
from that of the Merrimac, arrives in Hampton Roads ; and 
the next morning, when the Merrimac returns to complete 
her work of destruction, she finds, at least, an adversary 
worthy of hei*. After a long fight, in which neither of the 
two vessels gained a decisive advantage over the other, the 
Merrimac re-enters Norfolk harbor, and leaves the battle- 
field to her adversary. 

Great preparations were then made at Fortress Monroe 
for the reception of the Rebel steamer Merrimac, should 
she appear once more ; but she did not come. Her pres- 
ence, however, rendered all operations on the James River 
impossible up to the moment of the evacuation of Norfolk 
by the Rebels, and her subsequent destruction. 

In the midst of the activity and excitement created by 
the Merrimac at Fortress Monroe, the army of the Potomac 
began to arrive. It took from the ITth of March to the 
4th of April to transport the larger part of the army, which 
nural)ered from 80,000 to 100,000 men, to its place of desti- 
nation. 

On the 5th of April, preparations had so far advanced as 
9* 



98 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

to permit of a forward movement. General McClellan had 
arrived, and the troops were put in motion in the direction 
of Yorktown. General Keyes, with three divisions, formed 
the left, and advanced on the road to Lee's Mill. General 
McClellan, with the remainder of the troops, marched to the 
right. On the Tth, the army arrived in the neighborhood 
of Yorktown, and found itself in front of a long range of 
field-works, extending from York to James River, and 
occupied by a Rebel army under the orders of General 
Magruder. 

Most of the field-works were nearly unapproachable, in 
consequence of the swampy condition of the ground in 
front. An attempt near Lee's Mill to carry them failed. 
The navy, trying to invest Yorktown by water, found it so 
well armed and provided that the object could not be 
effected. General McDowell, who was expected to join the 
army at Yorktown, to disembark near Gloucester, and, by 
ascending York River, to turn the Rebel position on the 
Peninsula, did not come, in consequence of an order of the 
War Department, giving him an independent command be- 
tween Blue Ridge and the Potomac. Finally, James River 
being blockaded by the Merrimac, no alternative was left, in 
order to advance, but to undertake the siege of Yorktown. 

Preparations for this siege were immediately made. But 
while the siege was going on, the troops left in the north of 
Virginia were not idle. They had been divided into three 
independent corps, of which General Fremont commanded 
one, in the mountains west of the Shenandoah ; General 
Banks the next, in the Shenandoah valley ; and General 
McDowell the third, in the country east of Blue Ridge. 



CAiMPAIGN OF 18G2. 99 

On the nth of April, Monterey, Highland County, Va., 
is entered by General Milroy, from Fremont's command. 
Mount Jackson is occupied by General Banks's troops, 
and the Union columns push forward to New Market and 
Sparta — Jackson, with his army, all the while retreating in 
the direction of Stannardville and Gordonsville. General 
McDowell, on his side, advances toward Fredericksburg ; 
he enters Falmouth, and, on the 19th, Fredericksburg sur- 
renders, and is occupied by the Federal troops. 

Meanwhile the siege of Yorktown had proceeded ; bat- 
teries had been established, and all was ready for a final 
blow, when, on the 4th of May, the town was reported to 
be evacuated by the Rebels. In fact, they had left their 
intrenchments, and were in full retreat toward "Williams- 
burg, The same day, the army of the Potomac started in 
pursuit on two roads — one leading from Lee's Mill, the 
other from Yorktown to Williamsburg. On the 5th, a 
strong Rebel rear guard was found in position ; but, after 
a severe engagement, was dislodged, in consequence of a 
successful flank movement executed by General Hancock. 

While part of the army followed the Rebels by land, a 
body of troops, under command of General Franklin, was 
transported by water from Yorktown to West Point, to act 
on the communications of the Rebels still left on the Penin- 
sula. This gave rise to another fight on the Tth, which the 
Rebels had to sustain, in order to give their troops coming 
from Williamsburg time to pass. 

After a stay of several days at Williamsburg, the array 
resumed its forward movement, and arrived, on the 16th of 
May, at White House, on the Pamunkey River, from which 



100 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

point, as a temporary base, the army started, and arrived at 
the Chickahominy, at the place where the railroad crosses 
the creek, and called Bottom Bridge. 

These forward movements, as well as the proximity of 
General Burnside, endangered the communications of the 
troops in and around Norfolk, the evacuation of which 
place consequently became a necessity; it was effected on 
the 12th of May, and as the town was nearly immediately 
afterward occupied by Union troops, the Merrimac was left 
without any place to go to, and was therefore blown up by 
its commander. The navigation on the James River being 
thus opened by the destruction of their powerful adversary, 
the Federal gun-boats immediately entered and ascended the 
river; but at a distance of about ten miles from Richmond, 
they found themselves stopped by a barrier in the river and 
a heavy battery at Fort Darling, both of which obstacles 
united rendered all efforts at further advance useless. 

Between the Chickahominy Creek and Richmond, the 
Rebel army was encountered by the Federal troops; the 
Confederates were strongly intrenching themselves, render- 
ing farther immediate advance difficult. Part of the army 
passed the creek at Bottom Bridge ; four divisions were 
established on the right bank, along the railroad — in eche- 
lon, one behind the other — the foremost near Fair Oaks. 
These divisions formed the left wing of the army; the re- 
mainder, or right wing, was established from Bottom Bridge 
up the creek, the higher part of which, however, remained 
in possession of the Rebels. (See Fig. 6.) 

In this position the army remained for some time, busily 
engaged with establishing bridges over the creek, to secure 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 101 

the communication between the right and the left wing. 
The construction of these bridges was a difficult task, 
owing to the swampy condition of the river and its banks, 
and it took a considerable length of time. The season was 
exceedingly wet, and the bed of the river changed continu- 
ally. 

On the 26th and 27th of May, General Porter was sent 
to Hanover C H., to form a junction with General Mc- 
Dowell. An engagement took place with a Rebel division 
under General Branch, in which the Federal troops re- 
mained victorious ; but the projected junction was not 
effected — it was already too late. General McDowell, Gen- 
eral Banks, and General Fremont, as well as the whole army 
forming the garrison of Washington, had been thrown on 
the defensive by an audacious movement of General Jack- 
son ; and the terror in and around Washington was such, 
that orders were even sent to burn the only bridges by 
which a junction between General McClellan's and General 
McDowell's army was possible. This is, however, how 
matters happened : — 

On the 8th of May, Generals Jackson and Johnston, hav- 
ing united their forces in the Shenandoah valley, marched 
to "attack General Milroy at Bull PasturS Mountain, Pen- 
dleton County, Va. After an engagement. General Milroy 
retreated to Franklin, where the remainder of General Fre- 
mont's corps was stationed. The Rebels, after some delay, 
marched to Front Royal, where they arrived on the 23d, 
and captured the small garrison, General Banks at the time 
being stationed, with two brigades, at Strasburg. General 
Jackson's force moved from Front Royal direct to Middle- 



102 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

town, a place between Strasburg and Winchester, thereby 
seizing the communications of General Banks. Before, 
however, Jackson had arrived there in force, General Banks 
had commenced his retreat, and finding Middletown but 
feebly occupied, opened his way through, and escaped with 
the main body of his command. At Winchester, where a 
short stay was made, he was attacked by the Rebels, and, 
after a fight of several hours, obliged to retreat to Martins- 
burg, and thence across the Potomac, near Williamsport ; 
making, in all, nearly sixty miles in two days. 

General Fremont was informed of General Jackson's 
move on the 25th ; he struck camp the same day, and 
marched first to Petersburg, and from there to Strasburg, 
where Jackson had passed but a very short time before. 
Nearly at the same time, the advance of General Mc- 
Dowell's corps arrived and joined in the pursuit. Jackson, 
under continual skirmishing, retreated south, and on the 
Yth of June it was ascertained by a reconnoissance that he 
had left Harrisonsburg to the right on his march, and was 
crossing the Shenandoah at a place called Port Republic, 
the only place where a bridge was to be found for a long 
distance. 

General Fremont, who had arrived meanwhile at Har- 
risonsburg, on receiving this intelligence moved his army 
in the direction of Port Republic ; but was stopped at 
Cross Keys, a place about half way from his destination, by 
the rear guard of the Rebels, about 5000 strong, drawn up 
in line of battle, to cover the crossing of their train and 
main body over the Shenandoah. General Fremont attacked 
their position with his 20,000 men, but without ensemble, 



CAMPAUIN OF 130J. 



103 



Fig. G. 




104 PRINCirLES OF STUATEGY. 

and got beaten in detail. The next morning, when revenge 
was to be taken for the aflVont of the preceding evening, 
the Rebel rear guard had disappeared, and was only re- 
found on the other side of the Shenandoah ; but the bridge 
over this river was burned. 

While his rear guard was beating Fremont, Jackson, who 
had already crossed with his main body, found himself op- 
posed by General Tyler, of General Shields's division, who 
was sent from Luray to Waynesborough, to intercept him 
or prevent him crossing. General Tyler paid dearly for the 
attempt; his brigade was nearly annihilated, and his artil- 
lery captured. General Jackson, freed from his numerous 
pursuers, retreated with his booty unmolested toward Gor- 
donsville. General Shields's division belonged to Gen- 
eral McDowell's corps, who had been ordered to join in 
the pursuit of Jackson, and had left Fredericksburg at the 
end of May. 

In the mean time, while this daring movement of Jackson 
was taking place, the Chickahominy became the theater of 
more serious events. On the 31st of May and 1st of June, 
the battle of Fair Oaks was fought by part of the army of 
the Potomac. (Fig. 6.) 

The Rebels, seeing the exposed position of the left wing 
of this army, resolved to attack it with their whole force. 
A thunder-storm had been raging the day before, and the 
rising of the Chickahominy was expected by them, and with 
the rising they hoped that all communications would be cut 
off between the right and left wings, and that the four divi- 
sions composing the left would be exposed to their blows, 
while the right could do nothing but remain spectators. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1C62. 105 

The attack was made on tlie 31st of May, and on the front 
of the Union troops ; but, at the same time, a column moved 
on its flank, with the intention of taking possession of Bot- 
tom Bridge, and thereby forcing the four Union divisions 
into White Oak Swamp, where their destruction would have 
been certain. The front attack had raged for a long while, 
and the flanking column of the Rebels had nearly reached 
its destination, when it was attacked on its own flank by 
General Sumner's corps debouching over a bridge he had 
succeeded in throwing across the creek, which had not yet 
begun to rise. This attack creates disorder among the 
Rebels ; their commander, General Johnston, in trying to 
retrieve the day, is severely wounded, and leaves the field. 
Night stopped the fighting, which, however, recommenced 
on the 1st of June, but without ensemble and ordre by the 
Rebels. 

The attack, which had been a success at the commence- 
ment of the first day, ended with the retreat of the Confed- 
erates. Some 6000 to 8000 killed and wounded on either 
side, besides a few cannon captured by the Rebels, were the 
only result of this bloody battle. The remainder of the 
Union forces could not participate in the engagement, as 
at the moment the bridges over the Chickahominy were to 
be thrown, the creek rose,, and even carried away part of 
General Sumner's bridge. 

The time immediately following the battle was employed 
by both armies in intrenching themselves, and by the Union 
army, also, in building bridges, and thereby creating good 
communications between its right and left wings. In this 
way matters pasied up to the Ulh, when the uniformity 

10 



106 rUINCll'LES OF STRATEGY. 

of camp life was somewhat disturbed by the cavalry raid of 
Colonel Lee, at the head of 1500 men, in the rear of the 
Union army toward White House. This raid exposed at 
once the precarious and open position of the rear and the 
communications of the Federal army ; and it would appear 
that the commander of the Union troops, in consequence 
thereof, took into consideration the change of base from the 
Pamunkey to the James River, which was open to his gun- 
boats as far as Fort Darling ; at least such may be inferred 
from orders, which he gave at that time, for transports with 
supplies to come up the James River. 

While the armies were confronting each other near Rich- 
mond, the Confederate army at Corinth had retreated to 
Grenada unmolested by General Halleck. It was then gen- 
erally and openly asserted that part of their force was com- 
ing East to join the army in front of their capital, and now 
commanded by General Lee, in consequence of General 
Johnston's wound. How far the reports respecting this 
reinforcement are correct, it is difficult to say ; and though 
in the following battles the numbers of the Rebels were 
stated to be very great, the forces actually engaged do not 
by any means show such superiority. 

In the north of Virginia, General Fremont found his 
position at Mount Jackson too exposed, and so he re- 
treated. General McDowell, after his fruitless pursuit, 
takes position at Manassas Junction, and sends the division 
of General McCall, by way of Fortress Monroe, to the sup- 
port of General McClcllan. On the 26th of June, by an 
order of tlie War Department, the corps of Banks, Mc- 
Dowell, and Fremont were consolidated, and placed under 



CAMPAiaN OF 1862. 107 

the command of General Pope. In consequence of this 
order, General Fremont resigned, and the command of his 
corps is taken by General Sigel. 

The excitement created in the army of the Potomac by 
Colonel Lee's daring raid had scarcely subsided, when an- 
other mysterious movement was observed at Mechanicsville 
Bridge. It was also ascertained that Jackson, with his 
force, was at Hanover C. H. 

As in the following days, however, nothing of importance 
transpired, a forward movement was arranged for the'25th, 
and successfully executed. After a heavy skirmish, the 
Federal troops had advanced about a mile and held their 
ground. But the next day matters changed; the enemy, 
instead of attacking the Federal position in front, had 
crossed at Mechanicsville or Meadows Bridge, and were 
advancing against the right wing of the Union array, under 
General Fitz John Porter, consisting of two divisions and 
the reserve of regulars. General McCall being attacked, 
resisted successfully on the first day. In the night. Gen- 
eral Porter's entire train was passed over the bridges on 
the right bank of the Chickahominy. General McCall re- 
treated from his first position, and formed, with the divi- 
sions of General Morrill and General Sickles, a line of 
battle in front of Gaines's Mills. They were to pa ss the 
bridge on the evening of the 27th, and to execute with the 
array a grand movement through White Oak Swamp toward 
James River. 

Early on the 27th the fight commenced, the Rebels push- 
ing forward with the utmost determination ; the divisions of 
Slocum and Richardson are sent to the support of the right 



108 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEOY. 

wing ; the fight becomes so intense that all the reserves of 
the right wing are successively engaged ; the enemy has the 
last reserve to give out, and he carries the day and victory 
with it.' The left wing, formed by General McCall's troops, 
is entirely broken, and the disorder reaches even the i^enter. 
Happily, night and two fresh brigades arrive — those of 
Meagher and French — which puts a stop to further pur- 
suit. 

In the night, the whole of the right wing passes the 
bridges over the Chickahominy ; these bridges are de- 
stroyed, and the 28th finds. the whole Federal force on the 
right of the creek. This same creek, which, on the 1st of 
June, had nearly caused the ruin of the army, proves this 
time to be its salvation. On the 27th an attack was also 
made on the left wing, to prevent this wing sending rein- 
forcements to the right. This attack was, however, feebly 
executed, and without much result. The 28th and 29th 
were employed by the Federal army in passing its trains 
through White Oak Swamp, and by the Rebels in trans- 
ferring part of their forces back to the right bank of the 
river. On the 29th, however, they attacked the rear guard 
of the army at Savage Station, but were repulsed. In- the 
night, the Federal army retreated, and on the 30th it had 
passed through White Oak Swamp; and the advanced 
guard, conducted by Keyes and Porter, arrived the same 
day on James River. 

A rear guard was left on the south side of White Oak 
Swamp, where several roads cross each other ; under its 
protection, the trains arrively safely at Malvern Hill, This 
rear guard was, however, attacked with vigor by the Con- 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 109 

federates; the Union troops fought with great bravery, and 
effected their -retreat, repulsing nearly every attack. The 
last attack was tried against the whole Union force united 
on Malvern Ilill, and covered by 300 pieces of artillery; 
the Rebels were obliged to retreat after having experienced 
heavy loss. From Malvern Hill, the army of the Potomac 
moved to Harrison's Landing, where its repose was little 
disturbed, except by occasional shelling from the other side 
of the James River, where the Rebels had concentrated part 
of their forces. 

On the 11th of July, the Rebels had entirely disappeared 
from the front of the Union army. A reconnoissance, made 
by General Porter, found them, however, beyond Malvern 
Hill, and on their guard. 

The army of the Potomac had been greatly diminished 
by the sword as well as by si«kness, and the Rebel army 
had taken the offensive. It became evident that the total 
number of Union troops under arms was not sufficiently 
large to subdue the rebellion. A call for 300,000 more 
volunteers was made, and soon afterward another call for 
300,000 militia men to be drafted for nine months. Stevens's 
division was recalled from Port Royal, and Burnside was 
withdrawn from North Carolina. These troops arrived in 
the course of July at Fortress Monroe. 

At the commencement of August, some demonstrations 
or reconnoissances are made by the Union army in the di- 
rection of Petersburg. Finally, on the 12th of August, the 
army of the Potomac, not being strong enough to retake the 
offensive, commences its retreat by passing over the Chicka- 
hominy near its mouth. The march in the direction of 

10* 



no PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

Yorktown, where it arrives on the 16th, is executed un- 
molested by the Rebels. At Yorktown, the army is rc- 
embarked, and transported, partly to Aquia Creek and 
partly to Alexandria. General Burnside, with his corps, 
had sailed before, and had already occupied Fredericks- 
burg. After its return, the army of the Potomac did not 
find much repose. It had scarcely arrived, when it encoun- 
tered, in front of Washington, those same Rebel divisions 
it had left in front of Richmond. 

General Pope, when he took command of the army in 
North Virginia, established his headquarters at Warren- 
ton, where Banks and McDowell's corps were concentrated. 
General Sigel, with his corps, was at Sperryville and Luray, 
forming the right wing, and the troops at SPredericksburg 
formed the utmost left. General Hatch was ordered to ad- 
vance with a brigade from Warrenton to Gordonsville ; he 
went as far as Culpepper, pushing cavalry over the Rapidan 
to Orange C. H. From Fredericksburg a small cavalry force 
is also pushed southward to Beaver Dam, on the Richmond 
and Gordonsville Railroad. General Jackson is reported in 
force at Gordonsville, and consequently General Hatch re- 
treated. On the 1 0th of August, General Jackson advances 
to Cedar Run, about six miles south of Culpepper C. H, 
Here he is encountered by General Banks ; after a fight, in 
which General Banks's corps sustains heavy loss, and could 
only hold its ground when supported by fresh troops, Gen- 
eral Jackson retreated, on the following day, over the 
Rapidan. 

Soon after the battle of Cedar Mountain, General Pope 
is apprised that the Rebel army of Virginia is in motion 



CAMPAION OF 18t;2, 111 

against him. lie commences, on the 20th of Angnst, his 
retreat toward the Rappahannock to form a junction with 
General McClellan's troops, then beginning to arrive from 
the Peninsula.. On the Rappahannock, the Rebels soon 
appear in front of him, making feints to cross the river 
above and belbw, while part of their forces in reality cross 
at Waterloo Bridge. General Pope being apprised of the 
fact, sends part of his force against the Rebels reported to 
have crossed. These Federal troops find a large Confed- 
erate force near Waterloo, which occupies them in front ; 
while a large part of the enemy under General Jackson, 
having also a heavy force of cavalry with them, moves to 
Salem, and from there through Thoroughfare Gap to Ma- 
nassas Junction. Their cavalry penetrates to Centreville 
and Falls Church; also up to the Potomac, in Loudon 
County, and to Winchester, in the Shenandoah valley. 

At Manassas Junction, where the Rebel armies arrive on 
the 24th, they capture a large amount of government prop- 
erty. The force from Waterloo retreated toward Warren- 
ton ; and, on the 25th, when General Pope was apprised of 
the Rebel movement in his rear, he, on the suggestion of 
General Sigel, sent General McDowell and General Sigel to 
Gainesville, with orders to intercept communications be- 
tween General Jackson and General Lee, the latter being 
still, with his main force, near Salem. General Reno, with 
one division, was sent to Greenwich to support, if necessary, 
General McDowell. General Hooker and General Fitz John 
Porter, who had already arrived from General McClellan's 
army, and who were stationed near Warrenton Junction, 
were ordered to march to Manassas Junction. One divi- 



112 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

sion was sent to occupy Thoroughfare Gap ; finding it only 
feebly defended by the enemy, part of whose force were 
about to cross, the gap was carried, and, as the enemy soon 
afterward retreated, and no sign of his presence being left, 
this division quitted the gap to join in the fight in which 
the remainder of the Union troops were engaged. 

General Hooker, on his march from Warrenton Junction 
toward Manassas Junction, encountered, on the 2Tth, the 
Rebel General Ewell, with his division, at Bristow Station, 
near Kettle Run, south of Manassas Junction. General 
Ewell is attacked and thrown back toward Manassas, whence 
he moves in the direction of Centreville. Another part of 
Jackson's force, on the 28th, in the morning, encounters 
General McDowell at Haymarket. This force is thrown 
back and unites with Ewell, who had fought Hooker the 
day before. 

On the 29th, those Rebel troops take a position between 
Centreville and Haymarket, partly parallel to, and partly 
at right angles with, the Gainesville and Centreville Turn- 
pike. In this position, they are attacked by the entire 
Union army under General Pope, but without definite re- 
sult. The battle lasts till dark. In the night, the Rebels 
are strongly reinforced through Thoroughfare Gap by the 
remainder of General Lee's army. On the 30th, the fight 
recommences early in the morning, but does not take a 
decisive turn until the afternoon, when the left wing of the 
Federal army, under General Fitz John Porter and General 
McDowell, breaks, and the whole army is obliged to fall 
back beyond Bull Run. 

During the same night, General Pope retreats to Cen- 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 113 

treville, where General Franklin, with his corps, had already 
arrived, General Sumner, with his- corps, being still at Fair- 
fax C. H. The loss in killed, wounded, and missing, as 
well as in artillery, was heavy. The next day. General 
Banks, who had marched from the Rappahannock to 
Brentsville, arrived in safety at Centreville. 

The stay of General Pope at Centreville was not of long 
duration. On Monday, the 1st of September, the Rebels 
had turned his right flank once more, and pushed a column 
as far as Fairfax C. H. Generals Reno and Kearney were 
ordered to drive them thence; this was effected, but not 
without loss, the death of General Kearney himself being 
principally to be deplored. 

The position at Centreville being too much erxposed, 
General Pope commences his retreat, and seeks shelter 
under the guns of Washington. The same day, General 
Bumside was ordered to evacuate Fredericksburg, and to 
join the army of the Potomac with his corps. 

Here ends this memorable campaign in Virginia, com- 
menced by the Rebels on the defensive, and ended by a 
brilliant offensive, throwing the Union forces in disorder 
back to their first base of operation. But not only in Vir- 
ginia had the Rebels taken the offensive. No; on the 
whole theater of war their armies proceeded offensively, 
attacking everywhere the IJniion forces, and invading the 
scarcely conquered States. 

We left the Western armies after the evacuatioi of 
Corinth, the surrender of New Orleans, etc. On the 19th 
of July, General Halleck was called from the West to take 
the command-in-chief of all the United States forces. After 



114 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

his departure, General Grant occupied, with his army and 
that of General Pope, who was also called to the East, 
Jackson, Bolivar, Memphis, and Corinth. General Buell, 
with the army of the Ohio, moves back to South Tennessee 
and North Alabama. Nashville, Shelbyville, and Huntsville 
are occupied by his men. Cumberland Gap and Tazewell 
are held by General Morgan, with about 10,000 Federal 
troops. The Rebels have troops, under Generals Yan Dorn 
and Price, near Holly Springs and Tupelo in Mississippi, 
which they had transported there from Arkansas; under 
Bragg, at Chattanooga, where he had arrived from Tupelo ; 
and under Kirby Smith, in Eastern Kentucky and Tennessee. 

In order to take the offensive, the different Rebel armies 
in Tennessee and Kentucky advance in several columns from 
the Cumberland Mountains, as a base of operation, against 
the communications of the Ohio army. On the 26tb of Au- 
gust, they were reported, under Kirby Smith, in the neigh- 
borhood of Cumberland Gap, probably at Jacksborough. 
From there they marched into Kentucky. On the 29th, 
General Nelson is entirely routed by Kirby Smith near 
Richmond, Ky. Nelson falls back to Lexington, followed 
by the Rebels. From Lexington they push smaller bodies 
in the direction of Louisville and Covington, threatening 
thereby both those towns at the same time, and compelling 
the Union forces to divide for their defense; and in fact, 
great preparations are made in both places to repel an at- 
tack, of the Confederate forces, which is hourly expected. 

General Bragg, in his turn, is not idle. He moves to 
Sparta, Tennessee, thereby threatening to cut General 
Buell's communications with Nashville. 



CAMPAIGN OP 18G2. 115 

While those larger movements are being carried on, West- 
ern "Virginia is scoured by Rebel cavalry and guerrillas, 
and the valley of the Kanawha is overrun by them. Some 
cavalry attacks are also made against Grant's army, to hold 
his force in check ; and Washington, in North Carolina, is 
attacked by the Rebel forces. 

General Buell, in order to counteract General Bragg's 
movement against his communications, concentrates his 
troops near Murfreesborough and McMinnsville, and 
marches them, about the 11th of September, to Nashville; 
but meanwhile General Bragg encounters this movement of 
the Union army by his advance into Kentucky, where he 
takes hold of General Buell's communications by his attack 
on Mumfordsville, at which place he obliged the Union 
forces, consisting of some 4000 infantry and several guns, 
to surrender on the 1 9th of September. 

In West Tennessee, the cavalry engagements with Grant's 
army are followed by a more serious affair. General Rose- 
craus encountered General Price at luka, near Corinth, and, 
after a sharp engagement on the 20th, forced him to retreat 
to Tupelo ; thence General Price marched to Ripley, where 
he forms a junction with General Van Dorn's forces. 

In the utmost right zone the Rebels also operate offen- 
sively. Generals Rains and Hindman leave Arkansas, and 
march against Missouri. 

General Buell, in order to prevent his being cut entirely 
from his base, marches to Louisville, leaving a strong gar- 
rison, under General Negley, in Nashville, which is fortified. 
The army of the Ohio begins to arrive, on the 24th of Sep- 
tember, at Louisville, Bragg having, in the mean while, 



IIG I'RINCIPLES OF STaATEOY. 

marched to Bardstown and Lawrenceburg. Humphrey 
Marshall, with about 5000 men, is at Paris, Ky., ready to 
join Kirby Smith. The diiferent Rebel corps are approach- 
ing to form a junction at the decisive moment. 

Meanwhile Nashville is invested by Rebel troops under 
General Breckinridge ; they go so far as to demand the 
surrender of .the city; which, however, is refused. The 
Rebel cavalry in Kentucky at the time performed many 
raids, and thereby created the belief that their force was 
larger than it really was. On the 28th, their cavalry en- 
tered Augusta, Ky., on the Ohio. 

On the nth of September, Cumberland Gap is evacuated 
by General Morgan, who retreats with his troops to Green- 
upsburg, on the Ohio, near Big Sandy River, where he 
arrives on the 4th of October, having been pursued all the 
time by Stevenson's and John Morgan's cavalry. 

General Buell organizes and reinforces his army at Louis- 
ville, and retakes the offensive against the Rebels. On the 
1st of October, a fight took place at Shelbyville, between 
troops from Louisville and those of General Buckner, whose 
main body was reported at Bardstown. 

The different Rebel corps now begin their retreat, fol- 
lowed by General Buell. On the 8th of October, however, 
General McCook being too much advanced, and pressing 
the Rebels too closely, they make a stand, and defeat Mc- 
Cook at Perryville ; but then resumed their retreat. At 
Harrodsburg, on the 10th, Bragg, Kirby Smith, and Hum- 
phrey Marshall united, and retreated to Camp Dick Robin- 
sou. On the 16th, Buell arrived at Crab Orchard, and the 
Rebels at Loudou. Ou the ISth, John Morgan, with his 



CAMPAION OF 1862. 117 

cavalry, accomplishes a raid which has its parallel only in 
that executed by the Rebel General Stuart, between the 
10th and 12th of the same month. He entered Lexington 
in the rear of Buell's army; marched to Versailles, Law- 
rencebnrg, and Bardstown ; captured several trains ; made 
the entire circuit of the Union army, and left Kentucky, by 
way of Cumberland Ford, on the 29th of October. 

In Western Tennessee, in the mean time, the Rebels 
had again taken the offensive, but were once more thrown 
on the defensive by General Rosecrans. On the 2d of Oc- 
tober, a battle was fought between this general, with four 
divisions, and General Van Dorn's force, which we left at 
Ripley, and which had marched to Pocahontas, and thence 
to Corinth. The Rebels say their force consisted only of 
three divisions. After a desperate fight, lasting nearly 
three days, the Rebels were driven back toward Poca- 
hontas, where they encountered General Ord coming from 
Bolivar. After another fight, and after having experienced 
great loss, they managed to escape across the Hatchie 
River, thence south to Holly Springs. 

At the end of October, General Buell was relieved from 
his command, and replaced by General Rosecrans. But the 
Rebels under Bragg meanwhile have escaped through Cum- 
berland Gap, and marched to Murfreesborough ; and the 
army of the Ohio, giving up the pursuit, marched toward 
Nashville, where it began to arrive on the 8th of Novem- 
ber. General Rosecrans himself reached this place on the 
13th. Rebel cavalry occupied Somerset, in Kentucky. 
Price and Van Dorn meanwhile were fully employed in 
reorganizing their army at Holly Springs and Tupelo, 

11 



118 PRINCIPLES OP BTRATEGy. 

where, on the 4th of November, General Grant eoraraenced 
an offensive operation against them by marching toward 
Lagrange. 

Before going further in the Western campaign, let us 
return to the East, where the offensive campaign of the 
Confederate army had not beenrof long duration, and had 
terminated in a similar way to that of the West. 

After having forced General Pope to return under the 
guns of Washington, which retreat was executed in the 
greatest disorder, the Rebels marched in the direction of 
Leesburg, and, on the 5th of September, commenced cross- 
ing into Maryland. On the Tth, Frederick was occupied by 
them, and their cavalry pushed as far as Middlebrook and 
Poolesville. General McClellan meantime had taken com- 
mand of the whole army — that of Pope as well as his own 
— and, on the 8th, commenced moving from Washington 
northward to meet General Lee. General Sumner this day 
occupied Darnestown. On the 9th, skirmishing takes place 
at Poolesville. On the 11th, Union troops occupy Sugar 
Loaf Mountain, near Monocacy Creek. The same day, the 
Rebels enter Hagerstown, and their columns have pressed 
from all sides toward Harper's Ferry. On the 12th, Fred- 
erick is entered by Union troops, who now push forward 
with great energy. On the 13th, the attack on Harper's 
Ferry had commenced. On the 14th, the Union troops, in 
their advance, encounter the Rebel rear guard at South 
Mountain and Crampton Gap ; the former is occupied by 
General Longstreet, and the latter by General Jackson's 
troops. Reno and Hooker carry the first, Franklin the 
second — but too late. 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 119 

Tin's engagement, entered into by the Rebels merely to 
gain time for their operations against Harper's Ferry, has 
fultilicd its object. Harper's Ferry surrenders on the 15th. 
General White — who had occupied Winchester, and left it 
at the commencement of September, in consequence of the 
Rebels' advance, had marched to Martinsburg, but returned 
thence to Harper's Ferry to assist Colonel Miles — was in- 
cluded in the surrender, which delivered some 12,000 pris- 
oners and great quantities of stores and ammunition into 
the hands of the victors. General Jackson, however, did 
not repose long on his laurels. Scarcely had the prisoners 
been paroled, when he resumed his march, and moved in the 
direction of Shepherdstown to join General Lee, who was 
posted near Sharpsburg, behind Antietam Creek, and was 
awaiting the Union army to give battle. 

On the 16th, General McClellan's army arrived near the 
creek, and formed in line of battle opposite the Rebels. 
General Hooker, with his army corps, crossed the creek 
during the afternoon of the 16th, and had a preliminary 
engagement with the JRebels; and, on the ITth, the whole 
army advanced to the attack. Generals Hooker, Sumner, 
and Franklin, with their respective corps, successively at- 
tack the left wing of the Rebels, which, however, holds firm, 
though at first it loses some ground. Their right wing is 
assailed by General Burnside, who is thrown back to the 
bridge from which he debouched at first. Night closes in, 
and no decisive result has been gained on either side. 

On the 18th, the two armies faced each other, without, 
however, engaging, both being worn out by marches and 
the previous d.ay's fighting. The Union troops are rein- 



120 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

forced this day, and during the night of the LSth the 
Rebels withdraw, in full order and great silence, over the 
Potomac. An attempt to follow them on the 20th, and to 
cross right in front of their army, fails, part of the troops, 
after having crossed, being repulsed with loss. After some 
demonstrations made in the direction of Williamsport, the 
Rebels retreat toward Winchester, taking position between 
this place and Bunker Hill. The Federal army does not 
molest them in this movement ; but occupies Harper's 
Ferry, and encamps in Pleasant Valley, covering nearly the 
whole front from Williamsport to Harper's Ferry. 

Nothing disturbed the repose of the two armies at the 
end of September or the commencement of October. Some 
reconnoissances were pushed toward Warrenton by General 
Sigel's corps ; they found Rebel pickets there. Leesburg, 
Aldie, and Thoroughfare Gap were also occupied by them. 

On the 10th of October, the repose of the army of the 
Potomac" was somewhat disturbed by the news that the 
Rebels had entered Pennsylvania, and occupied Chambers- 
burg. It turned out to be General Stuart on a cavalry 
raid. He had, with 1800 men, crossed the Potomac at Coy's 
Ferry, and moved to Chambersburg ; this place he left to 
march toward Fredericktown ; thence in the direction of the 
mouth of the Monocacy. Finding an infantry column there 
he turned to the left and recrossed three miles below, at 
White's Ford, carrying a great number of horses and other 
goods with him. The Federal cavalry arrived at the ford 
when the Rebels had passed; they had marched eighty- 
three miles in one march, just in time to see the last Rebel 
crossing. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 121 

After this remarkable feat, everything became quiet 
again ; the only fact of importance being a reconnoissance 
toward Winchester, and the sending of some troops, under 
General Cox, into the Kanawha valley, in Western Yir- 
ginia, to drive out the Rebels. 

Finally, at the end of October, signs of a general advance 
became manifest; and in fact, the 1st of November saw the 
whole army of the Potomac moving down Loudon valley, 
leaving Harper's Ferry strongly occupied. The cavalry 
being continually in advance, had to fight its whole way 
against Rebel cavalry. On the 3d, the army reaches the 
Manassas Gap Railroad, most of the gaps in coming down 
the valley having been occupied. 

On the 6th, Orleans and Warrenton are occupied ; and, 
on the 8th, General McClellan is relieved of his command, 
and replaced by General Burnside. This change in the 
command occasioned, probably, a change in the plan of 
operation; and, at all events, some delay in the further ad- 
vance. The army was camped near Waterloo, Warrenton, 
and the Rappahannock, guarding the fords from Waterloo 
to Rappahannock Station. Rebel cavalry was seen every- 
where in front, flank, and rear of the Union army. Thor- 
oughfare Gap was occupied by General Sigel. 

On the 14th of November, the army left its respective 
camps and marched toward Fredericksburg. On the 11th, 
it arrived at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, which 
was already found occupied by the Rebels. The army went 
into camp, forming a line of battle from Aquia Creek to 
Falmouth. The pontoon-train had not yet arrived, and 
therefore the passage could not be undertaken at once. 

11* 



122 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

What the movements of the Rebels were during this time, 
is not very clear. It would, however, appear that part of 
their army marched at first in front of the Union army, re- 
treating before it, and then moving parallel with it on thQ 
right bank of the Rappahannock ; it arrived at Fredericks- 
burg nearly at the same moment as the Union army ; and 
that another part of their army remained quietly in the 
Shenandoah valley. This force appeared, on the 26th of 
November, near Salem, and then moved south and east- 
ward, joining the remainder of the Rebel army, which was 
encamped, and extending itself on a range of hills, forming 
a semicircle around Fredericksburg; which circle having 
a radius of about l^- to 2 miles, was one of the strongest 
positions for a large army that can be imagined. At length 
the pontoon-trains arrived, and, on the 12th of December, 
the Federal army enforced the passage over the Rappahan- 
nock, throwing bridges opposite the town and three miles 
below. The passage was only feebly opposed, just enough 
to make a show of resistance. 

The troops crossed, and, on the 13th, the main position 
of the Rebels was attacked ; but after several useless at- 
tempts to carry the hills, the army, after a loss of from 
10,000 to 12,000 men, was obliged to retreat, and seek 
shelter under its own guns. On the 13th, in the night, the 
army moved back over the river, which was accomplished 
without difficulty. 

While this was going on in the north of Yirginia, con- 
siderable activity existed at and near Suffolk, under orders 
of Major- Generals Dix and Peck, for a movement in the 
direction of Petersburg. After some fruitless demonstra- 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 123 

tions, all became quiet agaiu in these parts, and the move- 
ment was not carried out. 

In North Carolina, General Foster advanced from New- 
bern, with 15,000 men, to Kingston, which he took after 
little resistance ; thence he marched to Goldsborough, where 
he destroyed the Wilmington and Petersburg Railroad, after 
which he returned to Newbern. 

General Banks, after great preparations at New York, 
had sailed, on the 4th of December, for New Orleans, where 
he arrived on the 14th, part of his force being destined for 
an attack against Vicksburg and Port Hudson. He super- 
seded General Butler in the command at New Orleans. 

In Mississippi we left General Grant taking the offensive. 
He advanced with a large army, on the 3d of December, to- 
ward Holly Springs, the Rebels retreating southward, pur- 
sued by General Grant's whole force. General Hovey, with 
20,000 men, moves from Helena toward Grenada to take the 
retreating Rebel column in flank or rear; but the Confed- 
erates change their course to the southeast and escape. On 
the 16th of December, after having moved ten miles south of 
Grenada, a farther pursuit of the Rebel army is judged im- 
possible. Hovey retreats to Helena, Sherman to Memphis, 
and Grant to Bolivar. The Rebels follow immediately, and 
defeat and capture, at Holly Springs, a small rear guard of 
several hundred men. On the 24th, General Sherman leaves 
Memphis with a large number of troops, and moves to 
Helena, from whence he embarks with his army to attack 
Vicksburg. Yicksburg meanwhile had been reinforced by 
troops from Arkansas, and Price and Yan Dorn's columns 
were within supporting distance. When General Sherman 



124 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

therefore arrived, he found the place strongly occupied. 
He, nevertheless, attacked it on the 1st and 2d of January ; 
but was repulsed with great loss. General Banks, from 
New Orleans, had not arrived, nor assisted with his troops 
and gun-boats in the attack. 

In Tennessee we left the army of the Ohio arriving at 
Nashville, under the command of General Rosecrans. The 
Rebels meanwhile concentrated in the neighborhood of 
Murfreesborough, under the command of General Bragg. 
On the 6th of December, a Federal brigade is attacked in 
this place, and obliged to surrender. Finally, after all kinds 
of preparations and movements on both sides, General Rose- 
crans advanced, at the end of December, against Murfrees- 
borough with about 50,000 men. An engagement ensued, 
lasting several days, in which the Federal troops at first 
experienced a severe check, but afterward recovered ; and 
consequently, on the 3d of January, 1863, in the night, the 
Rebels retreated, though in good order, and unmolested by 
the Union troops, in the direction of Tullahoma. 

Finally, in the, utmost right zone, one more battle was 
fought, on the 8th of December, between the Rebel General 
Hindman and the Union Generals Blunt and Herron, near 
Prairie Grove, Arkansas, in which the Rebels are defeated, 
and obliged to retreat into the interior of the State. 

Here ends the narrative of the campaign of 1862. It is 
more than probable that some mistakes will have occurred ; 
and, considering the present state of affairs, it is scarcely 
possible that it should be otherwise. I have not access to 
any official documents, except those published by the public 
press. The whole campaign I had to put together by search- 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 125 

ing the files of several newspapers. It is well known how 
many false reports are published ; how incorrect dates are ; 
how rumors are given as facts ; and how incomplete most 
of the statements are for the purposes of a work like mine. 
There is, in most cases, no notice of the starting of a body 
of troops, or of any movement, till fighting turns up some- 
where, and then one has to find out where the troops came 
from, etc. Of the movements of the Rebel armies scarcely 
anything is published except rumors, and their numbers are 
always so variably stated that hardly any reliance can be 
placed on the statements about them. 

I hope, therefore, that the reader will excuse the mis- 
takes, and the apparent want of connection in the above 
sketch; the more so, as it is only the text of my disquisi- 
tion. As the discussion of these facts is simply an abstract 
and scientific one, the same lesson may be derived from a 
wrongly-stated case as from a rightly-stated one, provided 
only that the facts be rightly discussed. 

The review of this campaign — a campaign so full of vicis- 
situdes — is, perhaps, one of the most profitable studies in 
which an officer can engage, as nearly all the successes, and, 
without exception, all the great failures of both parties may 
be assigned to the direct violation of the great rules of mili- 
tary science. In order to render the review, which we are 
about to undertake, clear, we will commence with the plan 
of the campaign, embracing the whole theater of war, and 
then proceed to the discussion of the operations as they took 
place in the three zones separately. 

Let us refer to Map III : we find there the position of 
the different Union armies at the time they were ready to 



126 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

start. Curtis and Pope in Missouri ; Grant and Buell in 
Kentucky, besides some small forces in East Kentucky and 
Western Virginia; Banks at Winchester; the army of the 
Potomac at Washington ; a large force at Fortress Monroe ; 
Burnside at Roanoke ; Hunter at Port Royal ; and Butler's 
expedition getting ready for New Orleans. Thus, there 
were not less than ten different armies, and as many dif- 
ferent lines of operation, acting all in a more or less con- 
centric direction toward the interior of the theater of war. 
Not one of these armies was so strong that the Rebels 
might not with ease have concentrated a stronger one 
against it. 

If we consider what has been said in Chapter I. in refer- 
ence to great invasions, it will be remarked that this plan 
of invading by a great number of lines of operation, having 
a concentric direction, has never been followed by the great 
captains, either of ancient or of modern times ; and in fact 
is entirely against the rules laid down in Chapter I. It is 
a division of force, and it is acting on exterior lines. 

The campaign, or rather the plan of the campaign, had 
some resemblance to the invasion of France in 1193. The 
result was partly like that of this invasion, and would have 
been still more so, had the Rebels taken a lesson from Car- 
not, and followed from the first his plan of defense. 

As we have seen in Chapter I., a plan of invasion like 
this is based on simultaneous action on many points ; the 
defense, on the contrary, is based on successive action 
against one point after another. To make such a plan 
really successful, a simultaneous energetic advance of all 
the Union forces should have taken place ; and then, per- 



CAlJtPAION OF 1862. 1 2t 

haps, full success would have been obtained, not because the 
plan was good, but because the defense at first committed 
the same mistakes as the attack, and even more. But the 
impossibility of such simultaneous action was soon made 
manifest. 

The importance of the various points being diiferent, the 
defense had made very different preparations in the three 
zones; and thus it happened that, while some of the in- 
vading armies had conquered large tracts of country, others 
had scarcely moved from their base of operation. Conse- 
quently, the unity of action was entirely broken. Scarcely 
had the first operation taken place, when nearly all connec- 
tion between the several lines of attack in the three zones 
ceased, and each commander, on a separate line of opera- 
tion, acted according to his own judgment. There was no 
unity in effort and purpose, and consequently no decisive 
result. 

We have said that the defense committed the same mis- 
take as the attack did. The number of fortified positions, 
and the small bodies of troops, clearly showed the intention 
to defend a front of operation of nearly 1600 miles on all 
points. These long lines of defense, though they cover 
everything, may be pierced wherever we choose to attack 
them ; and when broken on one point, the whole line is 
obliged to fall back. The correct defense woflld have been 
to concentrate a sufficient force south of Nashville ; to op- 
pose Grant, Buell, Pope, and Curtis only by small corps of 
observation, retreating to the main body, which should fall 
on Grant or Buell — according as which of the two should 
present himself first — defeat him, and then the ue^xt one, 



128 I'RINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

and so on. And even if we take a still more extended view 
of the question; if we consider that the Confederate govern- 
ment depends entirely on its array, and exists only so long 
as this is successful, we may truly say that the real seat of 
government of the Confederate States, their real capital, is 
at the headquarters of their army, and not in any particular 
town or place. If we take this view of the question, and 
apply the principles of defense to the present case, all the 
Union armies, including that of the Potomac, should only 
have been opposed by small bodies of observation, and the 
main army of the Rebels should have been in a position 
between Knoxville and Lynchburg — that is, in the center of 
the entire theater of war — whence they might have fallen 
like an Alpine avalanche on any Union army invading their 
territory. Finally, it will be observed that, in the general 
plan of the campaign, as it is before us, the distribution of 
troops was not in accordance with the importance of the 
three zones. In fact, deducting the men in hospital, and 
those still in the recruiting districts, probably the real num- 
ber of men fit for duty at the opening of the campaign did 
not exceed 450,000. Of these nearly 100,000 were in Mis- 
souri, and only about 150,000 men, forming a field army, 
were in the left or decisive zone. A large proportion of 
them was used up in the occupation of fortifications and 
important points. The superiority in the right and center 
zones was great ; consequently operations in these zones 
advanced more quickly than in the left zone. 

An inspection of the map, as well as what has been said 
in Chapter II., will show us that a Union army holding 
Kentucky and Tennessee could be taken in flank by a Con- 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 129 

federate army moving from Lynchburg and debouching 
through Cumberland Gap, and that this Union army could 
be thrown back from South Tennessee to the Ohio by such 
an oflFensive movement. By this we mean that, should Ken- 
tucky and Tennessee have been carried by IJnion troops, 
but the Federal army in Virginia have experienced a deci- 
sive disaster, one single march of the Rebels from the 
springs of Big Sandy River toward Mumfordsville, Louis- 
ville, and Cincinnati would compel the Federal forces to 
evacuate the conquered country. That this is true, the 
march of Bragg and Kirby Smith has shown. Buell was 
thrown back by this march from Huntsville and Florence, 
in Alabama, upon Louisville, in Kentucky, a distance of 
not less than 300 miles. 

In her wars with France, where Italy was the disputed 
apple, Austria always thought that the chief object was the 
occupation, in force, of the country. She had to learn 
more than once, to her cost, that Italy was more frequently 
conquered in the valleys of the Rhine or the Danube than 
on the banks of the Mincio or the Po. 

In like manner, Kentucky and Tennessee will be con- 
quered on the banks of the Potomac or James River, rather 
than on those of the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, 
and, until decisive results are gained near the James River, 
advantages in the West will be more or less ephemeral. 

To conclude, therefore, the discussion of the general plan, 
we shall merely say that we miss in it the full understanding 
of the great principles of wars of invasion. The invading 
army should not care for towns or for occupation ; it should 
have but one object — the finding and annihilating of the 

12 



130 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

enemy's armies. We also miss the full understanding of the 
theater of war and its great strategic features. In a word, 
instead of one grand war or grand plan of operation, half 
a dozen small wars or petty plans were substituted. Let it 
be remarked here, that the defense admirably profited by the 
rude lesson it had received at Fort Donelson, and that from 
this moment its action became more and more correct, and 
in accordance with the rules : to concentrate the main force 
always on the decisive point, and to act on interior lines. 

Operations in the Right Zone. — The plan of cam- 
paign for this zone, framed separately, so far as may be 
guessed from the operations, seems to have been very sim- 
ple. General Curtis had to clear Western Missouri of the 
Rebels and to penetrate into Arkansas, and General Pope 
had to move along the Mississippi and to open this river 
to the Federal gun-boats, which, by ascending the rivers 
of Arkansas, would divide this State into- several parts, cut 
the communications between the different Rebel corps, and 
facilitate the operations of General Curtis, by furnishing 
supplies and protection. There is nothing to be said 
against this plan, as General Pope's as 'well as General 
Curtis's army were both sufficiently large to fight single- 
handed any force the Rebels could bring against them in 
those parts. 

The operations in this zone are so few, and, compared to 
the whole, so unimportant, that it is scarcely worth while 
to mention them. There are, however, two or three, move- 
ments which deserve to be noticed. Price, we have seen, 
retreated before a superior Federal force under General 
Curtis J but immediately on entering Arkansas, the Rebels 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. " 131 

proceeded to a concentration of their forces, and from the 
defensive they passed to the offensive. General Van Dorn 
executed a movement which reflects credit on him. With 
his whole force he turned the Union army, seizing its com- 
munications, and forcing it to fight when cut off from its 
base of operation. The battles of Marengo, TJlm, Jena, 
and Auerstadt were fought under similar circumstances. 
Only one objection — and it is an important one — is to be 
made, viz., that it was not safe to execnte this movement 
against an army superior in men and armament. Van Dorn 
was beaten ; and the only thing which is astonishing is, 
that our army did not make better use of the advantage 
it had when on the line of the communications of the 
defeated army. 

The next movement worthy of remark is General Cur- 
tis's advance into Arkansas, after the battle of Pea Ridge, 
and his retreat to Helena, on the Mississippi. This move- 
ment, though a retreat, but to an accidental base of oper- 
ation, had the character of an advance. Geheral Curtis, 
once in Arkansas, gave up his base of operation on the 
Upper Mississippi, and his lines of operation connecting 
him with it, to take up a base on the Lower Mississippi, 
by way of an accidental line of operation. 

Operations in the Center Zone. — The operations in this 
zone are important and highly instructive. The Ohio, being 
the only line separating this zone from Union territory, be- 
comes evidently the base of operation for the Union army 
or armies acting in it. Not less than three or four armies 
invade it simultaneously: General Pope, with his army, on 
the utmost right, along the Mississippi ; General Grant, 



132 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

along the Tennessee River ; General Buell, along the Louis- 
ville and Nashville Railroad ; and finally, some smaller corps 
in the direction of Cumberland Gap. 

The plan of operation in this zone, to judge from the 
movements the array and navy actually performed, was to 
conquer Kentucky and Tennessee, and to open the Missis- 
sippi to Northern navigation, thereby separating the right 
zone completely from the center zone ; and having the Mis- 
sissippi with its affluents under full control, operations could 
be directed in the right or center zone with equal facility. 
The Union forces being in possession of the line of the 
Tennessee, the States of Mississippi, Alabama, and Geor- 
gia found themselves pretty mu6h in the condition treated 
under the base of operation. Fig. 1, Chapter I. 

Had the entire theater of war been composed only of 
the center and right zones, this plan would have had great 
merit. It is in fact based on a division of the enemy, and 
of a division which is complete. The party holding the 
Mississippi could throw the superiority of forces into one, 
and then into the other zone, without fear of the enemy 
being reinforced, and his armies would then be successively 
crushed. 

But the right and center zones were not the entire thea- 
ter of war; and this changes the question so completely, 
that the plan which would have been a correct one under 
the first supposition, becomes entirely incorrect according 
to the real state of affairs. It is easy to show this. 

Let us first suppose that the two zones we are speaking 
of form the whole theater of war, and that the Savannah, 
the Clinch River, the Upper Tennessee, (as far. as Chatta- 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. , 133 

nooga,) and the Big Sandy River are boundaries toward a 
neutral State. Considered as such, the natural line of inva- 
sion would evidently be the Cumberland or the Tennessee, 
which would play here the same part that the River Meuse 
plays in Belgium, in a strategical point of view. Smith- 
field or Paducah would be the base of operation. Following 
the course of these two rivers, a Union army would take 
hold at once of the communications of a Rebel army sta- 
tioned, for instance, near Louisville. This Rebel army 
would have to retreat, by way of Nashville or Sparta, with 
the utmost speed, or it would be obliged to fight a battle in 
which it would have to face south. Should defeat be the 
consequence, it would be thrown in the direction of the 
Ohio, with a certainty of destruction. "We said it could 
only retreat by way of Nashville or Sparta ; and in fact it 
could not cross the Big Sandy River nor the Cumberland 
Mountains, as these, according to our supposition, are 
boundaries of a neutral country. In like manner, as the 
line of the Tennessee River takes in reverse the whole of 
Kentucky and Tennessee east of it, so it does with the 
country west of it, and situated between itself and the Mis- 
sissippi — that is, if the passage over the Mississippi is 
interrupted for the Rebel army. The consequence is, that 
if Clinch River were the boundary of a neutral country, the 
march from Paducah to Florence, in Alabama, would carry 
the entire upper center zone, and the simple occupation of 
Florence with a large army would be sufficient to maintain 
it. Thus, with the aid of the gun-boat flotilla, expeditions 
might be made to open the whole course of the Mississippi, 
leaving it to the vigilance of those gun-boats to render the 

12* 



134 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

separation between the right and center zones effective. A 
greatly superior force might now be thrown into the lower 
center zone, so that the adoption of two lines of operation 
would be justified. Acting, then, similar to what we have 
already described in Chapter III,, when speaking of the 
invasion of this part of the theater of war, the conquest of 
this zone would offer no difficulty ; there would be only the 
difference, that the Savannah is replaced by the Mississippi, 
and that, instead of making the invasion from east to west, 
it would be made from west to east. The Rebels, continu- 
ally outflanked by the army coming from the Tennessee, 
and pressed in front by that coming from the Mississippi, 
would be obliged to leave Mississippi, then Alabama, and 
would finally be thrown into the east corner of Georgia or 
into Florida. 

This whole plan of operation is, however, changed by the 
simple fact that the Clinch River is not the boundary of a 
neutral country, but of the left zone, or the most vital part 
of the entire theater of war. What before in our supposition 
was impossible — the retreating of a Rebel army to and over 
Clinch River — is now possible, and it will therefore be seen 
that a Union army, marching along the Cumberland from 
Smithland to Nashville, does in no way cut a Rebel army in 
Kentucky from its communications, and in general doeS in 
no way clear Kentucky of the Rebels, as they have always 
their retreat open along Big Sandy River or to Cumberland 
Gap ; therefore, the Cumberland or the Tennessee line, 
which was decisive according to our supposition, is no 
more so in reality, though it is an advantageous line. 

Re it now remarked that, whatever the military opera- 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 135 

.■it 

tions in the center zone may be, Louisville and Cincinnati 
are of sufficient importance to require an army for their pro- 
tection and that of the countiy round them. If this army is 
destined for active service, the most natural line of opera- 
tion — at least the easiest one, and that offering the greatest 
facility for communications with the base — is evidently the 
line from Louisville to Nashville and Huntsville. Should 
this line be adopted in consequence of the facilities it offers, 
then another army and line of operation become necessary 
to act against Cumberland Gap or the mountain district in 
general. 

Therefore if, under the circumstances as they were when 
the war broke out, the upper center zone is to be conquered 
and occupied and the Mississippi to be opened, we are almost 
necessarily led to the adoption of four lines of operation : 
One along the Mississippi, to open the river to navigation ; 
one along the Tennessee and Cumberland, to open these 
rivers and to outflank the position which the enemy may 
hold along the Mississippi or the Louisville and Nashville 
Railroad ; one along this railroad ; and one from Louisville, 
in the direction of Cumberland Gap. To have four lines of 
operation in so restricted a space is against all rules of mili- 
tary science ; and as the plan of operation we have deduced 
from the movements of the Union army, as they actually 
took place, is scarcely to be executed otherwise — certainly 
not with less than three lines — we conclude that the plan 
is not sound, or not adapted to the circumstances and the 
strategical features of the theater of war. 

There is in the execution of this plan another fact which 
is worth mentioning, and which strongly militates against 



136 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

its adoption. It is evident that the conquest and occupa- 
tion of the upper center zone is only a preliminary measure 
for the conquest of the lower one. It is the first object 
to be attained. Considering, then, the four lines of opera- 
tion with respect to the second object, the conquest of the 
lower center zone, it will be remarked that the Louisville 
and Huntsville Railroad is, the most direct line from north 
to south, besides being the principal line of communication. 
This line would, therefore, be chosen in preference to any 
other for a southward movement, and also for the occupa- 
tion of Kentucky, and of Tennessee itself. But this line is 
nearly parallel with the Cumberland Mountains in its whole 
length ; and as the Kebels may choose the Tennessee or 
these mountains (as they please) for a base to start from 
for action in Kentucky and Tennessee, the Cumberland 
Mountains will offer them the advantage of being able to 
act against the communications of a Union army in North 
Alabama, at any moment they choose to do so. This is a 
truth which has been proved by Bragg's invasion of Ken- 
tucky ; and if another proof is wanted, it may be found in 
the resemblance between the relative position of the base of 
operation of the defense to the line of operation of an invad- 
ing army in Kentucky and that of the French in the Penin- 
sular war. In that war the line of operation of the Prench 
armies extended from Bayonne to Burgos, Madrid, Cordova, 
and Seville. The base of operation of the English army 
was Portugal; first Lisbon alone, but after the capture of 
Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo by Wellington it was pushed 
to the frontier. The line from Ciudad Rodrigo to Badajos 
is parallel, or nearly so, to the line from Burgos to Seville. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 137 

In all their offensive movements, the English acted directly 
against this line of communication of the French. In 1808, 
Moore, in his ofTensive movement, marched from Ciudad 
Rodrigo toward Yalladolid, Napoleon being with his whole 
army at Madrid, an army nearly twice as large as that of 
Moore; besides, Napoleon was not the taan to permit play- 
ing with his communications. He immediately threw him- 
self on Moore's communications, and the disastrous retreat" 
of the latter to Corunna was the consequence. In 1809, 
Wellington also moved against this line of communication, 
but the battle of Talavera having crippled him too much, 
he was obliged to retreat ; the more so, as Ney and Soult 
were marching against his own line of operation. 

Finally, in 1812, after having defeated Marmont in the 
battle of Salamanca, Wellington advanced straight against 
Burgos from Ciudad Rodrigo as a base, and this was de- 
cisive. Soult, who held Seville, was thrown back to Madrid, 
and Andalusia was conquered and cleared from French 
occupation on the banks of the Douro. 

This relative position of the base of operation for a Rebel 
army and the line of operation of the invading Union army, 
necessitates a strong occupation of the country, as it facili- 
tates all kinds of raids and expeditions against the railroad 
communications of the Union army. 

Occupation is division of force, and the more occupation 
is necessitated, the more chances an enemy will have to beat 
the occupying army in detail. The rout of Greneral Nelson 
at Richmond, Ky.; the surrender of from 4000 to 5000 men 
at Mumfordsville, on the Louisville and Nashville Rail- 
road ; the capture of a brigade at Murfreesborough by 



138 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

John Morgan, are but too palpable proofs of the truth of 
our reasoning. 

Not only do Kentucky and Tennessee require a large 
number of troops for occupation, but the Mississippi re- 
quires a still larger. This river once opened, all places 
where main lines of communication arrive near it, connect- 
ing the right with the center zone, must be guarded by 
'large detachments ; the consequence of which will be, that 
the active or field array in these parts will be seriously 
reduced ; and should the enemy, by conducting his defense 
correctly, destroy this field army, the loss of all the detach- 
ments would probably ensue. 

For these reasons we conclude that the main plan of 
operation was not based on sound principles and a thor- 
ough understanding of the country; that it was in its exe- 
cution complicated ; and that it necessarily led to opera- 
tions which were not correct. The defense at first made a 
still greater mistake. It is, in the very nature of things, 
that a country adopting the defensive is the weaker one, 
and under such circumstances the right application of the 
maxims of war becomes an imperative necessity. Here, on 
the contrary, the defense opposes every advancing Union 
army by a smaller but intrenched Rebel army. The long 
line of defense is easily broken at Fort Donelson, and all 
the trouble of fortifying Columbus, etc. goes for nothing ; 
besides, there cannot be any doubt that the Rebels did not 
understand at first the advantage they might derive from 
the strategical features of the country. Finally, the great- 
est blunder they committed was the omitting to take ad- 
vantage of the errors or of the bad plan of operations of 



CAMrAIGN OP 1862. 139 

the Uniou army. Fort Donelson, however, taught them a 
lesson, and they profited afterward by it. 

From the general plan, let us pass to the details of the 
operations as«they took place in this zone. 

We have just said that Fort Donelson was a lesson to the 
Rebels ; in fact, immediately or very soon after its capture 
they evacuated their other strongholds, and commenced con- 
centrating at Corinth. Grant, meanwhile, had pushed south 
as far as Savannah, Tenn.,Buell was in Nashville, Pope still at 
New Madrid. General Grant, with about 50,000 men, passed 
the Tennessee at Pittsburg Landing, and encamped his army 
at Shiloh, backed by the river. This is a favorable oppor- 
tunity to destroy a Union army, and immediately the Rebel 
commanders take the necessary steps for a concentration of 
troops to profit by the occasion. Bragg from Mobile, Polk 
from Columbus, Johnston from Murfreesborough, join Beau- 
regard, who is already at Corinth. Grant is attacked and 
defeated ; and had there been a little more of that iron 
energy which usually distinguishes great commanders, the 
Union army would probably have been destroyed, notwith- 
standing the presence of the gun-boats and the arrival of 
Buell. Buell, informed perhaps of the great concentration 
of the Rebel forces, hastened, in turn, to ^ junction with 
Grant. He arrived in time, not to retrieve the day on the 
6th, but to win another 'battle on the tth. The Rebels 
were beaten on the second day by the application of the 
very same principle which made them gain the first day's 
battle. What would have happened had they been 15,000 
men stronger, that is to say, had the disaster of Fort Donel- 
son not occurred in consequence of their defective defense ? 



140 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

What would have happened had their plan of operation from 
the very first been based on a similar concentration, so that 
Grant might have been attacked several weeks sooner ? We 
do not wish to indulge in speculations, but it is easy to see 
how much more the chances would have been in their favor. 
The consequences of the first mistake were felt throughout 
the whole campaign. The plan of the battle and the con- 
ception of the whole manoeuvre is creditable to the Rebel 
generals who executed it. The concentration of troops, 
and, still more, the immediate resumption of the ofiTensive 
after a disastrous battle, is highly creditable to the officers 
and men of the Union army. The Rebels were, however, 
not followed up after the second day's battle ; and this was 
a great mistake — -just as great a one as the Rebels commit- 
ted in not pushing the battle on the 6th, and following it 
up to the very utmost. 

There are two kinds of battles in which the pursuit should 
be very differently conducted. The first is, that in which 
the battle is the consequence of a strategical manoeuvre, by 
which we have gained the communications of the enemy. 
In such a battle, all that is generally needed is simply to 
repulse the enemy, and to operate or pursue him so that he 
cannot escape either to the right or left. His whole army 
will then finally be obliged to surrender. The second is, 
that in which we encounter the enemy, both parties having 
their lines of retreat free. In this case the pursuit must do 
the principal work. Rear guards must be crippled, and 
every effort made to break up the main army. To abandon 
the pursuit is to give up the fruit gained by the victory. 

Here, in our case, the fault was aggravated by the whole 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 141 

position of affairs. Supposing that Buell and Grant were 
too crippled after the battle to follow immediately, they 
might have been reinforced within six days by General 
Pope, who had New Madrid and Island No. 10 in his pos- 
session. Then, from Shiloh to Corinth being only twenty 
to thirty miles, the army might have been before Corinth 
ten days after the battle of Shiloh. 

There is no doubt that after this battle the Rebels were 
quite as crippled as the Union army. This latter, being 
reinforced by Pope, would have had, therefore, a decided 
superiority; and that, even later, it possessed this superior- 
ity after the Rebels had had time to be reinforced, is easily 
perceived from the fact that had they been so S9oner than 
the Federal army was by Pope's arrival, they would have 
moved once more to Shiloh, and refought the battle of 
the 6th. 

Eight to ten days after the battle of Shiloh, the fortifica- 
tions of Corinth were probably not very strong; and if they 
were, a simple march or movement to Waterloo, Alabama, 
and thence to Jacinto and Danville, Mississippi, would 
possibly have induced the Rebels at once to leave Corinth; 
and then, by marching direct to Ripley and Holly Springs, 
the Union army might probably have prevented the Rebels 
from retreating south, and have forced them to a disastrous 
and decisive fight. 

Instead of such rapid action and decisive direction of the 
line of operation and of pursuit, the Union army advances 
slowly against Corinth, which the enemy meanwhile strongly 
fortifies. The Federal troops besiege Corinth till the Rebels, 
probably sorry to give them so much trouble, evacuate on 

13 



142 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

the 30th of May. They retreat to Grenada ; and, as if the 
occupation of Corinth was the main object, the Union army 
remains there ! General Pope alone undertakes the pur- 
suit, as if he by himself could accomplish, against a not 
defeated army, what he, united with Buell and Grant, could 
not do ! 

The Rebels posted at Corinth were caught en Jiagrant 
delit. A Union army was between them and their Eastern 
armies ; and by acting with the left, the Union army might 
have brought about a decisive, and, to the enemy, a disas- 
trous battle. Neglecting to take advantage of an enemy's 
faults is decidedly blundering, and here the fault was irre- 
parable ; for these very Rebel troops were afterward trans- 
ported East, and performed their share in inflicting the 
disasters which befell the Union armies there. The con- 
sequences of one mistake are sometimes incalculable in war, 
as well as in life in general. It is with them often as it is 
with an Alpine avalanche — growing, growing, till they crush 
everything under their enormous weight. 

After the occupation of Corinth, the main object of the 
Western campaign seemed to have been attained. General 
Grant commenced the occupation of the country west of the 
Tennessee, by placing his troops near Memphis, Corinth, 
Bolivar, and Jackson, in Tennessee, and Columbus, in Ken- 
tucky. General Buell left, on the 10th of June, for South 
Tennessee and North Alabama, moving from Corinth in the 
direction of Chattanooga, a distance of two hundred miles, 
or ten to fifteen days' march. That it was the intention of 
General Buell to go to Chattanooga, is difficult to say, as 
he might have been there by the 25th of June. We only 



CAMPATON OF 1802. 143 

know that in July he was still in the neighborhood of 
Huntsville. 

In the Rebel array, General Bragg had superseded Gen- 
eral Beauregard. After their retreat to Grenada or Tupelo, 
the Rebels soon corrected their mistake of forming exterior 
lines with their Eastern armies, by moving as quickly as 
possible from Tupelo to Chattanooga, this Badajos of the 
upper center zone. In fact, the position of Chattanooga, 
in respect to Northern Alabama, is nearly the same as that 
of Badajos in respect to Andalusia; the former being in- 
vaded by a Union, the latter by a French army. 

Buell's line of retreat from Huntsville to Nashville was 
within the grasp of the Rebels concentrating or arriving at 
Chattanooga ; and the first use they made of their new com- 
bination was the surprise and capture of the Union troops 
which were stationed at Murfreesborough, probably to guard 
the communications of the Ohio army. This army, iinding 
its line of communication and retreat endangered, had only 
the choice between two alternatives. Either to advance to 
Chattanooga with all its force, or to retreat and take a posi- 
tion near Shelbyville or McMinnsville — that is, nearer to its 
temporary base, which was Nashville. 

Whether Chattanooga was takable or not at that time, I 
do not know. To attack it was certainly a risk, consider- 
ing that the Ohio army would have had to move through a 
mountainous country easily defended, and to go so much far- 
ther from its base. However, all depended on the strength 
of this army. The very least that Bragg could concentrate 
would probably have been something like 35,000 to 40,000 
men ; and certainly only a greatly superior force should have 



144 PRTNCTPLES OP STRATEGY. 

tried to dislodge them from the strong positions in the in- 
terior of these mountain regions, unless a previous defeat in 
the open plain had taken place. 

If, therefore, the strength of the Ohio army did not sur- 
pass 30,000 to 40,000 men in the field, or available for 
operations, it would have been folly to march to Chatta- 
nooga ; and the only thing to be done was to concentrate 
near Shelbyville or McMinnsville, and to offer battle there. 
This latter expedient was the one General Buell chose. 
The Rebels, however, declined fighting ; but, by moving 
still to their right, they turned once more the position of 
General Buell, and thereby forced him to retreat to Nash- 
ville, where he arrived on the 11th of September. 

The whole configuration of the southern part of Tennes- 
see is such that it is difficult for an army in the plain to take 
the offensive, especially if not sufficiently strong; but the 
army holding the mountains has it entirely in its power to 
pass from the defensive to the offensive. The inactivity of 
the Ohio army is thus explained ; not so that of the Rebel 
army, which took nearly two and a half months to do what 
it might have accomplished in three weeks. 

By the force of circumstances, and the strategical forma- 
tion of the country, the Ohio army was put on the defensive, 
and followed, therefore, the impulse of the attack. The 
attack was slow at first in the execution of its movements, 
and the defense, occupying the enemy's country, was evi- 
dently in no hurry to give this up. 

We must remember another thing here. The different 
commanders of the Union forces were independent of each 
other ; every one acted in his own department as he liked, 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 145 

and cared very little as to what his neighbor was doing. 
This was only the natural consequence of having half a 
dozen lines of operation. 

Troops had been left in Eastern Kentucky to hold Cum- 
berland Gap ; to defend Lexington, Louisville, Cincinnati, 
etc. The Ohio army was as little affected by the fact that 
General Rosecrans had been attacked at Corinth, as by the 
fact that General Morgan or Nelson had been, or could be, 
attacked elsewhere. These generals had to look out for 
themselves, just as the Ohio army had to look after its own 
safety. Very speedy action on the part of the Ohio army 
against Kirby Smith, in Eastern Kentucky, could therefore 
not be expected up to the moment that this Rebel general's 
action would endanger its safety. 

We conclude, therefore, that (the circumstances being 
such as we have stated) the action of the Ohio army was 
correct, or at least not incorrect, in its movement from 
Huntsville to Nashville. We say if the circumstances were 
such as we have stated ; because we found the greatest diffi- 
culty in tracing the lines and the movements of the con- 
tending armies in these parts from the newspaper reports. 
A great number of details and facts which might materially 
change the aspect of aflfairs, and especially the criticism 
thereon, are probably unknown to us. 

There was, however, one decided mistake made in this 
campaign ; it was, that the Ohio army was not ordered to 
march, or did not march, from Corinth to Chattanooga, by 
forced marches, as soon as the Rebels had retreated from 
the first of these two places, and the pursuit had been given 
up. It might have been there by the 10th or 15th of June, 

13* 



146 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

which was probably sooner than General Bragg's arrival 
there. After the arrival of this general with his force, it 
was too late. 

Scarcely had General Buell commenced his retreat, when 
the Rebels immediately pushed forward with their right. 
A corps was left at Sparta, and the remainder moved to 
Mumfordsville, forcing from 4000 to 5000 Union troops to 
surrender. The troops left at Sparta moved parallel with 
General Buell as soon as he left Nashville. 

Considering the position of the Ohio army at Nashville, 
we shall find that it had only the choice between two lines 
of conduct. Its real base of operation (Louisville) was 
endangered, and its communications already seized. It had 
therefore to do something to prevent being cut off entirely, 
or of being left without supplies. The first expedient was 
to retreat to Louisville with the main force, leaving Nash- 
ville fortified, and in the hands of an able commander, with 
a small corps; the second was, to throw itself, with the 
entire force, on the communications of the Rebel armies, by 
marching to Carthage, Tennessee, and thence to Burkesville 
and Somerset, Kentucky. 

A similar course was proposed by Soult to King Joseph, 
after the battle of Salamanca. Wellington was near Bur- 
gos, and the king ordered Soult to evacuate Andalusia, and 
to join him south of Madrid. Soult, unwilling to give up 
Andalusia, proposed to the king to unite his (the king's) 
force and those of Suchet with his own troops, and to move 
from Seville to Ciudad Rodrigo — that is to say, on Wel- 
lington's line of operation. The king refused, in conse- 
quence of the general state of affairs. The campaign 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 147 

against Russia was a failure, and the French armies could 
not be exposed to risk. 

The circumstances were somewhat similar here. The 
peninsular campaign against Richmond, as well as that of 
Pope in Yirginia, had been failures. The Rebels were in 
Maryland. For General Buell to throw himself on the 
communications of the enemy, would have been equivalent 
to giving up entirely his own. To be defeated in such a posi- 
tion would have been ruin, and the battle would have had 
a decisive influence on the whole war. Therefore, the most 
prudent course was evidently to march to Louisville, leav- 
ing a sufficient garrison in Nashville. The very moment 
General Buell thought it a risk to fight a battle with the 
Rebels on his communications, it would have been a mistake 
to fight along his march ; because, up to the time when 
he really arrived at Louisville, he was continually so placed 
that the Rebels might have thrown him back upon Nash- 
ville, or into the Ohio. 

Both cases would have been equally disastrous. There- 
fore, taking into consideration the general state of affairs, 
no reproach can be cast on the Ohio army for its retreat 
to Louisville, so far as principle is concerned. Had oppor- 
tunity occurred for beating the enemy in detail, and been 
permitted to slip away, this would evidently have been a 
mistake, and a most serious one too. 

We have not been able to find any indication of the time 
the different marches and movements took, and are there- 
fore entirely unable to discuss this part of the question, 
though it is an important one. 

Once arrived in Louisville, the Ohio array was largely rein- 



148 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

forced. It advanced against the Rebel armies, which then 
united and retreated to Cumberland Gap. The pursuit was 
carried only as far as London, Ky., probably in consequence 
of the difficulty of maintaining the troops. The Ohio army 
went back to Nashville, and the Rebel army returned to 
Chattanooga, thence to Murfreesborough. The operations 
of the different Rebel armies all round rendered the position 
at Cumberland Gap a precarious one, and it was conse- 
quently evacuated by General Morgan. Should the fact be 
correct that he had to fight his way to Greenupsburg, and 
that he lost no cannon nor part of his train, then no doubt 
this retreat would be creditable to him and his men, and 
very little to the generals who permitted him to escape. 

The plan of the invasion of Kentucky, as conceived and 
executed by the Rebels, deserves great attention. Let us, 
before entering on the consideration of it, say only, that if 
Chattanooga holds a similar position to that of Badajos, 
Cumberland Gap, in its turn, plays the part of Ciudad Rod- 
rigo. Kirby Smith marched from Cumberland Gap, or the 
neighborhood, direct to Lexington, and Bragg advanced 
from Chattanooga against General Buell's communications. 
The Rebels form two lines of operation in this movement, 
but they were very careful to maintain interior lines ; be- 
sides, Kirby Smith had no enemy of importance before him, 
and his object was only to threaten. Under these circum- 
stances two lines may be adopted. In this invasion the 
Rebels made the best use of the direction of their base of 
operations, relative to the line of operations of the Union 
army. The consequence was, that by one march they 
cleared nearly the whole of Tennessee and Kentucky of the 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 149 

Union troops, and threw Bnell from North Alabama back 
on to the Ohio. So long as they had no strong enemy 
before them, they divided to attack, to occupy, and to 
threaten many points at the same time. As soon as a 
Union army in force approaches, they unite their divisions 
to avoid being beaten in detail. In their offensive move- 
ments, they capture or beat all smaller detachments sta- 
tioned round for the occupation of the country. In their 
retreat, as soon as they are pressed, they make an offensive 
return at Perryville, defeat the Union advance guard, and 
continue their retreat unmolested ; Bragg, in this retreat, 
changes his natural line of retreat to Chattanooga to an 
accidental one, that of Lexington to Cumberland Gap. 
Therefore, the direction of action' and the action itself were 
correct in this invasion, and the plan, as well as the execu- 
tion of it, so far reflect credit on the general or generals 
who originated and carried it out. There is only one remark 
to be made, and it is an important one. The invasion of a 
country must have an object, and the object should be im- 
portant enough to compensate for the risk the army runs 
in making it. Here, in this invasion, the Rebels declined 
fighting a decisive battle ; their sole object was, therefore, 
merely the destruction of the small detachments of Union 
troops and the provisioning of their own army ; for they 
could not expect to hold Kentucky and Tennessee without 
destroying at least the main army that occupied it. Had 
they destroyed this main army, to commence with, then they 
would have been able to hold the two States. In fact, it 
was the Ohio army which formed the nucleus of the army 
which drove them out of Eastern Kentucky, had it been 



150 rRTNCTPLES OP STRATEnT. 

destroyed at the very first, it could not have been reinforced 
by Grant's divisions nor by innumerable old and new troops 
which joined it at Louisville. Therefore, to render the 
invasion decisive, they ought to have commenced with a 
sufficiently successful blow, and not with a raid ; and, con- 
sidering the position of the different armies, we believe that 
a first success could have been gained. 

The army of the Ohio, when near Huntsville, probably 
did not muster more than from 30,000 to 40,000 men. 
Bragg had perhaps some 25,000 to .30,000; Kirby Smith, 
including Humphrey Marshall's and other small detach- 
ments, 15,000 to 20,000 ; finally. Price and Van Dorn, who 
had come from Arkansas, are said to have had at that time 
38,000, which number, however, we believe to have beea ex- 
aggerated. Kirby Smith was at Cumberland Gap, about 
150 miles distant ; Price and Van Dorn at Tupelo, about 
200 miles, or 10 days' march, distant. Could these different 
corps have been united without General Buell's becoming 
aware of it, the Rebel army, about 60,000 to 10,000 strong, 
might, in two forced marches, have moved to Manchester 
and Shelbyville, taking hold of General Buell's communica- 
tions, and forcing him to fight facing northward ; if defeated, 
(which would have been probable against such odds,) he 
would have been thrown into the Tennessee by a vigorous 
pursuit. Here the first success would have been obtained, 
and then, dividing in order to beat the smaller detachments, 
threaten diff'erent points, invade, in fact, the whole country, 
would not only have been correct, but of more lasting effect. 
The only difficulty is to make a concentration without the 
enemy becoming aware of it. For this purpose several 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 151 

things are required ; and we may learn much from Napo- 
leon's conduct. First, the march of the different corps, 
coming from different sides, must be so timed and calculated 
that they shall all arrive on the same day, and the day after- 
ward the offensive movement must commence. Secondly, all 
movements — the preliminary march for the concentration as 
well as the offensive movement itself — should be executed 
by forced marches of from 20 to 25 miles a day. Thirdly^ 
the troops should be kept in ignorance of their destination ; 
the rumor of a different destination to the real one should 
be spread among them. Finally, the principal generals of 
the joining corps, at least those of well-known name — such, 
for instance, as Kirby Smith or Price — should not leave 
with their troops, but stay with a detachment of several 
thousand, with which to make demonstrations and great 
noise in a very different direction from that in which their 
main body has moved, so as to show themselves in very dis- 
tant regions, and then, a few days before the arrival of their 
columns at the place of rendezvous, they should start, and, 
by traveling 100 miles or so a day, arrive at the same time 
as their men. By managing matters in this way, and telling 
no generals, except the commanders of corps, of the plan, 
a great concentration might be effected without the enemy 
becoming aware of it until at the last moment, or when it 
is too late to remedy. 

Napoleon, when about to start for the invasion of Bel- 
gium against Bliicher and Wellington, gave the most bril- 
liant feasts. In the night, in the middle of one of these 
feasts, he disappeared, and started for the army by extra 
post. This was so well managed that he was for two days 



152 PRINCIl'LES OP STRATEGY. 

with his army, and all his troops were fn movemeat, before 
WellingtoQ could believe the fact, being informed by good 
authority that Napoleon was still in Paris. Part of the 
English army was consequently surprised in its quarters, 
and its junction would perhaps have become impossible, had 
it not been for the double mistake of the 6th army corps, 
which assisted neither Ney in the battle of Quartre Bras 
nor Napoleon in that of Ligny, 

Only after a concentration of his forces with those of 
Price and Kirby Smith, would General Bragg have been 
justified, we think, in attacking General Buell. With his 
force alone, a battle would probably only have been detri- 
mental to his cause, or a useless butchery, as he could not 
have expected to gain any decisive result with an army in- 
ferior in strength to that of his enemy ; but had such a con- 
centration and action by the Rebels taken place, the final 
result of the Western campaign would have been probably 
very different from what it really was. 

The next movement we have to consider is the battle of 
Corinth. Price and Yan Dorn unite to attack General 
Grant's army, and to beat him in detail. Their first march 
from Ripley to Pocahontas is very correct; they take 
thereby a central position between Bolivar and Corinth, 
and prevent the junction of the Union troops stationed at 
these places. In the further execution of their plan, they 
however made a mistake. In movements of this kind, the 
general rule is first to beat the corps or army which has its 
line of retreat open, while the corps which is cut from its 
communications by the manoeuvre is amused by a small 
corps, just sufficient to force it to display. By attacking 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 153 

Corinth in the reaf, as they did, without first beating the 
troops at Bolivar, or even without masking them, they 
exposed themselves to an attack in their rear by all the 
troops at Bolivar, while they tljemselves were engaged in 
front with those of Corinth, as in fact it happened. What 
the reasons of their defeat at Corinth were, after they 
had carried the fortifications, it is difficult to say; one 
thing is certain, viz., that the defense of the place reflects 
great credit on the Union general and men. Once beaten, 
the Rebels retreated to Pocahontas; but "here they en- 
countered General Ord, who had been sent to attack them 
in the rear; they opposed this general, however, and there- 
by gained time to pass the Hatchie River. When the 
last Rebels had disappeared. General Ord's column found 
itself face to face with a column of Federal troops com- 
ing from Corinth ; the Rebels had just slipped off be- 
tween the two columns. It would seem that, had Gen- 
eral Rosecrans marched at the same time with his whole 
force to Black's store, and thence to Nubbin's store, the 
Rebels might perhaps have been entirely captured or de- 
stroyed. The position after the battle was such, that only 
a small corps should have pursued in the rear, but the main 
body should have pursued on the flank. Being more to the 
south than the Rebels, it might have continually prevented 
the Rebels retreating southward. They could only have 
escaped by opening their way with the bayonet. This at- 
tempt might have been somewhat difficult, considering that 
they had already been beaten, and that Ord's column was 
coming close at their heels. 

Finally, there is one more operation in this zone which 
14 



154 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

deserves notice. It is the advance movement of the Missis- 
sippi army, under General Grant, to Grenada. With this 
direct movement, a flank movement by General Hovey, with 
20,000 men, was executed from Helena toward Grenada. I 
do not know how many thousand men Price and Van Dorn 
had under their orders, probably more than 20,000. Hovey 
arrived first at Grenada, and, therefore, the Rebels might 
have beaten him before General Grant's army reached that 
place; at all events, Grenada was within their reach, and 
they could hwve prevented the junction. Hence this opera- 
tion was wrong in principle ; it was the adoption of two 
lines of operation, acting in the attack in a concentric way, 
one of the acting armies being weaker than the enemy, who 
holds a central position, and the point of junction being 
within his reach. The Rebels made a blunder in not taking 
advantage of the fault committed by the Union commanders. 

Operations in the Left Zone This zone is the most im- 
portant of the three. Hence the operations in it were the 
most important; and as in some respects they offer novel 
features, they are highly interesting and instructive. 

The question practically solved in the campaign which 
we are going to pass in review is this : Is a country, hav- 
ing a large army of several hundred thousand men, but also 
a very large navy, and being at war with its neighbor, with 
which it has a common boundary of several hundred miles, 
to be considered as a naval or as a continental power? — 
that is, ought it to carry on the war according to the prin- 
ciples which an insular power like Great Britain would have 
to follow, when making war on a continental power, or would 
it have to follow the principles of great wars of invasion, 



CAMPAIGN OP 1882. 155 

as carried oat by great continental powers when invading 
their neighbors ? 

To render the understanding of the proposition easy, 
suppose France and Germany engaged in a war. The 
common boundary extends over some 400 to 500 miles. 
The French frontier is covered by a great number of for- 
tresses. France possesses a very large navy, and great 
means of conveyance ; Germany does not. France and 
Germany each possesses armies of over "700,000 men strong. 
The question at issue now is, would France, by invading 
Germany, be justified in giving up the advantage of a fron- 
tier of 400 miles, to form a line of operation such as Eng- 
land would, based on the sea and on its ships? Would she 
he justified by taking, for instance, Stettin as a base, cov- 
ered by a large fleet, and starting from that point an army 
against Berlin, instead of starting it from the Rhine, and 
at the same time that offensive operations are going on in 
the east, leaving an army based on its fortresses on the 
Rhine on the defensive? 

This was the experiment which was tried in the opera- 
tions of the left zone. I believe the experiment might have 
been dispensed with, for the following reasons : — 

1. To act on one point offensively, and on the other de- 
fensively, is evidently forming two lines of operation, or 
dividing the army into two parts. Admitting the principle 
to be a sound one, that whenever two lines of operation are 
required, it is always better to act offensively, first on one 
point, and then on the other, by transporting the mass of 
troops from one to the other, and leaving the weaker always 
on the defensive ; admitting, I say, this principle to be 



]56 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

sound when two lines are required, the only questions to 
solve are, are two lines of operation really required, one 
being always preferable? and if so, have they exterior or 
interior lines of communication ? 

It is obvious that a country having several hundred miles 
of boundary in common with its neighbor, and its frontier 
well covered with fortifications, so as to form a good base 
of operation, has no need of forming two lines of operation 
— one by land and one by sea. Besides, the very nature of 
two such lines of operation renders them exterior in respect 
to those held by the defending army. The consequence is, 
that the defending army, by making use of the long fron- 
tiers, throws its whole mass into the interior of its enemy's 
country, and beats him in detail, while his main army is 
engaged on the coast disembarking material, troops, etc. 

2. In great operations, speed and punctuality are two 
main requirements. Therefore the more an operation, or 
the machinery of an army, etc. can be simplified, the more 
can be done with it. By making a combined operation 
— that is to say, one in which the army and navy are 
engaged — great difficulties immediately arise, and speed, 
and still more, punctuality, become impossibilities. First, 
the navy is under a different command, and then its sup- 
plies depend on different quartermasters and commissa- 
ries. In its operations, the Weather plays a great part. 
Another difficulty is to find transports for a large num- 
ber of troops. It is not only the men, but the horses, 
wagons, cannon, provisions, stores ; all must be sent by 
these transports. The expenses are enormous ; the time 
lost is generally very great; the means of transport usually 



OAMPAIQN OP 1862, 157 

insufficient; unavoidable sources of delay are continually 
arising; disorder is, in most cases, the natural accom- 
paniment of these operations ; and speed and punctuality 
are at an end. For forming an idea of the immense 
means of transport required for large armies, and the 
whole way in which such movements should be prepared, 
the study of Napoleon's preparations in 1805 will prove a 
good school. 

Most of these combined operations therefore infringe 
upon the principal rules of military science, especially when 
they are executed against a bordering country. They are 
based on a division of force ; they involve the formation of 
two or more lines of operation, with exterior lines, against 
an enemy holding a central position ; there is no certainty 
in results, no punctuality, and no speed ; and there are 
enormous costs, without adequate returns for the outlay; 
they are therefore to be avoided when possible. 

The principal plan of the campaign in the left zone was 
composed of one of these combined operations. In fact, as 
far as we can judge from the operatfons, and from what has 
been published on the subject, the general plan was to 
fortify Washington strongly ; to have it well garrisoned ; to 
hold Harper's Ferry and the line of the Potomac by smaller 
corps; and to transport the main- army, by means of the 
navy, to a point as near as possible to Richmond, the capi- 
tal of the Confederate States. 

The point chosen for the debarkatioli was Fortress Mon- 
roe ; and the main direction for the line of operation was 
the James River. It was probably thought that on this 
line gun-boats might penetrate the river, and powerfully 

14* 



158 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

assist in the capture of Richmond ; besides, York and James 
Rivers, if once in the possession of the Federal navies, were 
excellent lines for supplying the army. 

Before entering upon the discussion of this plan of oper- 
ation, let us say a feV words about its object, which was 
obviously the capture of Richmond. 

The reasons for which wars are undertaken are mani- 
fold ; and according to the real nature of the war, the 
object to be attained greatly varies. If we wish only to 
recapture a province taken from us in a previous war, we 
may be satisfied with occupying the province, and main- 
taining it against the enemy's armies. In this case we 
do not care so much to destroy the enemy, which always 
requires a great effort, and is joined with risk to our- 
selves. We are satisfied to hold him off, and push him 
back from the ground we have won. We capture the 
fortified towns, and, after a time, the enemy, seeing his 
efforts unavailable, and being afraid of losing more, makes 
peace. Such, for instance, was the Crimean war, A great 
war of invasion was out of the question ; and all that was 
desired was the capture of the Crimea, perhaps not even 
that. Russia, after the reduction of Sebastopol, probably 
afraid that the whole of the Crimea might be captured, made 
peace. In such cases, the first and main object of a cam- 
paign is the capture of a place, a fortress, or a tract of land ; 
but in no way the conquest of a whole country, combined 
with the destruction of all its parts capable of resistance. 

Very different from wars of this kind are those which 
have a greater object — the conquest of a whole country, for 
instance. Conquest is only complete when all resistance has 



CAMPATON OF 1802. 159 

ceased. The first or the main object of the campaign (not 
of the war) is therefore the utter destruction of all the 
armed forces of the enemy, wherever they may be found. 
This accomplished, the next or second object is the occu- 
pation of provinces and towns,- and the capture of fortresses. 
How little, for instance, the occupation of provinces, towns, 
and even capitals interferes with real military powers, is 
proved by history in many wars. 

In the Seven Years' war, the Russians captured Berlin, 
but were obliged to relinquish it, and the war was in nowise 
finished by the capture. After the battle of Salamanca, 
Wellington committed the extravagancy of entering Ma- 
drid in triumph, instead of falling on the different isolated 
French corps. The consequence was, that he had to leave 
it in his turn, and to retreat to Portugal. In 1805 and 
1809, the occupation of Vienna by Napoleon would not 
have finished the war, had it not been for his after victories 
at Austerlitz and "Wagram. Finally, in 1812, the occupa- 
tion of Moscow, in the very heart of the Russian empire, 
did not lead to peace, and did not prevent, but on. the con- 
trary hastened, the invading army's final destruction. 

Richmond, the Confederate capital, is to be considered 
as the seat of a real military power, whose very existence is 
based solely on the success of its arms. Such a government 
has a residence, but not a capital. In fact, no old traditions 
make Richmond a place of importance. What matters it 
if Richmond be in danger of being captured ? The leaders 
of the rebellion go twenty or forty miles farther off, and all 
is said. Their orders will not the less be executed, nor will 
their armies fight the worse for it. In fact, they ought 



160 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

never to have given any place even the appearance of a 
capital. 

It is very different with Washington. Washington is the 
history of the Union ; it is the seat of the loyal govern- 
ment, fighting for the suppression of the rebellion, and is 
supposed to be doing so supported by the majority of the 
whole country. Let Washington be taken, and the loyal 
government be overthrown, the consequence would be, that 
rebellion would become the legal authority, as it would have 
the appearance of having the majority on its side ; and the 
North would have to acknowledge the independence of the 
South, or to submit to be governed by it. 

The difference in the relative importance of Washington 
and Richmond is therefore great. The capture of Wash- 
ington by the Rebels might finish the war ; but the capture 
of Richmond would probably not have more influence on 
the ultimate result than the capture of Nashville, Memphis, 
or New Orleans. 

We conclude, therefore, from what we have just said 
about the first object of a campaign in a war of conquest, 
that in the plan of operation, such as was executed in the 
left zone, a secondary object — the capture of Richmond — 
was made a main object; and that consequently, whatever 
the plan for the attainment of this object may have been, 
no decisive result could have been gained by it, the object 
remaining the same. 

Let us now pass in review the plan of operation before 
described. 

The general principle of it is treated above when speak- 
ing of combined operations, and in our case we will easily 



CAMPAIGN OP 1802. 161 

see that two lines of operation were formed when a single 
one might have been chosen with facility ; that, moreover, 
these two lines had exterior lines of communication, and 
that a central position was held by the enemy; and finally, 
that as far as speed and punctuality were concerned, 
scarcely anything worse could have been imagined. From 
Washington to Richmond by land the distance is about 125 
to 130 miles, or 6 to 7 days' march. From Fortress Mon- 
roe to Richmond it is 75 miles, or 4 days' march. The army 
had advanced to Fairfax C. H. and Centreville, about 20 
miles from Washington ; thence they had to return to Alex- 
andria to get re-embarked, making some 30 to forty miles 
marching before embarking, or 2 days' march, which, joined 
to the 4 from Fortress Monroe, makes 6 days' march, or 
about the entire time required to march from Washington 
to Richmond. The fact is, that in order to avoid 15 or 20 
miles of marching, 100,000 mer, with their immelase mate- 
rial, were transported 180 miles by water, and to avoid this 
1 day's march, not less than 19 days were spent in embark- 
ing, transporting, and disembarking the army. Speed and 
punctuality were evidently here entirely out of question. 

Having considered the plan of attack in general, that is, 
the correctness of forming several lines of operation by a 
combined operation of army and navy, we have now to con- 
sider the direction of those two lines. 

One line had for its base Washington, with its fortifica- 
tions ; its natural direction was the straight line from the 
Federal capital to the Confederate one. On this line the 
defensive was chosen. The other line, the off'ensive one, was 
that from Fortress Monroe to Richmond — that is to say, 



162 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

from the sea-coast into the interior of the country. In 
Chapters" I., II., and III. we have at some length proved 
that operations made along the sea-coast, or generally to 
the left of the main left zone, are far from being decisive, 
for the very simple reason that the Rebel army can always 
retreat, and continually maintain its interior lines of com- 
munication with the Western armies, by which it can be re- 
inforced, and finally repulse the invading army. Besides, 
the Union army, once really thrown against one of the 
large rivers or bays, might, if rightly attacked, even find 
the protection of the gun-boats unavailable, and be obliged 
to surrender — that is to say, the Union army voluntarily 
places itself in positions into which the Rebel army ought 
to be forced by grand manoeuvres. Hence the operation is 
in no way decisive for the Rebels, but might become so for 
the Federal army, the very reverse of what ou-ght to be. 

Two lines of operation imply that two objects are to be 
attained. The object of the offensive operation is evidently 
the main object; it is, in fact, the object of the campaign. 
On the contrary, that of the defensive operation, or of the 
operation of the defensive army, is secondary to this prin- 
cipal object,. the main force being evidently employed for 
the offensive operation, as the whole campaign is to be an 
offensive one. At the time this campaign was planned, the 
Rebels were supposed to have very nearly as large an army 
as that of the Union, and their position, continually threat- 
ening Washington, was certainly far from being defensive. 
How would it have been if the Rebels, basing themselves 
on the difference of importance between Richmond and 
Washington, had adopted for defense a plan of campaign 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 163 

similar to that of the attack? To be more clear — if the 
Rebels had opposed the Potomac army coming from For- 
tress Monroe by a small corps, just sufficient to retard its 
march, and force it to a continual display of force, and had 
in the mean time thrown themselves by forced marches with 
their main force on the smaller corps in front of Washing- 
ton ; if then they had passed the Potomac, captured Har- 
per's Ferry and Baltimore, and attacked Washington on 
the left side of the Potomac, giving up, meanwhile, Rich- 
mond, and acting upon the simple truth, they could always 
afford to lose Richmond if they capture Washington in- 
stead. This they might have done, and hence we conclude 
that the choice of the direction of the two lines of opera- 
tion, as well as their importance, was not well considered at 
the time this campaign was planned. The principles laid 
down by the Archduke Charles, that in war we should 
always act as if the 'enemy would do the very worst he 
could do to us, was certainly not taken into account. Re- 
capitulating, therefore, all that has been said of this general 
plan, we may come to the following conclusions : — 

1. All main operations conducted to the left of the main 
left zone, that is to say, along the sea-coast, will force the 
Union armies to the adoption of two lines of operation, one 
defensive and one offensive ; or, in other words, to a division 
of force, to protect Washington and to carry on offensive 
operations, as the Rebels, by choosing a position ou the 
right flank of the Union army, threaten, without any danger 
to themselves, Washington and the Union army. 

2. All operations to the right of the main left zone do 
not require this division of force. The garrison of Wash- 



164 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

ingtoD might be reduced to a few thousand men, as the 
Rebel army could not act against Washington with th^ 
Union army on its left flank, giving it thereby free access 
to its line of retreat and its interior lines of communication 
with the "Western armies. If it did, nevertheless, act against 
Washington under such circumstances, the Union command- 
ers could only congratulate themselves, as this action would 
insure the destruction of the Rebel army by attacking its 
left flank and throwing it into the Potomac. 

3. The strategical direction of a line of operation in the 
left portion of the main left zone can never be decisive ; 
while, on the contrary, the strategical direction of a line of 
operation along the right of the main left zone is decisive. 

4. Combined operations of army and navy, being out of 
the corrtrol of the Commander-in-Chief, are to be avoided, 
as no speed nor punctuality can be accomplished by them; 
besides, as above shown, the strategical direction of the line 
of operation not being decisive, no adequate result is ob- 
tained for the immense cost of such expeditions. 

5. From 1, 2, 3, and 4 we conclude that one line of oper- 
ation to the right of the main left zone would be correct 
and preferable to the formation of more lines, which we 
know to be incorrect, or which at least is in general to be 
avoided. 

Let us now pass to the actual details of the campaign. 

The first movement is the expedition of General Burnside 
to Roanoke Island. As to its general fitness, the following 
remarks will apply to all smaller similar expeditions. They 
are to be considered as detachments sent to the rear of a 
stronger enemy, and consequently they are against the rules 



'CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 165 

of grand war. Whenever the enemy chooses to do so, he 
may crush them; besides, they conduct only to a division 
instead of to a concentrttion of force ; and the alleged 
reason, that they are necessary to prevent foreign interven- 
tion or the running of the blockade, is simply ridiculous, for 
this reason, that were the operations conducted rightly, with 
the great superiority of men possessed by the North, the 
war ought not to last longer than two or three months, as 
shown in Chapter III.; and in these two or three months 
certainly foreign powers would not have much time to med- 
dle, nor would many ships be able to run the blockade. For 
more on the subject of expeditions, see " Summary of the 
Art of War," pp. 52 and 168. 

As far as the execution of the opei'ations against Roanoke 
Island is concerned, nothing is to be said except that it 
seems to have been carried out well and even brilliantly. 

The operations of the army of the Potomac began with 
General Banks's movement against Winchester. Scarcely 
had the Union army advanced in this direction — that is to 
say, on the right of the main left zone— than the Rebels 
evacuated Centreville. If this evacuation was the conse- 
quence of the above movement, and I really do believe that 
it was, it would show that the Rebels understand fully the 
importance of the different parts of the theater of war, 
though at that time their other preparations for the defense 
of their country were far from being good or correct. Two 
days after the retreat of the Rebels, the whole Union army 
moved after them, but only as far as Fairfax and Centre- 
ville, for no other purpose than to move back again, to 
embark at Alexandria. 

15 



ITrG PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

The embarking of the Potomac army commenced on the 
17th of Mai'ch, and lasted until the 5th of April. It took 
not less than nineteen days to ftansport 80,000 to 100,000 
men a distance of 180 miles, in which nineteen days the 
army might have marched some 350 miles, or very nearly 
from the Potomac to the Savannah. The troops were 
landed near Fortress Monroe. By consulting the map, it 
will be seen that Fortress Monroe is situated at the end of 
a peninsula, which in some places is not over six to seven 
miles wide, and in all about fifty miles long. A line of battle 
six to seven miles long requires, according to the nature of 
the ground, and to its being defensive or offensive, from 
40,000 to 100,000 men. (See "Summary of the Art of 
War," p. Y6.) 

The ground on the peninsula being extremely favorable 
to the defense, 40,000 men could at any time have stopped 
100,000 men for a long while, if the army would have had 
to make the whole march from Fortress Monroe to the 
upper end of the peninsula — that is, if, by means of the 
gun-boats and steamers, the York and the James Rivers 
could not have been ascended, and thereby the Rebel army 
outflanked. 

The James River, at the time the operation took place, 
was closed by the Merrimac, and the York River by York- 
town and Gloucester, The array therefore had to advance 
from Fortress Monroe; and as the peninsula is so narrow 
that no flanking movement could be made, all movements 
had to be executed by the front, and every obstacle to be 
carried by force. 

One of the chief principles of grand war is to get posses- 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. VQ'J 

sion of the enemy's coini»unications without exposing one's 
own. Evidently the application of this principle was out 
of the question in the position the Potomac army was 
placed in. To suppose that by transporting the troops to 
Fortress Monroe, and by acting thence against Richmond, 
was seizing the communications of the Rebel, army in Vir- 
ginia — at Centreville, for instance — is to suppose that the 
Rebels could neither see, nor think, nor march. 

They were, at the time the first preparation was made, in 
possession of the right bank of the Potomac, and could see 
and count the transports going up to Alexandria. Even if 
transportation for half of the army had been provided, it 
would have taken five to six days to transport the whole of 
it; and in six days the Rebels could have marched from 
Centreville to Williamsburg, and encountered the Union 
army in front again. These considerations alone should have 
been sufficient to prevent the campaign on the peninsula. 

"While the Potomac army found itself imprisoned on the 
small tract of land between the intrenchments of Yorktown 
and Fortress Monroe, the army for the defense of Washing- 
ton was divided into three independent commands : Fre- 
mont, in the mountains west of the Shenandoah ; Banks, in 
the Shenandoah valley ; and McDowell, east of the Blue 
Ridge. Thus, including General Burnside's corps, not less 
than five armies were operating on five different lines of 
operation against Richmond. A curious spectacle — the 
main array shut up in the peninsula, and these other four 
small armies inviting the enemy to come and annihilate 
them ! The Rebels, however, were magnanimous 1 they 
allowed this unique opportunity of striking a decisive blow 



168 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

(we might almost say, to finish the war) to slip. What an 
occasion for a general ambitious of gaining the reputation 
of a great commander ! Jackson finally felt that cheap 
laurels might be gained here, and he made the attempt, 
though commanding but a small corps. He could not help 
gaining some, laurels, though not enough to enable him to 
pass for a great captain. 

These surrounding manoeuvres, forming four or five lines 
of operation converging all on one point, were favorite ma- 
noeuvres in the good old times. In the Peninsular war, the 
Spanish generals used them profusely. In the first war of 
the French revolution, the Austrian generals could not live 
without them. In more modern times, however, they had 
become scarce ; till in our present day, the Virginia cam- 
paign saw them once more in full flower. 

It is scarcely worth while to say much about such disposi- 
tions; history has already pronounced judgmeut on them. 
To form an idea as to how much they are against the rules, 
and how ridiculous they must be considered, if executed 
against a stronger army in a central position, it is only 
necessary to read military history; to study Jomini, Napo- 
leon, Cesar, and all those who have won a name in the 
great art of war. 

After the evacuation of Yorktown, the army followed up 
the Rebels, whose rear guard was found at Williamsburg. 
Meanwhile General Franklin's division was transported to 
West Point to act on the communications of the Rebels. 
At Williamsburg, the Rebels made a stand, and were only 
forced to relinquish the position in consequence of a flank 
movement executed by General Hancock. The whole move- 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 169 

ment, as well as the style in which it was executed, is highly 
creditable to this general. 

After the retreat of the Rebels, the army remained for 
several days at Williamsburg, which delay must be consid- 
ered a fault. We must look at such a pursuit as was exe- 
cuted by Napoleon, after his great battles of Jena and 
Wagram, or at the pursuit executed by Bliicher, after the 
battle of Waterloo, to see what, under such circumstances, 
can be and should be done. 

Here was a rear guard of the enemy which ought to have 
been crippled before arriving at the Chickahominy, and 
not even trying to cripple it was certainly a fault. Ad- 
mitting that the roads were bad, they were quite as bad 
for the retreating as for the pursuing troops. Besides, 
Franklin's expedition to West Point could be of no avail, if 
not supported immediately by the whole army coming -from 
Williamsburg. As a general rule, detachments like that of 
Franklin seldom do any good in the rear of a stronger 
enemy, and, when against great captains, nearly always 
finish with disasters. 

The defense was well conducted. The evacuation of 
Yorktown, just as that of Centreville and of Corinth, was 
executed in a masterly manner. The leaving of a rear 
guard at Williamsburg was also right, and according to 
the rules, in order to prevent the enemy following with too 
much impetuosity, and to give the trains time to be brought 
in safely. For similar reasons, the engaging of Franklin 
was in its place. 

The army took eleven days to move from Williamsburg 
to White House, a distance which it ought to have made 

15* 



no PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

in two or three days at the very utmost. These delays, and 
this great slowness in a forward march, are fatal mistakes. 
They give an enemy time to make his preparation; to re- 
cover from a fatiguing retreat; to push in reinforcements; 
to get over the demoralization which the retreat may have 
occasioned among the troops ; to restore discipline, etc. ; 
and instead of a half-beaten enemy, we find a strong and 
determined one in front of us. 

These slow movements violate the greatest rules of grand 
war, which are to use the utmost speed, and always to strike 
an enemy before he is prepared. The movements of Cesar 
and Napoleon, and some of the French marshals in the 
Peninsular war, are well worth studying in respect to the 
use of time. 

When the army arrived on the Chickahominy, it placed 
one wing on the right and the other on the left bank of the 
creek, connected with each other only by way of Bottom 
Bridge. Very soon after its arrival, an attempt was made 
to form a junction with General McDowell at Fredericks- 
burg. This attempt was based on sound principle, and 
would, in some degree, have corrected the defective position 
of the Union armies ; though it is by no means proved that 
had this junction taken place, it would have insured the 
capture of Richmond. The Rebels could have prevented 
it by moving in force on Hanover C. H.; by beating Porter 
and McDowell, and throwing them back to the north, and 
then placing themselves between these two generals and 
General McClellan's army. 

The disposition of the army in separate wings was a very 
dangerous one, as is well proved by the two attempts the 



CAMPAIGN OP-1862. ITl 

Rebels made to destroy these wings separately. The first 
of these two attempts was made against the left wing, and 
the battle of Fair Oaks was the consequence of it. The 
left wing consisted of four divisions in echelons, one behind 
the other along the York River Railroad. The Rebels fell 
on these divisions in front, and at the same time moved a 
strong column against Bottom Bridge to cut off all retreat, 
and prevent any reinforcement arriving. 

The conception of this plan was certainly sound. The 
idea was not to defeat, but to destroy the left wing — that 
is, nearly one-half of the Union forces. To attack with 
their concentrated force part only of the Union army before 
they could be succored, is according to the rules of war. 
The conception of the plan, and the applying of the rules 
to the situation, reflect honor on the general who was the 
author of it. The execution of the plan, however, was far 
from being equal to the conception. This is probably, to 
a certain extent, the consequence of the composition and 
organization of the armies, which possess too few well- 
instructed officers, and men not sufficiently drilled, to per- 
mit of very rapid or very precise manoeuvres. 

The promptitude with which General Sumner marched 
against the enemy in this battle is creditable to him ; and 
here the old truth was once more verified, that he who flanks, 
exposes his own flank. The flanking column of the Rebels 
was attacked on its own flank by General Sumner ; the dis- 
order created thereby, occasioned in a great measure their 
final repulse. The plan of defense in this battle was not 
equal to the plan of attack. 

With the exception of General Sumner's corps, the right 



172 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

wing did not succor the left wing; and though there were 
difficulties to overcome, they ought to have been overcome 
at all events, and at any price. When the battle com- 
menced, some uncertainty was entertained about the real 
place of attack. It might have beeu that the fight on the 
left wing was only a feint, and that a main attack on the 
right wing would take place. All doubts were, however, 
soon dispelled. The reports from the battle-field, and an 
aeronautic reconnoissance, soon proved that the whole 
Rebel army before Richmond was engaging the left wing. 
As soon as this fact was ascertained, three kinds of meas- 
ures ought to have been taken at once. First, the imme- 
diate construction of bridges over the Chickahominy ; the 
immediate marching of Sumner's troops to Bottom Bridge, 
and thence to the battle-field ; and the immediate concen- 
tration of the troops more to the right, near the bridge 
constructed by the engineers of General Sumner's corps. 
The right wing would have had only some eight miles to 
march by acting so ; and by commencing the movement at 
two o'clock, the whole army would have been by night on 
the other side. Troops, on such occasions, cross the defile 
in double quick, and the artillery is only brought on after 
the main body of the troops has passed. 

That such or a similar energe"tic action was required, a 
simple reasoning proves. Three alternatives were possible. 
Either the left wing gains a victory ; or it is only able to 
repulse the attack, and the result is a drawn game ; or it is 
defeated, and may be entirely destroyed. The first of these 
three alternatives was out of question. It could not be 
supposed that four divisions would gain a decisive victory 



CAMPAIGN OF 18G2. It3 

over the whole Rebel army. By not succoring the left 
wing, therefore, only a drawn battle or a disaster could be 
expected. By throwing five or six divisions to the support 
of the four already engaged, a drawn battle would evidently 
have been changed into a decisive victory, and a disaster 
probably into a drawn battle. The only objection which 
can be made to this reasoning is that, by throwing the whole 
army over the Chickahominy, the whole army was exposed 
to destruction. Admitting the cogency of this argument, 
we can only ask, how it happened that under such circum- 
stances the left wing was placed on the right bank of the 
creek at all? and why Sumner was sent over? which, ac- 
cording to the supposition, would only have increased the 
disasters ; and finally, why, if such a disaster was appre- 
hended, the immediate retreat of the left wing was not 
ordered ? Therefore, it was decidedly a mistake that the 
right wing did not succor the left wing; and that no 
bridges were ready, cannot be accepted as an excuse, con- 
sidering that General Sumner managed to have one, and 
that, therefore, the other corps might have had bridges too. 
The crossing of the right wing ought to have taken place, 
even if no immediate advantage in the battle of the 31st of 
May could have been expected from it ; it ought to have 
taken place, in order that the army might have taken the 
offensive itself immediately after the repulse of the Rebels. 
We can here only repeat what we have already said, of not 
following up a victory, when speaking of the battle of Wil- 
liamsburg. That immediate action after a battle, even in 
this country, and with our present armies, is possible, is 
proved by the Rebels in the seven days' fight and by their 



174 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

campaigns in Virginia and in Maryland, and by the ener- 
getic advance of the Union army after the fight at South 
Mountain. 

Jackson's offensive operation in the Shenandoah valley 
was one of the most apropos movements executed during the 
war; it prevented the junction between General McDowell's 
and General MeClellan's troops; it threw the whole army in 
and around Washington on the defensive, and thereby pre- 
vented reinforcements being sent to the army of the Poto- 
mac, which was left to its own fate, and had finally to suc- 
cumb under the blows its stronger adversary was about to 
deal it. The strategical direction of Jackson's line of opera- 
tions was a good one. General Banks's corps was not only 
the weakest, but it was the center of the long line of defense 
or attack formed by the three Northern armies. By break- 
ing this center, by beating Banks, General Jackson found 
himself at once in a central position, between the corps of 
Fremont, McDowell, and Banks, and the only mistake the 
Rebels made was to undertake this operation with about 
15,000 men instead of 40,000 to 50,000. 

It has been stated that General Jackson had 25,000 men. 
I do not credit this statement. With 25,000 men there was 
no reason to run away before General Fremont or before 
General McDowell, who came presenting themselves to his 
blows from two different sides, with only 15,000 to 20,000 
men each. If Jackson had really been as strong as was 
stated, he ought, after driving General Banks over the Poto- 
mac, to have marched to the encounter of Fremont, beaten 
him, and then, turning against McDowell, driven him right 
under the guns of Washington. That with 25,000 men such 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 175 

action would have been possible, is sufficiently proved by 
Napoleon's campaign of 1796. Therefore, admitting that 
General Jackson had 25,000 men, is admitting that a blun- 
der was committed in sending Fremont and McDowell on 
converging lines of operation against him ; it was exposing 
them uselessly to be defeated separately, as in fact happened 
to them at Cross Keys and Port Republic, though Jackson 
had, all told, probably not more than 15,000; which may 
also partly be inferred from the fact that in these two en- 
gagements he had only 5000 opposed to Fremont and 8000 
opposed to Tyler, making a total of 13,000. 

In his advance, General Jackson did not march straight 
against Strasburg, but to Front Royal, whence he could 
act, and in fact did act, on General Banks's communica- 
tions. But from Front Royal he did not ishoose-the best 
line he might have chosen ; he moved to Middletown, which 
is from Strasburg only half the distance from Front Royal ; 
therefore Banks could sooner be there than Jackson. There 
are two other roads — one to Newtown and one to Winches- 
ter — from Front Royal, and the distance on these two roads 
is the same as from Strasburg to Newtown or Winchester. . 
Starting, therefore, at the same time as General Banks, 
Jackson, by moving on one of these two roads, might have 
prevented the former from going farther north, and have 
forced him to fight a battle, the result of which would 
scarcely have been doubtful. A few cavalry thrown out 
toward Middletown, to disturb or. even seriously attack 
General Banks's train, would probably have retarded this 
latter sufficiently to give Jackson time to be first on one of 
the two decisive points named above. On reading over 



116 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

the details of this operation, it seems, however, as though 
either General Jackson's force had not entirely arrived at 
Front Royal when the capture of the Union forces took 
place there, or else precious time was lost by him at this • 
place, and the Union forces at Strasburg thereby enabled 
to make good their retreat. 

The quickness with which General Banks understood the 
position and decided to retreat is creditable to him ; but, as 
no further danger for his communications existed the mo- 
ment he had reached Winchester, the retreat from this place 
farther north might have been conducted with more firm- 
ness and in a more soldier-like manner. What may be 
done under such circumstances, is well illustrated by Gen- 
eral Sigel's retreat previous to the battle of Pea Ridge. 
In his case the superiority of the enemy was far greater than 
that of Jackson over General Banks, who had probably 
never to deal with more than 5000 to 6000 Rebels — that is 
to say, with the advance of their columns — his own com- 
mand consisting of two brigades. 

General Jackson's retreat from Winchester to Stannards- 
ville was, as far as we can judge, executed in a masterly 
manner. His two engagements at Cross Keys and Port 
Republic show firmness and understanding of the art of 
war. The action at Cross Keys is highly creditable to the 
Rebel general and to his men who fought it. The general, 
on the contrary, who lets slip the opportunity of crushing 
5000 men with 20,000, and, what is worse, who permitted 
himself to be beaten under such circumstances, has certainly 
but very few claims to the title of "general." 

The direction chosen by the corps of Fremont and Mc- 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 177 

Dowell, for the intercepting of Jackson, was a wrong one. 
To march to the place where Jackson had only been heard 
of, according to the last accounts, was evidently coming too 
late. To effect the object, a very simple exercise of arith- 
metic would have shown where to march to. From Win- 
chestei*, where Jackson was on the 25th, to Harrisonsburg, in 
the Shenandoah valley, is three days' march ; from Franklin, 
where Fremont was, two ; and from Falmouth, where McDow- 
ell's corps camped, three forced or four ordinary days' march. 
Both Union generals might have gained certainly one, and 
McDowell easily two days' march on Jackson, who could 
not have been immediately informed of their movements. 
Hence, if General McDowell had marched to Stannardsville, 
and thence through Swift Run Gap to Luray, occupying 
Chester Gap and the road to New Market, Jackson could not 
have hindered him from doing so ; if at the same time be had 
pushed a column from Warrenton to Manassas Gap, which 
could easily have been occupied and held by a small force, 
he might have been in those places on the fourth day, and 
formed by his left wing a junction with General Fremont, 
marching from Franklin to Harrisonsburg, and moving thence 
upon Broadway and New Market. Both generals, pushing 
rapidly forward and throwing out cavalry to the right and 
the left near the gaps, to remain well informed of Jackson's 
movements, might have been in this position on the fourth 
day ; and, supposing they had gained only one day on Jack- 
son, he could not have prevented them. It will be seen that, 
by acting in this way, they might with their main force have 
continually prevented Jackson returning south, whatever 

16 



nS rRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

course he might take, as they could always reach the de- 
cisive point before him. That point would have been evi- 
dently the spot to the right or left, where Jackson tried to 
pass them. That they would have gained several marches 
on him, is well proved by the fact that at the commence- 
ment of June he was still at Strasburg, and on the Tth only 
at Port Republic, at which place, or somewhat below, the 
two Union generals might have been by the 29th of May. 

While Jackson was retreating, leaving the armies of the 
North out of breath with their useless run, the army of the 
Potomac remained inactive, permitting the enemy to re- 
cover from his repulse at Fair Oaks, to reorganize his army, 
to draw reinforcements from the West, and finally to pro- 
ceed to a junction with Jackson, and to the execution of a 
grand plan, which was calculated to deal a decisive blow to 
the main Union army. 

In the middle of June the Rebel cavalry had made a re- 
connoissance in the rear of the Federal army ; and toward 
the end of this month, when solid bridges over the Chicka- 
hominy had been constructed, an advance was determined 
on ; but scarcely had it begun by the Union troops of the 
left wing, when the Rebels, consisting of Jackson, Hill, 
and Longstreet's corps, under General Lee, appeared on 
the right flank of the right wing of the Federal army, and 
proceeded immediately to the attack. 

Taking the map in hand, it will be seen that by this 
movement the Rebels took hold at once of the communi- 
cations of the Federal army, and that the right wing, once 
beaten, would be thrown against the Chickahominy with its 
swamps; while the left wing, shut up between Richmond 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 1*79 

and the Chickahominy, had scarcely any other chance than 
to surrender. The defeat of the right wing, therefore, would 
decide the destruction of the entire army of the Potomac. 
The conception of this plan was good, and worthy of a great 
general. The Union army, separated, and the most import- 
ant wing exposed to the blows of a greatly superior force, 
seemed to be lost. This time, however, the defense was 
equal to the attack. James River was open to the Federal 
gun-boats, and by marching straight to it, on the right bank 
of the Chickahominy, leaving the main Rebel army on the 
left bank, the army might be saved. The Chickahominy 
was difficult to cross. The Rebels had passed over a bridge 
some 10 miles above the utmost right of the Union troops; 
if, therefore, the Federal army crosses on its own bridges, 
and destroys those behind it, the Rebels have to return by 
their bridge, and lose one day in useless marching, and this 
might be enough. Once near James River, the army could 
take shelter under the igun-boats. As soon, therefore, as the 
Rebels appear on the right flank, the right wing is ordered 
to oppose them, while the train is sent over the bridges to 
join the left wing. At the end of the second day the right 
wing was beaten, but the train had crossed, and, night 
coming on, a rout of the Union forces was prevented. The 
troops of the beaten wing then followed their train, crossed 
the creek, and destroyed the bridges behind them. The junc- 
tion of the right and left wings took place, and the retreat 
toward James River was immediately commenced. This 
plan of defense reflects the highest credit and honor on the 
general who conceived and carried it out ; and the entire 
operation of the defense, as well as of the attack, must be 



180 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

looked upon as two of the finest movements executed during 
the war. 

History presents an example of a similar operation to 
that executed in the seven days' fight. In 1674, Monte- 
cuculi crossed the Rhine to attack Turenne on French soil ; 
Turenne avoided the attack by himself crossing that river, 
and entering on German ground. Montecuculi was thereby 
forced to retreat, and recross the Rhine to defend his own 
country. 

The fight at Gaines's Mill took place on the 2Tth, and on 
the 29th the Rebels had come back to the right bank and 
commenced the attack. The retreat was, nevertheless, con- 
tinued, the Rebels following the retreating troops with the 
utmost determination. A rear guard, left after the crossing 
of White Oak Swamp, was attacked by them with great 
energy, and at Malvern Hill a final attempt was made to 
throw the whole army of the Potomac into James River. 
This determined pursuit was correct, and would probably 
have produced greater results had the distance been only 
one or two marches longer. The Potomac army had suf- 
fered severely in the retreat, and was greatly disorganized 
on its arrival at Malvern Hill and Harrison's Landing. 

The only fault which seems to have been committed on 
the side of the Rebels was, that the attacks on the Union 
rear guards were not executed in sufficient force. How far 
they were adapted to the topography of the country, we are 
unable to judge. At Malvern Hill, for instance, it would 
appear that the dispositions for the attack were not in 
accordance with the ground, and were far from having 
been correct. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 181 

After the failure at Malvern Hill, the Rebels could not 
expect that another attack would succeed ; and both armies 
being exhausted, a pause occurred in the operations. The 
position at Harrison's Landing threatened Richmond ou 
both sides of the James River, as the Union army, by means 
of its gun-boats, commanded the river, and could cross it 
at will. This position of affairs obliged the Rebel army to 
retreat to the neighborhood of Richmond, so as to be able 
to act on either side, using Richmond as a double tete-de- 
pont, and acting against the Union army from whatever 
side it would advance. 

After the troubles created by Jackson's offensive' move- 
ment against General Banks, the armies of Generals Mc- 
Dowell, Fremont, and Banks were consolidated ; General 
Buruside, with his troops, was called from Roanoke Island, 
and General Stevens's division from Port Royal. These 
troops were then ordered to Fredericksburg. 

July passed without any event of importance. Jackson 
had moved to Gordonsville ; and it was the 12th of August 
before the army of the Potomac, by commencing its retreat, 
gave the signal for another offensive movement on the part 
of the Rebels, not against this army, but in a northward 
direction, against the army of Yirginia, then under com- 
mand of General Pope. 

Before passing this campaign in review, we must be per- 
mitted to say a few words on the previous inaction of the 
Rebels, which lasted from the commencement of July to the 
12th of August. 

In operations where an army holds a central position 
16* 



183 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

between two hostile armies, the main chance of success lies 
in attacking one after the other, before they can unite, or 
before they can arrive so near as to make a simultaneous 
attack on the main body holding the central position. Great 
speed and immediate action are therefore necessary to ob- 
tain great results, and it is evident that the best moment to 
attack one of the two armies acting on exterior lines, is 
immediately after the defeat of the other, for the simple 
reason that the defeated army is not in a position, morally 
or physically, to take up the offensive for some time ;' besides, 
the enemy has no time to bring his armies to a junction or 
to reinforce or withdraw them ; and finally, the moral effect 
of two victories, one gained directly after the other, is very 
great. In the present case, therefore, the Rebels, imme- 
diately after the Malvern Hill fight, ought to have moved 
north, leaving only 20,000 to 30,000 men at Richmond. 
Supposing they had taken three to four days to repose and 
reorganize their army, they might have been on the eighth 
or ninth day at Warrenton. Attacking the forces there with 
impetuosity, they would have beaten them, and, pursuing 
them from Warrenton to Washington in the same style 
they had pursued the Union army from the Chickahominy 
to James River, little doubt can be entertained that they 
would have completely routed them. Passing the Potomac a 
few miles above Washington, the capture of one or two forts 
on the left side of the river would have insured the capture 
of the town, and there would have been but few troops to 
oppose the Rebels in their attempt. The Potomac army, in 
its condition when at Harrison's Landing, could not and did 
not take the offensive during the first fortnight after its re- 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 183 

treat; and the Rebel army once before Washington, it 
would have been very soon recalled to the defense of the 
Federal capital. 

Several considerations may have influenced the long inac- 
tivity of the Rebels : one, that they thought the climate of 
Harrison's Landing would finish what the sword had com- 
menced, and greatly reduce or destroy the Potomac army, 
without their doing anything for it; or they felt not strong 
enough to undertake this movement. This last reason, how- 
ever, we cannot admit, for afterward they attacked the two 
Union armies united ; besides, their strength may be com- 
puted about as follows : It has been stated that they had from 
150,000 to 200,000 men engaged in the seven days' fight. 
This is certainly a great mistake. The main army under 
Lee, attacking the Federal right wing, numbered, according 
to the estimation and reports of Union generals, 60,000 men, 
which means that probably it amounted to not more than 
50,000. The other part of the Rebel army was left on the 
defensive, or at least was not commanded by any general of 
renown. The Rebel army before Richmond had no other 
task than to defend that place and hold the Union left wing 
in check. This army, having a secondary part to play, was 
certainly not stronger than the main army. The whole, 
therefore, probably did not exceed 100,000 to 110,000 men. 
Of these, 15,000 to 20,000 were disabled in the seven days' 
fight ; 20,000 were required for the defense of Richmond ; 
hence 60,000 were left for the ofi"ensive movement; and this 
was fully sufficient, considering the strength of the army at 
Warrenton. If the presence of the army of the Potomac 
really did prevent the Rebels following a course similar to 



184 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

the one described above, then their inaction must be consid- 
ered as a grave military fault, which probably was the first 
cause of their losing the campaign at the end. 

As we have already stated, the departure of the army of 
the Potomac became the signal for an offensive movement 
against the army under General Pope, who had advanced to 
Culpepper, General Burnside's corps remaining meanwhile 
at Fredericksburg. On the 10th of August General Jackson 
had already encountered General Banks ; but it was not till 
about the 20th that the advance of the whole Rebel army 
was felt ; and then General Pope commenced his retreat. 
The Rebels, however, had delayed their movement too long. 
On the 20th of August General McClellan's army com- 
menced disembarking at Aquia Creek to join Pope near 
Warrenton. On the 2'7th these troops were ordered to 
Manassas Junction to attack General Jackson, who had 
turned the right flank of the Union army, and had passed 
through Thoroughfare Gap, in the rear of the Federal 
troops. Generals Sigel and McDowell were ordered to 
Gainesville, to intercept communication between Jackson 
and Lee, but were subsequently sent to Manassas Junc- 
tion. On the 28th and 29th the fight becomes general; 
the Federal army is defeated, retreats, is outflanked once 
more at Centreville, and takes shelter behind the fortifica- 
tions of Washington on the 2d of September. 

Let us consider first the attack. The object of the attack 
was evidently to defeat Pope before General McClellan's 
army could effect a junction with him. This was only pos- 
sible by leaving Richmond before the army of the Potomac 
left Harrison's Landing. By not doing so, the object could 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 185 

evidently not be carried out; and the long inaction of the 
Rebel array was therefore, as already said, a fault. 

The direction they gave to their line of operation was a 
sound and good one. Pope's front of operation was per- 
pendicular to the Potomac; it was therefore the wing 
opposite the river which was to be attacked, and the 
whole army thrown against it. It is a general rule, that 
an army pointing with one wing to an unsurmountable ob- 
stacle and having the other wing in the air, is always to be 
attacked on this last wing, and to be pressed against the 
obstacle — a river, a swamp, a mountain, the sea, or what- 
ever it may be — where it will be forced to surrender. This 
rule is one of the elementary rules of strategy; and the 
course the Confederate armies would take could therefore 
not be one moment doubtful. It was obvious that they 
would attack and turn the right wing of the Union army, 
and, after the slightest success was gained on this wing, 
they would push the army in the direction of the Potomac, 
and force it to surrender there. This was in fact the course 
followed by the Rebels, and they thereby rapidly conducted 
the Federal troops from the Rapidan to Washington. 

As far as the details of the operation are concerned, we 
must confess that we know too little about them to form 
any precise opinion. One thing, however, seems clear, viz., 
that a division of the Confederate forces took place; and 
that while one part of them was amusing the Union army 
in front, another part marched in its rear. This division 
was evidently a mistake, and would have been paid for 
dearly by them had the first direction of Sigel's and Mc- 
Dowell's corps been followed up. We must, nevertheless. 



186 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

admit that the direction taken by Jackson's corps was ad- 
mirably chosen, in complete harmony with the rules of 
strategy and with the natural features of the country ; and 
the only objection we have to make is, that it was executed 
with part only, instead of with the entire force of the 
Rebels. If the simultaneous march of the whole Rebel 
army was impossible, it would perhaps have been more 
correct to fall on General Sigel's corps, which was near 
Waterloo, unsupported, in front of the Rebel army, and 
therefore exposed to their blows. 

The way the flank movement was executed by the Rebels 
certainly deserves credit, if it is considered that it became 
known only when Jackson was already through Thorough- 
fare Gap — that is to say, entirely in the rear of the Union 
army. Besides the loss of time and the division of force, 
one more reproach may be made to the attack. It is, that 
the pursuit, after the battle, was not nearly so energetic as 
in the seven days' fight ; and thereby the whole fruit of the 
victory was lost. 

Though the attack, as we have seen, was not entirely 
correct, the defense was still less so. No advantage was 
taken of the mistakes of the Rebels ; and in fact it was a 
series of the most serious military errors, as will be shown 
in the following dicussion. 

When General Pope commenced his retreat, it was known 
that the whole Rebel army was moving against him. Only 
an immediate concentration of all the Union forces then in 
North Virginia, and those of McClellan's army coming from 
Yorktown, could save General Pope either from a defeat, or, 
at all events, from an inglorious retreat. Instead of such a 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 18T 

concentration, we see General Pope at Culpepper; part of 
the Potomac army arriving at Aquia Creek, and marching 
toward Warrenton Junction ; another part of the army of 
the Potomac transported to Alexandria, and remaining 
there ; and finally. General Burnside staying with his corps 
at Fredericksburg. This looks very little like a concentra- 
tion ; and in fact General Pope was only joined by those 
corps which had moved from Aquia Creek to Warrenton 
Junction. 

General Burnside's corps remained at Fredericksburg. 
What for, is more than difficult, it is impossible to say. 
Of what use was or could be the occupation of Fredericks- 
burg? None, In fact, either the Rebels were victorious 
against Pope, then as a matter of course Fredericksburg 
could not have been held, as the troops there would have 
been certainly exposed to destruction ; or the Rebels were 
beaten and thrown back south. In that case, Fredericks- 
burg might have been at any moment occupied by the 
Union forces ; and therefore there was no need of holding 
it, and depriving the Union troops of the succor of a whole 
corps. 

By throwing into the scale, in the fights of the 29th and 
30th, this and Banks's corps, which also did not participate, 
who knows but that these battles might have been won ? 
At all events, a battle is so serious an affair that all chances 
should be calculated, and all possible efforts made to win it. 
To leave General Burnside's army on an utterly useless post, 
instead of engaging it on the decisive point, is violating the 
principal maxim of war, which is to concentrate the troops 
at the decisive moment and on the decisive point. This, 



188 " PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

however, is not all. Not only was this corps, against all 
rules, not engaged, but, against all rules, it was a detach- 
ment on an isolated post, where, exposed to the blows of 
a stronger enemy, it might at any moment have been 
crushed. 

One reason only, for this, we believe, is alleged, at least 
such was the only reason presented to the Senate for the 
inaction of Burnside's corps, viz., that Fredericksburg was 
expected to serve as a base for some operations to be made 
afterward. It is not necessary to comment on such reason- 
ing ; it only proves, what we have already advanced on the 
subject, that the strategic importance of the different parts 
of the theater of war was very far from being understood. 
We have shown, in Chapters I., II., and III., that opera- 
tions executed to the left of the main left zone cannot be 
decisive. 

General Pope might, nevertheless, have obtained great 
results had. this non-concentration been the only mistake ; 
but another, perhaps quite as great a one, was made in the 
choice of the line of retreat. Once at Culpepper, and pressed 
by the Rebel army. General Pope had two lines of retreat 
open — one along the Culpepper and Manassas Railroad 
toward Alexandria, and the other from Culpepper to Mark- 
ham, and thence to Knoxville and Berlin, on the Potomac. 
Two reasons recommended the choice of the latter line of 
retreat. The first is, that, as we have already said, the 
attack against the' Union troops would be directed against 
their right wing, in obedience to elementary rules of strategy; 
and that the natural counter-movement would be, to move 
to the light to prevent being outflanked. Therefore, by 



CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 189 

moving to a position between Markham and Salem, the 
Union array would have avoided being oatflanked, and 
would continually have presented its front instead of its 
flank to the attack. The next reason is, that by taking a 
position there, Washington was more effectually protected 
than by moving in a direct line to that place. 

We will prove this. An army having to defend a certain 
point — an important town, for instance — may do so in two 
ways. One, by placing itself square before it, which is 
meanly defensive, and has, besides, the disadvantage that if 
the defending army is beaten, it is thrown pell-mell into the 
town with the pursuers ; and consequently, instead of keep- 
ing the enemy off, this kind of defense really draws him to 
the object to be defended. 

The other way to defend a point of importance is to take 
a flank position, i.e. such a position that the enemy,' in 
order to attack the town, is obliged to offer his flank to the 
defending army. This way of defending is evidently offen- 
sive, and the only one a good general would choose, if the 
geography of the country allows it. In fact, the attacking 
army has, in this case, three lines of conduct open. Either 
to march straight to the object without heeding the defend- 
ing army: this no general, of course, would dare to do, con- 
sidering that he would offer his flank and rear to the defending 
army, which would avail itself of the occasion, and deal him 
a serious blow. Or to divide the army, masking with one 
part the defending army, and attacking the town with the 
other: this would give the defending army the chance of 
beating the attacking one in detail. Or finally, which is the 
only reasonalde course, to march with the whole attacking 

17 



190 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

army against the defending one. This, if not strong enough 
to accept battle, retreats, but marching away from the point 
of importance to defend, and thereby drawing the enemy 
away too, who cannot undertake anything against the town 
before having gained a decisive advantage over the defend- 
ing army. 

Applying this to our case, it will be seen, by taking the 
map in hand, that there are few cases where such a flanking 
position could have been more efficacious than in Eastern 
Virginia. If, for instance, the Federal army had taken a 
position along the Thoroughfare and Manassas Gap Rail- 
road, and between these two places, holding Thoroughfare 
Gap, it would have been very soon in the flank and rear of 
any Rebel army advancing from the Rappahannock toward 
Washington, and this without any risk for its own communi- 
cations. 

If the Rebel army had, for example, advanced as far as 
Centreville, the Federal army, by debouching through 
Thoroughfare and Aldie Gaps, would have been on the 
flank, and on the communications of the Rebel army, 
which, if attacked and beaten, would have been thrown 
into the Potomac. To suppose that the Rebels would, 
nevertheless, choose so hazardous and wrong a course, 
would evidently be supposing that their generals were 
ignorant of the commonest rules of strategy; and this 
could scarcely be supposed, considering the signal proofs 
to the contrary they had already given. 

Hence the correct line of retreat for General Pope's army 
would have been to Markham, Piedmont, etc., and if not 
strong enough to await an attack there, it ought to have 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 191 

continued its retreat and placed the Potomac between itself 
and the Rebels. The junction with the remainder of Gen- 
eral McClellan's troops might have taken place at Knox- 
ville and Berlin. Had this course been followed, what could 
the Rebels have done ? Attack Washington on the right 
bank, with its thirty-five fortresses, and with General Pope's 
army on their left flank ? Certainly not. Or cross the Po- 
tomac between Pope and Washington ? Still more unlikely ; 
utter destruction might have been the consequence. Or 
force the passage in front of General Pope ? This would 
probably have been too diflScult a task. There would, 
therefore, have been only one alternative left ; this was to 
try to cross above General Pope by acting always to their 
left. This the Union army might have prevented by acting 
continually to the right. At all events, this course would 
have prevented the invasion of Maryland, the surrender of 
Harper's Ferry, and the useless butchery of Antietam. 
The Rebel army, in order to do anything, could only have 
acted in the direction opposite to Washington, and would 
thereby have receded from it, instead of nearing it or threat- 
ening it in the rear. 

The retreat toward Washington was therefore a grave 
military fault, and it was aggravated by other mistakes, 
which were partly of a strategical, partly of a more tactical 
character; the accounts are, however, still so little cleared 
up, that we do not think it proper to enter into any further 
discussion of the subject. Let us merely notice two facts. 
The order sending Generals McDowell and Sigel to Gaines- 
ville to mask Thoroughfare Gap, and interpose between 
Jackson and Lee's forces, is certainly a luminous point in 



192 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

the ensuing chaos. But this order ought to have been fol- 
lowed up by pushing all the other troops to the same point, 
and by advancing Sigel and McDowell on the Gainesville 
and Aldie Gap road. Instead of this, all the troops are 
drawn to the right, and the first manoeuvre of the two gen- 
erals became entirely useless, by marching them afterward 
to Manassas Junction and to Grovestown. To act correctly, 
Hooker, Kearney, and Porter ought to have been sent to 
Gainesville. Jackson would then have been really out- 
flanked, and by moving the whole army rapidly forward in 
a northeasterly direction, he would finally have been thrown 
against Alexandria, where he would have been obliged to 
surrender. In the battle it would appear that the left wing 
was parellel to the Gainesville and Centreville Turnpike, 
pointing toward Thoroughfare Gap; evidently this wing 
was in the air, and exposed to the blows of reinforcements 
coming through the Gap, and, therefore, could not avoid 
being beaten. Another mistake committed in the battle, is 
the absence of General Banks's corps, whose movements or 
whereabouts are difficult to understand. 

The next fact worthy of remark is the stay which the army 
made at Centreville, instead of retreating without delay to 
Washington, and moving thence immediately to Point of 
Rocks. Let us explain this somewhat more. The Rebels 
had driven General Pope at the point of the bayonet rapidly 
and violently from the Rapidan to Centreville. It could 
not be supposed that, after their victory at Manassas, they 
would remain idle ; and the very simple question arises, 
what would or what could they do ? Pope's army being at 
Centreville, they could attack him once more ; if the posi- 



CAMPAIGN OF 1S62. 193 

tion was too strong in front of the Union troops, the Rebels 
might outflank it again — as in fact they did. This latter 
being the safest and most decisive course the Rebels could 
adopt, no doubt could for an instant exist that they would 
adopt it. Staying at Centreville, therefore, was exposing 
the army to disaster, besides losing valuable time. Once 
outflanked at Centreville, the army had to come back at all 
events, and must be considered very lucky in being able to 
do so. After this retreat to Washington, what was the next 
thing the Rebels could do ? To attack the thirty-five forts 
on the right bank of the Potomac, we have already said, 
would have been simply foolish ; it was therefore out of the 
question. That they would remain idle, could not be sup- 
posed either ; the only course left to them was to pass the 
Potomac, and the only question difficult to answer would 
seem to be — Where ? Taking the map in hand, it will be 
seen that by crossing this river above Washington, the 
Rebels might at any time have prevented the Union army 
from retreating north, and would have shut it up in the 
Federal capital, cutting off all communications by land 
with the Northern States, and having only the commu- 
nication by sea open. This manoeuvre would, therefore, 
be a decisive one, if in the battle which would surely 
follow, the Union army should be thrown back into the 
town. What we advance evidently implies that the Union 
army is on the Potomac below where the Rebel army 
crosses — that is, between this army and the Chesapeake 
Bay. The very moment the Rebel army would cross, hav- 
ing the Union army above it, the manoeuvre would be- 
come destructive to them, as they would, in case of defeat, be 

17* 



194 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

thrown against the fortifications of Washington or Chesa- 
peake Bay, where they would obviously be obliged to sur- 
render. Hence the Rebels could cross only above the Fed- 
eral army ; and this latter, by marching immediately from 
Manassas to Point of Rocks, the principal point where the 
roads from Manassas and Centreville lead to, the crossing 
of the Rebel army would have been hindered. It seems 
easy to reason in this way after the facts have transpired, 
and to stigmatize as a great military fault the non-execu- 
tion of a manoeuvre which, it might be said, was diflBcult 
to foretell. Such an objection would not, however, be ap- 
plicable to me ; those who will take the trouble to read the 
first chapter of my "Summary of the Art of War," written 
at the end of December, 1861, — that is to say, eight months 
before the events, — will find the very same remarks, only 
more fully developed ; they will also find it expressly laid 
down, that after the defeat of the IJnion troops- in Northern 
Virginia, Point of Rocks becomes the decisive point. Events 
having so clearly proved the truth of my reasoning of a 
year since, I am now certainly justified in calling the not 
sending of troops to Point of Rocks, to prevent the passage 
of the Rebels, a military fault. 

We have said above, that after this successful "Virginia 
campaign no other alternative was left to the Rebels but 
to invade Maryland. But here difficulties and consider- 
ations arose which it is interesting to investigate somewhat 
more closely. An invasion must have an object, and what 
could be the object of the Maryland campaign ? From a 
really military point of view only one answer seems possi- 
ble, viz., to gain possession of the communications of the 



CAMPAIGN or 1862. 195 

"Cnion army at Washington, and to fight the decisive battle 
of the war — decisive for the North, and accompanied with 
little risk to themselves. If this was the object, and it was 
grand enough to justify the attempt, the Rebel army, instead 
of crossing at Point of Rocks, ought to have crossed between 
Rushville and Coon's Ferry, at which place they might have 
been by the first of September, in the evening, at the same 
instant that part of their troops attacked Pope in the rear 
near Fairfax C. H. On the morning of the second — that is 
to say, before even Pope was back at Alexandria — part of 
their forces might have been before Washington, on the left 
bank of the Potomac, and made a bold attempt to carry by 
surprise and escalade one or two of the forts on the left 
side. Had this coup-de-main been crowned with success, 
the way to Washington would have been laid wide open. 
Little danger accompanied such an attempt. Pope's army 
was at that time too disorganized to act offensively against 
the communications of the Rebels; besides, the terror in 
Washington would have been such that nobody would have 
thought of it ; and at the very worst, the Rebels might 
have retreated- to Point of Rocks or Sharpsburg. This 
course would probably have been the only admissible one, 
had Pope's array experienced a more serious defeat, amount- 
ing almost to destruction. Under the circumstances, it was 
probably thought that such an operation would be too ad- 
venturous and too risky ; the consequence was, that a kind 
of middle course was followed, which leaves on the mind the 
impression of indecision, and which certainly was the cause 
of their losing the campaign. It is therefore difficult to say 
whether they intended first to fight the decisive battle on the 



196 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

Monocacy, whether they only afterward determined on the 
operation against Harper's Ferry, or whether, as a general 
thing, they did not feel strong enough to 6ght the battle 
offensively, and preferred to fight it defensively with offen- 
sive return on ground chosen by them. There was a certain 
delay and wavering in their operations, which indicate inde- 
cision, and which lasted until finally the rapidly changing 
circumstances enforced a decision which was probably not 
the best they might have chosen. In short, the operations 
seem to indicate that at the moment the Rebels entered 
Maryland, they had no thoroughly studied plan of action, 
and no definite object in view : at least no one which was 
worth the risking of their main army for. Subsequently 
the defeated Union army had time to reorganize, to recover, 
to reinforce, and to reassume the offensive in a few days. 
The great maxim, "strike an enemy before he is prepared," 
was certainly left out of sight by the Rebels in this part of 
their offensive operation. 

To show that what we advance is a fact, we need only 
follow the operations after the 1st of September. On the 
5th the Rebels crossed the Potomac at Point of Rocks, and 
inarched to Fredericktown. Thence to Hagerstown is one 
or two days' march. The investment on the south and west 
side of Harper's Ferry could be made from Leesburg by 
marching through Vestal's Gap, or about one day's march ; 
taking two marches more to make a junction, by way of 
Martinsburg or Shepherdstown, between the forces coming 
from Hagerstown and those from Yestal's Gap, the investing 
of Harper's Ferry might have been completed on the 8th or 
the 9th, and, by an energetic action, the surrender might 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 197 

have been forced on the 10th or the 11th; instead of which 
four or five days are lost, for Harper's Ferry surrendered 
only on the 15th. This delay forced the Rebel army, on 
the 14th, to the two fights at Crampton's Gap and South 
Mountain, in order to gain time for the reduction of Har- 
per's Ferry. These engagements cost a large number of 
men, and certainly must have somewhat demoralized their 
troops. Having finished their operations against Harper's 
Ferry, they immediately offer battle ; but the circumstances 
and the strategical position of the army were already so 
changed that this battle could no longer have had the effect 
of a battle fought near the Monocacy or near Washington; 
and as one object — viz., the surrender of Harper's Ferry and 
the capture of 12,000 men — was accomplished, they might 
have dispensed with the battle, the more so as the field they 
chose for the battle-ground was only adapted for a defensive 
battle, and could not possibly be used for an offensive one. 
The result of defensive battles is in most cases but an insuf- 
ficient one, as it can only have for effect the repulse, but 
never the total defeat and destruction of the enemy's army. 
The energy that both parties displayed during the last days 
of the Maryland campaign, and the determination with which 
they fought in the battle of Antietam, is highly creditable to 
both of them. I believe, however, it would have been more 
correct for the Rebels to cross the Potomac and fight the 
battle on the other side, the more so, as their position at 
Sharpsburg was a very dangerous one. Once defeated, dis- 
asters would certainly have been the consequence, having, as 
they had, the Potomac behind them. Their withdrawal from 
the left bank, in the night of the 18th, was well managed. 



198 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

The defense, or, as it afterward turned out to be, the 
attack, in this campaign was somewhat better; at least it 
had a definite object — the driving of the Rebels out of Mary- 
land, wherever they were to be found. This object was at- 
tained. Nevertheless, more might have been gained had 
it not been for some mistakes. The army of the Potomac 
took seven days to march from Washington to Frederick- 
town, a distance of 40 miles, or, at the outside, two days' 
march. This slowness evidently gave the Rebels the neces- 
sary time to complete their operations against Harper's 
Ferry. From Fredericktown the movement was conducted 
with more energy. The fights of South Mountain and 
Crampton Gap are creditable to the victors. The battle 
of Antietam was fought, and, though at one time a drawn 
battle, it became a victory io the result. The partial at- 
tempt to cross the river in pursuit of the Rebels was evi- 
dently a blunder, as it was plainly their intention to renew 
the battle at once, if it could only be done on their own 
terms — that is to say, in a position more advantageous to 
them than that of Sharpsburg, with the Potomac in their 
rear. 

The inaction of the Federal army after the battle must 
also be considered as a fault. This army ought to have at 
once operated by way of Harper's Ferry, so as to act on the 
communications of the Rebels and force them to another 
fight, which might have been disastrous to them. The lesson 
the Rebels had given to the Federals in their Virginia cam- 
paign might have been made available against them, instead 
of letting them quietly retreat to Winchester. 

The great and main fault committed in this short cam- 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 199 

paign was, however, the exposing of the troops at Harper's 
Ferry to capture. We have had repeated occasion to give 
our opinion on sending detachments to the rear of a stronger 
enemy. We have stated that they are against the rules of 
grand warfare, and that in most cases they turn out badly 
for those who make them, instead of for those against whom 
they are intended. Here is one of those cases. What was 
the use of holding Harper's Ferry the moment the Rebels 
were in Maryland and occupied Fredericktown ? The place 
in itself has no importance. As a strategic point, it was only 
of importance against an enemy coming from Winchester, 
serving in this case as a kind of tele-de-pont for Union troops 
to debouch in the Shenandoah valley; besides, the garrison 
was sufficiently strong to prevent smaller corps of the enemy 
from crossing above and making raids into Maryland. By 
holding it, the Rebels could not be prevented from return- 
ing into Virginia, as in fact their main army did not return 
this way. The roads to Sharpsburg and Hagerstown were 
open, and no obstacle existed to prevent a recrossing near 
Berlin and Knoxville. Was it to save a few rounds of 
ammunition and cannon, that orders were given to hold the 
place? Why it was, we are at a loss to guess, unless it 
was that one of those schemes, which were such favorites 
with the old Spanish generals, was based upon it : that it 
was supposed that the men of Pennsylvania would occupy 
Williamsport, that Miles would hold Harper's Ferry, and 
that McClellan would push in the rear; perhaps the road by 
way of Sharpsburg was overlooked, and it was supposed 
that the Rebels would not do otherwise than surrender. 
Harper's Ferry, as we have said, being of no importance 



200 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

the moment the Rebels entered Maryland, the corps of Miles 
ought to have been ordered to retreat immediately by way 
of Sharpsburg and Williamsport, or Sharpsburg, Shepherds- 
town, Martiusburg, Hancock, or any other northeasterly 
route, unless the place was fortified and really defensible for 
a certain length of time against an army investing it on all 
sides. If the place was not defensible against an enemy 
coming from Maryland, the leaving of this detachment at 
Harper's Ferry must be considered as the most wanton and 
unmilitary sacrifice of men that was made during the cam- 
paign. We are going to show that the place was not de- 
fensible, and that nothing but utter ignorance of the topog- 
raphy of the country or of the rules of grand tactics can 
assert that it was. 

The opposite cut gives the main features of the topogra- 
phy of the country. It will be seen by it that Maryland and 
Loudon Heights are two long mountain chains, which are 
prolongations of the Blue Ridge Mountains, separated from 
each other by the Potomac ; both fall nearly vertically upon 
the river, leaving only space for a road on each side. The 
Shenandoah passes along Loudon Heights, and separates 
them from the town of Harper's Ferry and a kind of bluff 
called Bolivar Heights. The inclination of this bluff toward 
Harper's Ferry is gentle, bat against the Virginia side very 
steep; Loudon and Maryland Heights overlook it consider- 
ably. The Potomac, about a mile or a mile and a half 
above Harper's Ferry, turns to the north, and the space 
between Maryland Heights and the river is filled up by a 
kind of table-land overlooking the incline of Bolivar Heights, 
and falling also vertically, or very nearly so, toward the Po- 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 



201 



Fig. 7. 




I I 1 



■!i /■' 





^ ^^=^ I .'''/nil' 



18 



202 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

tomac. The camp of the garrison was on the incline of 
Bolivar Heights, at U. From Loudon Heights this space 
couldbe battered directly; and from Maryland Heights, or 
the table-land on the Maryland side, it could be enfiladed. 
Maryland and Loudon Heights were wooded, and on a small, 
open space on the table-land at G was placed a battery of a 
few heavy pieces, pointing toward Bolivar Heights. No 
intrenchments of any description could be discovered on 
Maryland or Loudon Heights. From this sketch it will 
be understood that the party holding these two mountain 
chains was evidently master of the battery, and consequently 
of Harper's Ferry and Bolivar Heights. 

Col. Miles's orders were, I believe, tohold Harper's Ferry, 
by occupying Maryland Heights in force. Now, considering 
the topography of the country, he could occupy Maryland 
Heights only by forming a line of battle like A B, or like 
A' B\ Both positions are so entirely against all military 
rules, that no general would ever attempt to fight a battle in a 
similar array, as in both cases his defeat would be inevitable, 
and accompanied with the most severe loss, with no benefit 
whatever to the cause he is fighting for. The reason is easy 
to perceive. An army (A B) along the mountain crest has 
one wing leaning against a precipice ; the other wing would 
be attacked by an army formed in oblique line of battle, like 
ah', and as the attack would evidently dispose of more men, 
A B would be thrown over the precipice. The army A' B' 
has the precipice in its rear, and therefore the slightest ad- 
vantage gained against any point of its position would be 
the ruin of the whole corps. 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 203 

It is useless to say much about such positions. Those 
who are willing to read from authorfties what we have just 
advanced, may take up Jomini, Baron de Ternay, or any 
good work on grand tactics. A battle fought under such 
circumstances would last five or six hours, and terminate 
with the destruction of the whole corps. 

What could the commander of Harper's Ferry do under 
similar circumstances ? To act according to his orders and 
fight a battle on Maryland or Loudon Heights was sacri- 
ficing a large number of men without an object; to stay at 
Bolivar Heights was impossible. Only two courses were, 
therefore, left open : either to surrender, or to open a way 
with the bayonet in the direction of Martinsburg. The 
latter course was "evidently the more honorable, and the 
only one becoming a true soldier; if repulsed, there was 
always time to surrender, and the honor of the flag would 
have been saved. 

Before passing in review the last part of the campaign, 
we will say a few words respecting the offensive operations 
of the Rebels on the whole theater of war, considered as 
one great plan of attack. 

Simultaneously with the movement against Pope, those 
against Buell and Grant were executed. The entire plan 
was based on an action on interior lines of all the Rebel 
armies, and the direction of all the movements was sound 
and good. The only mistake (and it was a great one) was, 
that all these operations were simultaneous, instead of being 
consecutive ; 50,000 more men in the East, or 50,000 more 
in the West, would have obtained decisive results. The 



204 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY, 

campaign of 1800 was studied, but not thoroughly. Napo- 
leon, in that campaign, only invaded Italy after Moreau had 
obtained decisive results on the Rhine, and could send him 
a reinforcement of 15,000 men. 

We have seen that after the battle of Antietam another 
long pause in the operations took place. The Rebels had 
retreated to Winchester; had been reinforced, and reorgan- 
ized and recovered themselves there ; and being on the defen- 
sive, quietly awaited the next movement of the Union army. 
This movement finally took place at the commencement of 
November. The Union army marched down Loudon valley, 
and went in this direction as far as Waterloo a'\d Warrenton. 
There General McClellan was relieved; and with the change 
of command, probably a change in the plan of operation took 
place ; for after a stay of eight days at or near Warrenton, 
the army marched to Fredericksburg. There it gave the 
enemy full time to prepare and concentrate. On the 12th 
of December it crossed the river; on the 13th it attacked 
the Rebel position, and, being repulsed with loss, recrossed 
to the other side. 

We do not know, and can only with difficulty surmise, the 
object of this campaign. Probably it was the remote, final 
capture of Richmond, The object was certainly not to beat 
or to destroy the Rebel army, as the Federal army advanced 
without paying the slightest attention to this army sta- 
tioned at Winchester, which, in fact, had to run after the 
Union army to get a fight out of it at Fredericksburg. 

We have already said that the main object of the Union 
army ought to be the destruction of the Rebel army, and 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 205 

not the capture of a town, or a small tract of land. The 
object which evidently formed the basis of the whole plan 
of operation being not well considered, the plan itself could 
not be well studied, or be according to the maxims of war. 

What was this plan of operation ? Was it to move down 
the army to Gordonsville, and thence to Richmond, stealing 
itself between this town and the Rebel army, and snatching 
the long-coveted prize away from the latter? By going 
to Fredericksburg, was the idea the same, but the route 
changed ? And this, all the time with the Rebel army in 
the flank or rear 1 But perhaps it wa^ thought this army 
would stay idle at Winchester ! Doubtless, Dumourier's 
invasion of Holland in 1193, and Pichegru's movement in 
Belgium in 1194, must have served as models for this cam- 
paign, I prefer referring to Jomini's " Summary of the 
Art of War," and his "Wars of the Revolution." The 
reader will find there the question more thoroughly treated 
than I am able to treat it ; and as Jomini is a great military 
authority, his judgment on the case will have more weight 
than mine. 

Once at Fredericksburg, the Rappahannock was to be 
crossed, in order to move forward. This river, which near 
Waterloo (where the army was before moving to Fred- 
ericksburg) did not measure more than ten yards in width, 
is a considerable stream near Fredericksburg, and conse- 
quently the first difficulties ensued. It took a considerable 
time to procure pontoons. Meanwhile the Rebels, as if 
entirely sure that they would be attacked in front, made all 
necessary arrangements to repulse such an attack. 

18* 



206 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

To understand this battle folly, the reader may suppose 
a plain, about a mile to a mile and a half wide, bordered on 
each side by a range of hills, about one hundred feet high. 
The northern range of hills was occupied by the Union 
army, and close to the foot of these hills is the Rappahan- 
nock. The southern range of hills was occupied by the 
Southern army. About two miles above Fredericksburg, 
the southern range of hills forms a large curve, and comes 
close to the river, forming thereby a kind of semicircle 
around the town. The plain between the two armies was 
commanded by the guns of either army; and Fredericks- 
burg being close to the river, was evidently commanded en- 
tirely by Northern guns. Consequently the crossing would 
be attended with no serious difficulty; and for the same 
reason, the recrossing or withdrawing of the army could be 
done without danger. 

Either of the two armies entering the plain between the 
two ranges of hills would be destroyed by the artillery of 
the opposite party. The Union army attempted it, and 
paid dearly for it. Had the Rebels tried to follow up their 
victory, they would have experienced the same fate that the 
Federal army did in attempting the attack. 

Considering this state of affairs, it was obviously a mis- 
take to cross in front ; the more so, as the simple crossing 
a few miles above would have carried the position. And 
had this operation been well and secretly conducted, as it 
ought to be done in similar cases, the Rebels would have 
been obliged to sacrifice a rear guard, in order to save their 
army. In fact, the Rebel right wing pointed toward the 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 20t 

Potomac or York Riyer, The elementary rale of strategy, 
already mentioned several times, wills therefore that the 
attack should have been directed against the Rebel left 
wing. 

With the battle of Fredericksburg the campaign ends, 
and we wish only to say a few words by way of conclusion. 

In the Union plan of invasion, the first and main object 
of the campaign was misunderstood. Occupation was taken 
for this object, instead of the beating and destroying of the 
Rebel armies. The consequence of this mistake was the 
formation of a great number of lines of operation. Hence 
division of force ; hence defeats and retreats. 

The facilities offered by the navy — by sea and river gun- 
boats — had the most deteriorating effect on the operations. 
It was almost taken for granted that without them opera- 
tions were impossible, and with them irresistible. The con- 
sequence of this gun-boat mania was, and is still, that the 
best lines of communication, but the least decisive lines of 
operation, were invariably chosen. The large rivers on the 
sea-coast attracted the Union generals like magnets. If 
ever a circumstance conducts them into the interior of the 
country, immediately these rivers, and the thought of safety 
and gun-boats, draw them back. 

As far as gun-boats are concerned, they ought to play a 
very secondary part — merely to serve as a kind of diversion, 
but never to intrust large operations to, or confine to their 
guns the safety of a large army, as was done at Shiloh and 
Harrison's Landing. Of how little use gun-boats are in 
really grand operations, may be seen from the fact that, as 



208 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

a general rule, the Rebels had none, and nevertheless were 
able to defeat us in several campaigns, though we had 
many. 

The Rebel operations, looked at as a whole, were much 
sounder, and more according to the maxims of grand war. 
The direction of their lines of operation was, in most cases, 
decisive ; but accidents, or the defective organization of 
volunteer armies, deprived them of the full results. The 
only reproach that can be made to their defense is, that it 
might have been somewhat grander — by giving up more on 
one side, but gaining more on the other — i.e. by concentra- 
ting still more to gain more decisive results. 

The study of the campaign of IT 96, wherein Napoleon 
gave up his whole siege-park, in order to regain it after- 
ward, and the study of the campaign of 1800, had not been 
made thoroughly. 

We close here our review of the campaign of 1862. We 
must repeat once more that we do not wish to have it con- 
sidered as a historical, and still less, as a kind of political 
review. We have simply taken facts, belonging already to 
the public, as we found them, and have formed from them 
the text of a purely military treatise. Should we have com- 
mitted errors in the narration of the facts, it must be ex- 
cused. The object of this work is a purely scientific one, 
and the fault in the narration is of no importance, if the 
discussion of the wrongly- stated fact, as we give it, be but 
correct. 

Finally, we must say that we do not at all wish this dis- 
cussion to be considered personal, or directed against any 



CAMPAIGN OP 1862. 209 

one general in particular. Such an idea is foreign to our 
purpose; the more so, as the views we have set forth in 
this treatise are far from being generally adopted. English, 
French, and German writers, for instance, differ widely on 
the subject; and the question, how different wars ought 
best to be conducted, is still a mooted question. Besides, 
many things in the present war have been entirely new, or 
different from what takes place in Europe. The entire 
absence of a highly- educated general staff corps; the 
organization of volunteer armies; the want of correct and 
good maps; the difficulty of obtaining information; and 
the scarcity of provisions in many districts, are so many 
excuses for movements which, viewed merely from the 
stand-point of science, would be considered as mistakes. 



210 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1863. 

In passing in review the campaign of 1862, we have seen 
how a wrong general plan, a division of force, a choice of 
indecisive lines of operation, led to insignificant results, and 
even reverses. The campaign of 1863 opens for the Union 
forces without any change in the general plan of operation ; 
it is but the continuation of the campaign of 1862. The 
capture of Richmond and the opening of the Mississippi 
seem still to be the main objects to be obtained by the 
Eastern and Western Union armies. 

A wrong general plan of operation will lead to bad or 
insignificant results even if the counter-plan be correct, what- 
ever the minor or detailed operations may be. In the plan 
of 1863, probably these latter will be different from those 
of 1862; but nevertheless the result ought to be the same. 

A long study of military history has led me to the con- 
viction that great decisive results can only be obtained by 
a thoroughly correct action, especially in a case like ours, 
where the adversary is a skillful one, and understands the 
great rules of war himself, and, what is of more importance, 
knows how to apply them. 

We have shown, in Chapters I., II., and lY., that great 
wars of conquest or invasion, conducted on a number of lines 
of operation, concentric toward the interior of the country. 




\ 



y 




\ 



r'S-*^ 



h 



CAMPAIGN OF 1863. 211 

are against the roles laid down for such wars. The cam- 
paign of 1862 as well as that of 1863 are conducted on a 
great number of lines of operation, and consequently on 
wrong principles. Moreover, the general plan of operation 
being wrong, the objects which are to be attained by the 
different armies are such that, even were the plan of opera- 
tion right, nothing decisive could be achieved. 

Similar assertions are generally answered by the argu- 
ments, that in this country the distances are too great ; that 
the extent of territory is too vast, and consequently war of 
conquest is out of the question ; that peace can only be en- 
forced by occupying all the principal towns of the South, 
and by opening all the rivers ; that the Confederate States 
will meanwhile exhaust themselves, and are already very 
much exhausted; that nearly all their means are used up; 
that the North possesses now an irresistible superiority; 
and that a few large battles more, even if not decisive, will 
so weaken the Southern armies that they will not be able to 
do much more mischief. 

It may be that all this is true ; and that, in fact, the whole 
rebellion will break down quite as suddenly as it rose up. 
Considered, however, from a purely military point of view, 
I entertain some doubts as to the soundness of the above 
reasoning. By closely examining the theater of war, the 
strength and position of the two contending armies, and by 
drawing the correct defense according to the rules of grand 
war, it will be seen that the South, by making a last effort, 
might come victorious out of a struggle which should have 
lasted but a short time, were the intrinsic strength of both 
parties alone to be considered. I will draw this correct 
defense as well as I am able; and the reader may then 



212 



PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 



judge for himself if my doubts of the above-mentioned rea- 
soning are justified or not. 

I have added a map, showing the approximative position 
of the contending armies, and giving also the principal lines 
of operation, for our imaginary campaign. The following 
table exhibits the strength of the two contending parties re- 
spectively, as well as I could judge from the different news- 
paper reports. Very likely these figures are not entirely 
correct, or rather most of them are probably incorrect. 
This is, however, of little importance, as it does in no way 
alter the principle in the matter ; and I shall therefore sup- 
pose them to be correct : — 

UNION FORCES. 

Army of the Potomac 140,000 men. 

Washington G0,000 «' 

Baltimore 15,000 «« 

Harper's Ferry, Mary- j ^^ ^^^ ,^ 

land, and Potomac i ' 

Winchester 5,000 " 

Fortress Monroe 10,000 " 

Yorktown, Suffolk, and Norfolk 20,000 " 

Newborn 50,000 " 

Port Royal. 20,000 " 

New Orleans and Baton Rouge 20,000 " 

Vicksburg 60,000 " 

Helena 5,000 " 

Memphis 10,000 " 

Corinth 20,000 " 

Bolivar 15,000 " 

Jackson 5,000 " 

Columbus 5,000 " 

Missouri and Ai'kansas 50,000 " 

Nashville 10,000 " 

Murfreesborough 40,000 " 

Kentucky 40,000 " 

Detachments, etc 40,000 " 



Grand total 650,000 



CAMPAIGN OF 1863. 213 



CONFEDERATE FORCES. 



Army of Virginia 120,000 men 

" Richmond 20,000 

" Petersburg 5,000 

'« Blackwater 5,000 

" Newbern 5,000 

" Charleston 15,000 

" Savannah 15,000 

•' Tullahoma 50,000 

" Vicksburg 50,000 

Mobile 10,000 

" Arkansas 15,000 

Detachments, etc 20,000 



Grand total 330,000 « 

The disparity of forces is enormous, according to these 
two tables ; perhaps, in fact, it is not so great. This would, 
however, in our case, only aggravate the matter, as then the 
defense would have evidently still greater -advantage. 

The above numbers are such that obviously the South 
cannot afiford to make blunders ; and were their system of 
defense based on as vicious a plan as our attack, the war 
would evidently be soon finished, as in such a case the mere 
numbers would tell. 

Those who have made a special study of military history 
will have found that a great difference exists even between 
plans considered correct. A plan of attack or defense may 
be correct without being grand ; more or less knowledge, 
more or less genius, may be shown in it. Who, for instance, 
would doubt that a Napoleon would have dealt differently 
with Jourdan and Moreau in 1796, had he been in the place 
of the Archduke Charles, though the latter's campaign 
against the two French generals was not only correct, but 

19 



214 rRiNcri'LES of strategy. 

is even considered as a model of a defensive campaign ? 
Who could blame tbe general for refusing to fight a battle 
under exactly the same circumstances Napoleon did at 
Rivoli ? He might have retreated, and it would have been 
correct; but to fight the battle was both correct and grand. 

In a similar way, the defense of the South might be cor- 
rect, without being grand or displaying genius; and though 
they would, in such a case, probably obtain sufficient results, 
I believe that the whole nature of the contest requires a 
somewhat greater effort than strict correctness. A kind of 
methodic war would drag on in length, and this the South 
will certainly have to avoid. 

Correct, but audacious, and perhaps even somewhat ad- 
venturous, operations alone can obtain brilliant successes ; 
and the war, as we understand it, for the South is that of 
Napoleon's, campaign in 1^96, only on a larger scale. 
Giving up everything, except the place where the army 
stands; concentrating their entire force on the decisive 
point ; being victorious there ; and gaining, by a faw well- 
directed blows, not only what has been lost, but more too, 
is the lesson we may derive from this admirable campaign. 

It is based on such reflections, and on the conviction 
that really decisive results on one point can only be ob- 
tained by a large superiority of force, that I shall sketch 
tbe defense. Besides, as the Confederate States have, like 
Europe, adopted the system of conscription, I will suppose 
that they have also introduced the system of keeping always 
the cadres of regiments or brigades full by new recruits. 
By supposing this, I avoid the necessity of making a reduc- 
tion of numbers after every one of our imaginary battles. 



CAMPAIGN OP 1863. 215 

Moreover, I shall be obliged, in some of the operations, to 
give a great number of details concerning the concentration 
of troops ; first, to show how, as a general matter, such con- 
centration should be executed; and secondly, to justify to a 
certain extent my reasoning, which, without these details, 
might appear in some cases extravagant. 

The object of the South in making war is to repel inva- 
sion, and to enforce peace and their recognition. These 
objects can only be attained by destroying some of the prin- 
cipal- Union armies and by taking the Federal capital ; then 
making peace with the Federal Government, or with the 
different States separately, by threatening thera with inva- 
sion. The first object, or the main object of the campaign, 
is therefore the destruction of the Union armies, or part of 
them. 

Taking the map in hand, it will be seen — 

1. That the Union forces are scattered over a large tract 
of land. 

2. That they are acting on exterior lines. 

3. That the Rebel forces are acting on interior lines. 
Consequently the natural plan of operation, in such a 

state of things, is to concentrate on the different points suc- 
cessively, and to defeat the Union troops successively and in 
detail, i.e. before they can unite. In campaigns of this de- 
scription, the principle is to make a break, generally in the 
center of the long front of operation, thereby preventing the 
junction of the two wings, and then to defeat these sepa- 
rately. In our present case it is difficult to say where the 
center of the front of operation is, considering that the Union 
forces have a front of operation from Port Royal to Wash- 



216 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

ington, another from Washington to Memphis, and another 
from Memphis to New Orleans. At any point, therefore, 
where the Rebels attack the Union forces, they could make 
a breach, except on the two extremities, New Orleans 
and Port Royal. Now, evidently the points where they 
might break through are of very different relative import- 
ance. We have already contended that the left zone is the 
most important and the most decisive : the main blow ought, 
therefore, to be struck there. The principal Union armies are, 
however, of such strength in it, that it would require a con- 
centration of nearly the whole Confederate forces to obtain 
decisive results against those armies. Having, in conse- 
quence of such a concentration, no Rebel armies opposed 
to them, the Federal armies in the West could destroy too 
much property — just now of great value to the Rebels — and 
could, besides, send immediate and enormous reinforcements 
to the East ; and in this case, the whole advantage which 
the present position of the Union armies offers to the Con- 
federate forces would be lost. It is therefore clear that, 
before attacking the main Union army in the left zone — that 
is, before coming to the last decisive struggle — the road 
ought to be well prepared by crushing a,ll the smaller armies 
in the Bast and those in the Northwest — that is to say, by 
destroying the Union forces in Kentucky and Tennessee, 
and thereby breaking the connecting link between East and 
West. This would place all the Western Union armies on 
the defensive, and would give the Confederate forces time 
to prepare for the main or decisive campaign in the left 
zone. 

Looking at the map, it will be seen that two armies — one 



CAMPAIGN OP 1863. 21 1 

in the East, the Union army at Newbern, and one in the 
West, the Union army at Murfreesborough — are excellently 
posted for the Rebels to open the campaign by two deci- 
sive blows. The army at Newbern especially ought to be 
attacked: first, because it is a large detachment greatly 
exposed; and secondly, because it threatens continually one 
of the principal lines of communication of the South between 
the East and West. 

To make successful attacks, concentration of troops is 
requisite, and to strike decisive blows, those concentrations 
should be so directed that the enemy shall not be ap- 
prised of them till it is too late. To concentrate troops 
slowly, vis-d-vis to an enemy, is always a great mis- 
take. He has time to reinforce himself, or to take other 
steps to prevent disasters. We can only point, in order to 
show how concentrations ought to be effected, to the miracu- 
lous concentrations executed by Napoleon in his campaign 
of 1806, near Bamberg ; in 1812, in Russia; and in 1815, 
near Charleroi, in Belgium. His columns, coming from all 
directions, marching 25 miles a day, arrived on one and the 
same day at the designated spot of rendezvous. It was 
always at this day of concentration, and never sooner, that 
Napoleon himself joined the army, and immediately put it 
in motion against the enemy. In 1806, the concentration 
and forward movement of Napoleon had been so rapid, that 
the Prussian commanders could scarcely credit the fact till 
they found themselves in front of his army. Just as great 
a mistake would it be to send a commander of reputation to 
effect a junction with another army, and that he should 
arrive before his troops did. His name is generally suffi- 

19* 



218 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

cient to give ample proof that his corps is following; there- 
fore, commanders of corps as well as the commander-in-chief 
should arrive only on the same day — ^that is to say, the day 
when the whole army concentrates, coming from all sides to 
the rendezvous. It is obvious that the offensive operations 
have to commence at once, and to be carried out with the 
utmost rapidity. Without this, the effect gained by this 
sudden concentration would be entirely lost. 

The Union army at Newbern we have supposed to be 
50,000 men strong. The concentration of Confederate 
forces to destroy them might be conducted in the follow- 
ing way: — 

Already near Newbern 5,000 men. 

From Savannah 10,000 

^' Cliarleston 10,000 

" Richmond 15,000 

" Army of Virginia 33,000 

" Blackwater 3,000 

" Petersburg 4,000 



Total 80,000 

These troops start from their respective whereabouts, and 
arrive all on one and the same day at Goldsborough. To 
render the understanding of the movements easy, we will 
commence counting with the 1st of month 1, and go on 
counting month 2, 3, etc. 

For the movement of the above troops railroads may be 
used to a great extent. I suppose that generally those 
roads are able to convey 2500 men a day, with the excep- 
tion of the shorter distances — from Fredericksburg to Rich- 
mond, for instance, or from Richmond to Petersburg. The 
following tables will show the complete movement : — 



CAMPAIGN OP 1863. 



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CAMPAIGN OF 1863, 221 

On one and the same day 80,000 men would therefore 
march into Goldsborougb ; and if also the Union com- 
mander would be informed of the fact that reinforcements 
have arrived there, he would never know how many, and 
would certainly never think that 80,000 could arrive at the 
same moment. 

This operation is evidently a main operation, and ought 
therefore to be conducted by the general-in-chief himself 
of the Rebel army. Starting in the night of the 8th or 
9th from Fredericksburg or Richmond, he would arrive at 
the same time with the army, and could prepare everything 
for the offensive movement to be commenced on the 10th, 
On the 10th, the whole army would march in parallel 
columns to the neighborhood of Kingston, and on the 11th, 
to the neighborhood of Newbern. On the 12th, the battle 
would take place ; and, as it is fought under particular cir- 
cumstances, a few words of explanation are necessary. 

The large concentration of troops, and the offensive oper- 
ations immediately following, would result in a certain sur- 
prise of the Union army ; and it is obvious that, in a fight 
so prepared, no time should be left to an enemy to recover 
from his surprise, and to take preparatory dispositions. 
The attack should therefore be executed in the same style 
as the whole offensive movement. 

In the present case, there is another reason for a very 
energetic attack. The Union army is backed by a river; 
and in fact, its safety in such a position are its gun-boats, 
under the cover of which it is thought no disaster can 
happen to the troops. I am very far from sharing this 
opinion, and believe that whenever the attack is well pre- 
pared, and rightly executed, disaster must occur to an army 



223 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

SO backed by a river, and protected only by gun-boats. 
Gun -boats are, after all, nothing but a few batteries of 
heavy guns, but batteries which are excessively vulnerable. 

In European navies percussion shells, containing (besides 
the bursting charge) incendiary composition, are used against 
such wooden batteries. The shell is sure to burst within the 
ship, and the combustible matters are thrown in different 
directions ; the smoke of the bursting shell preventing at 
first their discovery till it is too late. Those who wish to 
form an idea as to the effect of shells on ships, and espe- 
cially those fired under such conditions, may read General 
Paixhans's memoirs on the matter, and the report of a com- 
mission of French officers to investigate the disaster of 
Sinope in 1854. 

A few rifled 20-pounder batteries, firing such shells, and 
concentrating their fire successively on the difi'erent gun- 
boats, would soon drive them out of range ; and if at this 
moment the attack against the land force is well prepared, 
by heavy masses of artillery drawing to very short canister 
range, and followed up by a general onset, disorder in the 
attacked party would ensue ; and as no space to retreat and 
re-form is left, the slightest advantage gained becomes deci- 
sive, and finishes with the destruction of the whole, or at least 
of a great part, of an army placed in such a position. It 
may be said also that the attacking party should not give 
up the contest till the object — the destruction of the at- 
tacked force — is fully attained. It is evident that, whatever 
be the loss of the attack at the commencement, the defend- 
ing party will at the end experience the greatest loss. 

On the 13th, the day after the battle, the whole army 
leaves, with the exception of 10,000 men left on the battle- 



CAMPAIGN OF 1863. 223 

field to attend to the dead and wounded. The army moves 
to Kingston, and, on the 17th, is back at Weldon. From 
there, 35,000 are transported by railroad to Richmond, 
where they arrive between the 17th and 19th. The remain- 
ing 35,000 march to Suffolk, attack the Union forces there, 
and join the Richmond army on about the 25th to 27th of 
month 1. The 10,000 left on the battle-field may move by 
railroad to Charleston or Richmond ; this movement de- 
pending on where the need of troops is the greatest. The 
general-in-chief leaves the army on the 13th to proceed to 
Chattanooga, where meanwhile another great movement has 
been prepared. 

Evidently 87,000 men, or the number of the Virginia 
army after the deduction of 33,000 men for Goldsborough, 
would never be able to resist 140,000 men, which we have 
supposed to be the strength of the Potomac army. It 
would therefore be a great mistake to engage with this 
number in a battle. All that is required, is to observe the 
army of the Potomac, and when it moves forward to retard 
its march : 50,000 men are quite sufficient to accomplish 
this task, and even more fit for it than 87,000; because a 
smaller number can always be quicker put in motion, and if 
a disaster occurs, the risk is not so great. 

We reduce, therefore, the army of Virginia by 27,000 men 
more, which we would send to Tennessee, giving positive 
orders to the remaining 50,000 to accept no engagement of 
consequence; to retreat if the army of the Potomac ad- 
vances; and to be satisfied with defending the passage of 
the rivers, beating an advanced guard, etc. 

The campaign in Tennessee, as the next in importance, 
we would conduct almost simultaneously with that against 



224 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

Newbern ; and this is possible ia the present case : first, be- 
cause the Union armies of Newbern and Murfreesborough 
are not large ; and secondly, because the army sent to 
Goldsborough is not far from the decisive point, which we 
will suppose to be Richmond, and might be back there 
before a Union army could reach it. 

It is evident that all the troops executing these different 
manffiuvres are to be in the lightest marching order ; and 
to facilitate their rapid movement, the inhabitants of the 
places through which troops pass ought to be instructed to 
prepare rations sufficient for the number of troops passing, 
for which they are to be liberally remunerated. 

The movements against Murfreesborough might be com- 
bined in the following way : — 

Army at Tullahoma 50,000 men. 

From the army of Virginia 27,000 

" " Vicksburg 25,000 

'< " Mobile 5,000 

*' diflferent detacliments, etc 10,000 



Total 117,000 

The 25,000 men from Yicksburg ought to be partly re- 
placed by the 15,000 from Arkansas and Texas. 

The following table will show how the concentration is 
to be conducted — the different corps being transported all 
by railroad as far as Chattanooga and London. From this 
line as a base, the movement is to be executed. We sup- 
pose, as we have done before, that the longer railroad 
lines are able to transport 2500 men per diem; and that 
on some of the shorter, the number might be augmented 
by running the cars day and night, and by stopping for a 
few days all other traffic : — 



CAMPAIGN OF 1863. 



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20 



226 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

On the 14th, the commander-in-chief should arrive at 
Chattanooga ; and on the same day the offensive operation 
should be commenced. With 117,000 men against 40,000. 
to 50,000, a commander can well propose to himself to de- 
stroy this latter army ; and the only correct way to do this 
is to execute similar manoeuvres to those executed by Napo- 
leon in 1805 and 1806, — the relative position of the base 
of operation of the Rebels to that of the line of operation 
of -the Union army facilitating such action. 

We will try to describe such a movement here, though the 
task is somewhat above our abilities, notwithstanding we 
have the brilliant examples of 1805 and 1806 before our 
eyes. 

On the 13th of month Ist, 1000 men start from London, 
and march for Crossville. On the 15th of month 1st, 30,000 
men start from Cleveland, on the road to Sparta, and cross 
the Tennessee. 

For easier understanding, I have added an engraving, 
showing the position of the different corps. V. S. is the^ 
Union army, stationed nine to ten miles south from Mur- 
freesborough. Eor better distinction, we will divide the 
Rebel army into divisions of 10,000, numbered from one to 
twelve, as shown on the plate. (See Fig. 8.) 

On the 16th, all the divisions are put in motion. Divi- 
sion 6 starts from Chattanooga, and is on the 18th, in the 
evening, at Manchester; t and 8 march from Harrison for 
B, where they arrive on the 18th, in the evening; 9 and 10 
leave Tennessee River, and arrive at McMinnsville on the 
18th, in the evening ; and finally, divisions 11 and 12 march, 



Fig. ». 




>{QTE._Read Londo 



;;^r;^;;;;;j;;;7^;:;— ii;i-^ Harrison for damsou. 



228 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

by way of Sparta, to about ten miles from Smithville, where 
they arrive also on the 18th, in the evening. 

All distances, as will be seen, are three days' march. On 
the 19th, the divisions arrive in the positions shown in the 
engraving ; and for the 20th, the action is impending. On 
the 20th, divisions 11 and 12 start on their respective routes 
at four o'clock a.m. At two o'clock, they have to strike the 
railroad above Murfreesborough ; and at five o'clock, they 
have to be half way to Franklin, on the Franklin and Mur- 
freesborough Turnpike. Division 12, which should consist 
in great part of cavalry, with some batteries, should be very 
near Franklin at that time. 

On the same day, divisions 9 and 10 start at four o'clock 
A.M., and march for Murfreesborough, where they should be 
at twelve o'clock, changing their front, and moving in a 
southwesterly direction. (The map at my disposal is not 
exact enough to designate any special point.) These corps 
have to communicate with divisions T and 8, and may receive 
special orders about the direction they are to take daring 
the day. 

On the 20th, also in the morning, at five o'clock, 7 and 8 
move against the railroad, half way between Murfrees- 
borough and the Union army, from where they have to be 
at about nine o'clock ; then they take also a southwesterly 
direction to join in the battle at about ten o'clock, and to 
attack the extreme right and rear of the Union army. 

Finally, divisions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 attack the Union array 
ZJ. S. at six o'clock in the morning, holding at first some- 
what back till 7 and 8 arrive on the battle-field, when the 



CAMPAIGN OP 18U3. 229 

reserves are brought in the action and the coup-de-collier 
is given. Should the retreat of the U. S. troops commence 
very early, and in the direction of Franklin, the direction of 
9, 10, 11, and 12 should be changed to clear west, or per- 
haps even somewhat west-northwest. These corps have to 
pursue on the flank of the Union army, and continually 
prevent its going north ; the remainder of the Rebel army 
pursue in the rear. A few days of such pursuit, especially 
if the battle has been conducted with great energy, would 
entirely break up and finish the U. S. army, the remainder 
of which would, besides, be obliged to surrender near the 
Tennessee River. 

The great mistake to be avoided in the battle, is one 
similar to that committed by Ney in the battle of Bautzen. 
The corps 7, 8, 9, and 10 have always to act more to their 
right than to their left ; and wherever they meet the enemy, 
they have to attack with the utmost impetuosity, and to fall 
headlong on him. The reason for such action is obvious. 
By the direction of their march, they will appear in the 
flank or rear of an army already fully engaged in front 
against superior numbers. To proceed slowly under such 
circumstances, would give the attacked army time to retreat 
and escape from the impending peril. 

After the battle, 117,000 men are obviously too many to 
pursue some 25,000 or 30,000 constituting the remainder 
of the Union army. Under these circumstances, a division 
of force is according to the rules ; therefore, immediately 
after the battle, the divisions 3, 5, and 6 march to Nashville, 
which town they attack on the 21st, in the afternoon, and 

20* 



230 I'lMNClPLES OF 8TllATEaY. 

wliich they have to carry by assault. These three divisions 
ought to be well provided with artillery for this purpose. 
After the capture of Nashville, the divisions 3, 5, and 6 
cross the Cumberland and march to Gallatin. On the 25th 
they ought to be at Glasgow, Kentucky; 27th at Mumfords- 
ville, beating and destroying all smaller Union corps on 
their way. On the 2'7th they might be at Lebanon, and, if 
there is the slightest chance of the capture of Louisville, it- 
should be attempted ; after which the movement is to be con- 
tinued to Lexington, pushing cavalry parties as far as Cov- 
ington. From Lexington the corps proceed to Cumberland 
Gap, and arrive at Rodgersville Junction about the 20th 
of month 2. From there they will be transported by rail to 
the East, so as to form a junction with the Rebel armies in 
the left zone. This junction ought to be effected by the 1st 
of month 3. 

The main army, some 80,000 strong, is meanwhile march- 
ing by forced marches toward Savannah, Tenn., or any point 
where the pursuit of the Cumberland army carries it to, or 
where it can easily cross the Tennessee River. Supposing 
that the crossing will take place at Savannah, where the army 
has arrived on the 26th of month 1, on the 27th the cross- 
ing and advance to Purdy takes place; on the 28th 15,000 
men march to Jackson, the same day 35,000 more to Boli- 
var, 20,000 to Pocahontas, and 10,000 remain on the road 
from Purdy to Corinth. On the 29th the Union troops at 
Bolivar and Jackson are beaten ; those at the former place 
are pursued by 15,000, and those at the latter by 3000- or 
4000, of which about 2000 should be cavalry, and which 



CAMPAIGN OF 1863. 231 

troops should push on as far as Columbus. The remaining 
10,000 or 12,000 march to Somerville or Raleigh, and form, 
on the 2d of month 2, a junction with the 15,000 Rebel 
troops coming from Bolivar. An attack on Memphis should 
take place immediately, if this place has not meanwhile been 
reinforced by Union troops returning from Yicksburg. The 
remainder of the 35,000 at Bolivar march to Pocahontas, 
join with the 20,000 there, and proceed on the 30th to the 
attack of Corinth, which, attacked by 50,000 men, and from 
several sides, would be obliged to surrender. After this 
action, the Rebel troops should have two or three days of 
repose, and then commence their eastward movement. The 
troops left before Memphis, after the capture of this place, 
should also commence their movement to the East. By using 
all possible means, as far as railroads are concerned, this 
whole army ought to be, by the l§t of month 3, in the left 
zone, ready to effect a junction with the Rebel forces there. 
The beating of the armies at Corinth, Bolivar, Memphis, 
etc. necessarily disengages Vicksburg, if this pkce has not 
meanwhile been carried by the Union troops. We have 
supposed that the Rebel troops there have been reinforced 
by 15,000 troops from Arkansas. If those 40,000 have 
been able to withstand all assaults undertaken by the Fed- 
eral army, it cannot be doubted that about the 2d or 3d of 
month 2 the siege of Vicksburg would be raised. This 
should immediately be taken advantage of by sending 30,000 
men to the East, where they should arrive also about the 1st 
of month 3. By using the Mobile and Savannah and Lynch- 
burg and Knoxville Roads, 5000 troops ought to be con- 
veyed daily from west to east. 



232 PRINCIPLES OF STllATEGY. 

We have now to return to the East, to see what has hap- 
pened meanwhile there. 

Probably, after some time, the departure of so great a 
number of troops from the Virginia army for the South and 
West will be noticed by the army of the Potomac, and a for- 
ward movement will take place. Three directions may be 
chosen by this army for its advance toward Richmond, the 
capture of which we still suppose to be the object of its 
offensive campaign. These three directions are given stra- 
tegically in the action of the center, by the right or by the 
left. The action by the center means a straight movement 
from Fredericksburg toward Richmond, taking the road 
leading from the first to the latter place as the line of oper- 
ation. The crossing of the Rappahannock would be required 
in this case, and this crossing, simply considered as a tactical 
operation, might take place just as the whole operation, con- 
sidered strategically, would, viz., by the right, left, or center; 
that is to say, the army may cross some miles above Fred- 
ericksburgh^ turning thereby the left of the Rebel army and 
marching straight to Bowling Green or Sexton Station; or 
it may cross below, and turn the right of the Rebel army by 
marching to Bowling Green; or, finally, it may cross at 
Fredericksburg, and attack the Rebels in front. This latter 
expedient has already been tried in the battle of Fredericks- 
burg, and it failed ; however, considering the weakened 
state of the Rebel army, it might be tried again. This lat- 
ter army, as we have seen, after sending 30,000 men to New- 
bern, sends 27,000 off to Richmond, which place they leave 
by lots of 2500 for the West, the last lot starting on the 14th 



CAMPAIGN OF 1863. 233 

of month 1. Immediately after the departure of these corps, 
the Rebel army takes the following position : 20,000 remain 
in and near Fredericksburg, 5000 march to Chancellorsville, 
and stay there, and finally 25,000 move to Bowling Green, 
to await events. The Rappahannock is strongly picketed 
from Fredericksburg some 10 or 15 miles above and below, 
to prevent any surprise. Should the Union army cross once 
more to Fredericksburg, the 20,000 men there would be 
joined, within three or four hours, by the 5000 at Chancel- 
lorsville and the 25,000 at Bowling Green ; and, as at the 
first battle of Fredericksburg scarcely more than 50,000 
Rebels were actually engaged, it might be that the remain- 
ing 50,000 would be able to repulse the attack, or at all 
events to inflict serious loss. It would probably take till 
night before their position was carried, and then they would 
have time to retreat, and place the Mattapony between them 
and their pursuers. The bridges over this river would be 
destroyed, and another river defense would take place ; the 
same game would be repeated at North and South Anna 
River, at the Chickahominy, and at Little River; till, 
finally, arrived near Richmond, the Rebel army takes shel- 
ter under the cannon of the fortifications of their capital. 

Should the Union army cross below Fredericksburg, and 
advance straight to Bowling Green, the 25,000 Rebels at 
this place would cross the Mattapony, destroy the bridges, 
and defend the passage over the river, till joined by the re- 
mainder of the Rebel force from Fredericksburg and Chan- 
cellorsville, who would have marched by forced marches, and 
by way of Mount Pleasant, to a junction with their friends. 



234 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

The fight at Fredericksburg would therefore be avoided, 
but at the Mattapony the same difficulties in crossing would 
be experienced as before. Evidently the Mattapony, as well 
as all the subsequent rivers, may be crossed above or below 
the defending forces, who would have to conduct the de- 
fenses entirely according to the rules laid down for such 
operations. (See "Summary of the Art of War.") Finally, 
should the Uniou army cross above Fredericksburg, it would 
immediately be attacked by the 5000 at Chancellorsville and 
20,000 at Fredericksburg, who would soon be joined by the 
25,000 from Bowling Green. Once the passage effected, 
the case is the same as the two preceding. The Union 
army advances, and the Rebel army retreats in the direc- 
tion of Richmond and along the Fredericksburg and Rich- 
mond Railroad. 

Let us suppose the movement of the Federal army to be 
commenced on the 5th of month 1. Considering the diffi- 
culties of the advance, the crossing of five or six rivers over 
which bridges have to be built, and, finally, the necessity for 
rebuilding the railroad bridges also, in order to use the rail- 
road for supplying the army, — considering all this, we could 
not suppose that the army would take less than 10 to 12 
days to reach Richmond ; it would probably take twice that 
time. Let us take 12 days, and say that on the 17th of 
month 1 the Federal troops find themselves in face of the 
Rebel capital, occupied at that time by some 60,000 to 
G5,000 men — 50,000 from Fredericksburg, 5000 who were 
left aa garrison, and some 5000 to 10,000 men who have 
had time to arrive after the battle of Newbern. 



CAxMPAIGN OF 1863. 235 

Richmond being fortified, two ways of action are open 
fo? its capture — either a general assault immediately after 
the arrival of the army, or the formal siege of the place. 
The fortifications around Richmond having more or less 
the character of field-works, a daring commander might try 
the assault. Field-works of such a description, defended 
by 65,000 men, who would be reinforced on the day of battle 
by some 20,000 more transported from Weldon and Peters- 
burg, are difficult to take. The position would have to be 
carried without reference to the loss of life. The most ener- 
getic and decided action alone could warrant such an attempt 
or render it successful. To make an assault just to try the 
thing, at the same time being afraid of the loss, would evi- 
dently be useless — it would be repulsed with great carnage. 
Supposing the first kind of action — that is to say, decided 
action, like that of Napoleon at the battle of Smolensk or 
Borodino — to take place, it is necessary to consider the re- 
spective chances. The Union army arriving before Rich- 
mond would probably not amount to more than 100,000 to 
110,000 men, as it would have to detach largely to cover 
its long line of communications with its bridges, etc. The 
Rebels would oppose them with 65,000 to 85,000 men, 
covered by redoubts and a strong artillery. The beating 
of these 85,000 men is not impossible under such circum- 
stances; but if well led, they ought to be victorious in the 
end, and the loss of the attacking party after the repulse, 
considering the desperate nature of the attack, would be so 
enormous that it would probably force them to retreat. 
The more prudent course would, therefore, seem to be to 



236 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

undertake the siege ; but whether it bo so or not, we will 
suppose it to be undertaken without a previous assault. 

The siege of Richmond would take a month at the least; 
perhaps two. Meantime the army must be supplied ; it 
must therefore have a safe base and a secure line of com- 
munication. The most natural lines of communication • 
that present themselves are the Fredericksburg and Rich- 
mond Railway line, the York River, York River Railroad, 
and the James River. The adoption of the two latter 
would force the army to a change of front, in order to pro- 
tect its communications; but as these two cases are iden- 
tical with the action of the Potomac army at Falmouth to 
its left, we will treat of them when speaking of the latter 
case. We therefore suppose, first, that the Federal army 
before Richmond keeps the Aquia Creek and Richmond 
Railway line as a line of communication, in order to obtain 
its supplies, etc. This line evidently requires strong detach- 
ments to protect it from surprise: 20,000 to 25,000 men, if 
not more, would certainly be necessary to guard the many 
bridges, the long trains of stores, and the temporary maga- 
zines at Aquia Creek and Fredericksburg, etc. On the 20th 
of month 1 the army in Richmond would be increased to 
90,000, and a few days later to 125,000 men, by the arrival 
of 35,000 more, consisting of the corps which has marched 
against Suffolk and beaten the Federal army there. The 
Confederate forces would now be strong enough to take 
the offensive ; but, in this case, temporizing would probably 
prove an advantage to them : first, because within a month 
they would be so heavily reinforced from the West that a 



CAMPAIGN OP 1863. 237 

decisive result, finishing the war, might be obtained; and 
secondly, the long line of operation of the Union forces 
would offer an excellent chance for beating them in detail, 
and hold out too great a temptation for a Jackson and a 
Stuart, united, to gather fresh laurels by capturing or de- 
stroying those Federal corps scattered over a long space 
of from 55 to 60 miles. 

In order to execute such a raid, Jackson, with some 
30,000 of good infantry, and Stuart, with some 4000 to 
5000 cavalry, would move to Goochland C. H., and cross 
the James River there ; thence they would march to Sex- 
ton's Junction, leaving a thousand cavalry, with about four 
guns, at South Ann River, in the neighborhood of Allen's 
Creek, for the purpose of informing the main body of any 
movement taking place in the Federal army, and for retard- 
ing the march of a corps which might be sent by the Federal 
commander toward Orange C. H. to intercept the Rebels in 
their retreat. 

The main body, under Jackson and Stuart, arrived at a 
distance of about eight miles from Sexton's Junction, would 
detach some 12,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry to attack the 
Union post at South Ann River, provided this post does not 
number more than 4000 or 5000. If it should number more, 
it would be preferable to march there with the whole force, 
crush it, and destroy the bridges over the river; for it must 
be borne in mind that this post might be reinforced within 
an hour from the army before Richmond. 

The next move is to North Ann River, then to the Mat- 
tapony and to the Rappahannock. The Union troops at 

21 



238 ' PRINCIPLES OP STEATEGY. 

Fredericksburg are attacked, the bridges over the river de- 
stroyed, and the river itself passed above, and the move- 
ment continued to Aquia Creek. This whole movement 
must evidently be executed with great speed. Rapidity, 
energy, and determination would probably render it a com- 
plete success. The consequent retreat from Aquia Creek 
would depend entirely upon the action of the army of the 
Potomac. Three principal directions present themselves: a 
movement to Gordonsville, or to Culpepper, or to Warren- 
ton and Thoroughfare Gap. The two latter would only be 
executed in order to reach the Shenandoah valley, and with 
it safety. 

The Potomac army finds itself, in consequence of this 
raid, in an embarrassing situation. The Rebels would prob- 
ably have spread reports of having 50,000 to 60,000 men 
with them in this raid ; besides, the day the attack on South 
Ann River takes place, the army in Richmond would engage 
in a fight which would detain the Union forces, and prevent 
a large detachment being sent away. It must also be con- 
sidered that the Federal army would probably number not 
more than 100,000 men; that to detach 40,000, 50,000, 
or 60,000, would leave only about 50,000 exposed to the 
blows of the 90,000 forming the defending army of Rich- 
mond, which, by crossing a few miles above Richmond, 
might attack the remainder of the Union army in flank, and 
destroy it before the detachment could return. Sending 
only a small detachment would expose the latter to a defeat 
by Jackson ; besides, sending troops after the Rebels on the 
Richmond and Fredericksburg line would be entirely use- 



CAMPAIGN OP 1863. 239 

less, as they would continually come too late. The only 
thing they would gain would be the latest reports of the 
depredations committed by the Rebels. 

In a case like this, the real character of different generals 
would show itself. A Napoleon or a Cesar would, at the 
first notice of the raid, leave their trains and parks, and 
move with their whole army, by forced marches, toward 
Orange C. H. or Potteisville, according to circumstances. 
Executed against them, this raid would be destruction to 
the corps who undertook it. A Wellington would prob- 
ably at first do nothing at all, but raise the siege as soon as 
the reports were fully confirmed, and move with his whole 
material composedly back to his first base. A Jourdan or 
a Victor would send a detachment after the Rebels, staying, 
themselves with the main body before Richmond. A Moreau 
or Massena.would get their trains in readiness, leave a strong 
detachment to cover them, with orders to retreat as soon as 
the Rebels in Richmond manifest a desire to attack, and 
with their main body they would march to intercept the 
Rebel corps which has undertaken the raid. 

In our case, I think that the undertaking of the raid would 
be sufficiently justified by the simple fact that a Napoleon or 
Cesar would probably not have chosen the line of operation 
from Fredericksburg to Richmond. 

It would occupy us too long to enter upon a discussion 
of how to act in a case like this. We may merely say that 
Jackson should by all means try to escape to the Shenan- 
doah valley, and the Union forces should endeavor to pre- 
vent him from doing so. Once plunged in this valley, all 



240 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

pursuit would be useless, as the different gaps give him the 
facilities to execute movements similar to those of some 
Spanish generals — La Romana, for instance, in the As- 
turias and Gallicia, against Ney, where the latter descended 
one valley in pursuit of a Spanish column, which remounted 
at the same moment a parallel valley, separated from the 
first by impassable ridges, and thereby escaped. 

If the siege, notwithstanding this raid, should be con- 
tinued — the Rebels carrying on all the while a kind of 
counter-siege — the Confederate forces would have to pre- 
pare for a final and decisive action. In the middle and at 
the end of month 2, their reinforcements from the "West 
begin to arrive ; and by the 25th their strength is sufficient 
to allow of its coming to decisive blows. With the supe- 
riority they would have at that time, they should prepare 
themselves for more than simply beating the Union array ; 
they should try to destroy it. The necessary movement for 
this might be executed in the following manner : — 

About 200,000 troops are to be disposed along the Rich- 
mond and Burkesville Railroad, at Mattoax, Powhatan, Tom- 
ahawk, and Coal Mines. From there they advance, in one 
day, to Tay, and cross the James River ; moving then, in 
the mode we have indicated for the engagement in Tennes- 
see, by parallel columns, the right wing to Hungary, push- 
ing a detachment to Scuffletown, the center on the road 
from Montpellier to Richmond, and the left wing at Ash- 
land. After having taken possession of all the bridges over 
the Chickahominy, the army changes front to the south. 
The advanced guard of the center becomes the left wing, 



CAMPAIGN OP 1863. 241 

and the reserve which marched with the center becomes the 
center, the left becomes the reserve. 

The Union army is attacked in this way in its rear by 
some 180,000 or 200,000 men. Moreover, 40,000 or 50,000 
debouch from Richmond and attack its left, to prevent its 
retreating once more to Harrison's Landing or Malvern 
Hill. If, under such circumstances, the battle is rightly 
planned and carried out with sufficient speed, it must end 
with the entire destruction of the Federal army, which is 
inclosed between the fortifications of Richmond and the 
main Rebel army, and has, besides, a corps of 50,000 men 
on its flank. After this battle, the Rebels have to take the 
offensive against the North. "We will treat of this here- 
after. 

The Union army, instead of acting by the center, may 
act by its left — that is, for its advance from Fredericks- 
burg it may cross the Rappahannock very far below, at 
Urbana, for instance, march to York River, cross it by 
means of steamers, and push toward Richmond from West 
Point or White House as a base. Or it may be transported 
to James River, taking this river as a base, and move either 
on its right or its left bank toward Richmond. The dis- 
tinctive feature of this manoeuvre by the left is, that the 
army would base itself on a river, and the navy would have 
to play a great part in the operations. The cases to be con- 
sidered, as we have already seen, are three : 1, York River 
as a base; 2, James River as a base, with an advance on 
the right bank against Richmond; 3, James River as a 
base, with an advance on the left bank against Richmond. 

21* 



242 PIUNCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

Taking York River as a base, tlie Union army would 
have to go over the campaign on the Chickahominy once 
more. It could not be supposed that the Rebel army would 
be surprised, or their corps at Fredericksburg be outflanked 
by the movement of the Federal troops to West Point, as 
they might reach Richmond in two days from Fredericks- 
burg, the distance being only some 60 miles. If General 
Banks's soldiers in the Shenandoah valley could march 60 
miles in two days, those' of Jackson or Longstreet might 
well travel the same distance in the same time. Considering 
carefully such a movement, consisting partly of transporta- 
tion, partly of marching, it would be found that in less than 
10 or 12 days the Union army, leaving Fredericksburg, could 
scarcely reach Richmond. It would arrive there without 
previous loss, and this certainly is to be taken into account. 
It is not necessary to discuss the chances of the campaign 
against the Confederate capital, with York River as a base. 
The study of the campaign of the Potomac army in 1862 
will be sufficient to show the dangers and difficulties an 
army would have to contend with. 

Choosing James River as a base of operation against 
Richmond, the army might reach there by marching from 
York River to Harrison's Landing or Malvern Hill, or any 
other place on this river where the army would be in com- 
munication with the gun-boats and transports; or the army 
might arrive at the appointed place by being transported to 
it from Aquia Creek. This arrangement would evidently 
take a great length of time, and in no case could the army 
be before or near Richmond under 12 to 15 days, counted 



CAMPAIGN OP 1863. 243 

from its starting from Fredericksburg. Arrived at James 
River, let us suppose, lirst, that the advance takes place on 
the right bank of this river. If so, much will depend if 
Petersburg and "Walthall form fortified donhle teles- de-pont, 
able to resist an attack of a strong army ; much also de- 
pends on Fort Darling forming a similar fortified double 
tete-de-pont. Should, in fact, a system of fortifications exist 
such as we have spoken of in Chapter III., Fig. 5, little can 
be expected from the action of the Federal army. It would, 
in order to approach Richmond, have to make the siege of 
Petersburg, and especially of Fort Darling, in the first in- 
stance, and this in the face of an army of 120,000 men, 
which within a month would be reinforced by 125,000 men 
more. The Union army might think itself lucky if, after 
some attempts to carry the fortifications, it could save one- 
half of its numbers ; and certainly the Rebels would deserve 
severe criticism if so large a portion of the Union army 
should escape, inclosed as it is or would be by the James 
and Appomattox Rivers, and by a Rebel army acting 
against its left flank and its rear. 

If no fortifications exist at Petersburg and Walthall, if, 
moreover, the James River is open to gun-boats and trans- 
ports above Appomattox River, then the Union army might 
at once cross above this latter river and advance against 
Manchester. The gun-boats could only follow as far as 
Fort Darling, and if the Union army would advance farther, 
it would run straight into destruction. Evidently the Rebel 
army would not commit so ridiculous a blunder as to place 
itself square before Manchester. It would take a position 



244 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

at Coal Mines or Tomahawk, on the left flank of the Union 
army, and, as soon as the latter would have advanced above 
Fort Darling, it would immediately advance to Cedar Row, 
taking the Federals on the left flank and rear, and throwing 
them into the corner formed by the James River at Richmond 
or Manchester. Should the Union army be defeated in such 
a battle, its total loss would evidently be the consequence. 
To avoid such a disaster, the reduction of Fort Darling and 
the opening of James River would probably be tried before 
any farther advance against Richmond takes place. This, 
however, the Rebels should endeavor to prevent by all "means. 
They should attack the left flank of the Union army with 
impetuosity ; they should construct in the James River other 
bars above the first ; should drive oif the gun-boats by firing 
incendiary shells at them ; they should continually reinforce, 
till their superiority had become such that the Union army 
could not resist a further assault, and is finally thrown into 
the river. Here, as well as before, if the attack is executed 
rightly, the Federal army ought, in consequence of its posi- 
tion, backed by a river, to be completely destroyed, and the 
gun-boats should not be able to save it. In this operation — 
that is, along the right bank of the James River — the Fed- 
eral army is obviously more exposed than in our first opera- 
tion, when acting along the railroad from Fredericksburg. 
Its entire safety depends on its gun-boats ; it has no space 
to mancBuvre in, to advance, or to retreat ; it is chained to 
James River, and the slightest accident happening to the 
flotilla, the appearance and fortunate action of a Merrimac 
No. 2, for instance, would be the ruin of this army. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1863. 245 

There remains to be considered the advance against Rich- 
mond along the left bank of James River, from a point below 
Fort Darling as a base. An attack on this side would lead 
to the same disasters as on the right bank, if the crossings 
over the Chickahominy remained in possession of the Rebels. 
Holding the bridges over this creek, the Rebels might at 
any moment debouch against the right flank of the Union 
army, and throw it against the James River; or, if Fort 
Darling forms a double tete-de-pont, they might cross the 
James River there, and attack the Union army in the rear. 
This fort, if forming a tete-de-pont, ought, therefore, to be 
masked or reduced before the Federal army proceeds any 
farther. This takes time, and meanwhile the Rebel army 
is continually reinforced ; the final result can, therefore, not 
be doubtful. No special manoeuvre could be made by the 
Rebel troops when once the siege was commenced, unless 
by holding the bridges over the Chickahominy from Meadow 
to Bottom Bridge, and, passing behind the creek, they were 
to debouch by these bridges and attack the Union army in 
the rear. It would be a manoeuvre somewhat similar to 
that of 1862, executed on the same spot. If this manoeuvre 
is impossible, mere strength or numbers would decide ; only 
tactically the attack would probably be directed against the 
center or right wing of the Union forces, as in both these 
cases, if the attack is successful, great results would be 
obtained. 

We have, lastly, to consider the third case, that of the 
Union array acting by its right. This operation differs 
from the two others only by the route the army takes. Once 



24 G PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

before Richmond, in order to make the siege, one of the four 
cases already considered will take place, as the army, for its 
supplies, has to base itself on Aquia Creek or York or James 
River. (If Richmond were not fortified, the operation to 
the right would be decisive.) We have supposed, in our 
imaginary campaign, that only 50,000 men oppose the army 
of the Potomac ; these have, therefore, nothing better to do, 
when the Union army commences its movement to the right, 
than to march, at first parallel with the Federal army, and 
then retreat to Richmond. The defense of rivers is out of 
question, as the Union army may pass high enough, where 
the rivers are so unimportant that their defense would be of 
no avail. Little would, therefore, be changed by this action 
to the right, and only the fights on the diiferent crossings 
avoided. Were the Rebel army equal, or very nearly so, to 
the Federal army, the matter would be different. In the 
same way that the Union army moves to the right the 
Rebels should move to their left, continually parallel with 
the Union army, and finally, arrived near Gordonsville, they 
might, by making good use of the diflPerent gaps, perhaps 
be able to beat the Union army in detail. At all events, 
here the Confederates might permit the Union forces to 
pass to their right and to march toward Richmond, pro- 
vided that place has a sufiicient garrison, and, by following 
this army immediately, render its march a kind of retreat. 
Should the Federals, under such circumstances, try an as- 
sault against Richmond, their rear and right flank would 
be attacked at the same moment by the entire Rebel army, 
thexase being the same as the one we first considered, viz., 



CAMPAIGN OP 1863. 247 

the Union army undertaking the siege of Richmond, having 
A quia Creek as a base. 

Returning to our imaginary campaign, it will be under- 
stood that, immediately after the decisive defeat of the 
Union army before Richmond, the offensive should be taken 
against the North. If the destruction has been complete, 
the entire Rebel army should move. If the defeat has 
been only such as after the seven days' fight, 50,000 men 
left at Richmond would be sufficient to defend the town; 
the remainder — some 180,000 to 200,000 — should move on 
the day after the battle, by forced marches, to the North. 
Washington we will suppose strongly garrisoned, as well as 
Harper's Ferry and Baltimore. At Warrenton 30,000 men 
would be detached, to move by way of Centreville against 
the Federal capital, as a kind of corps of observation : 
20,000 men would be sent through Ashby's Gap against 
Winchester, and thence against Martinsburg. Arrived at 
Buckletown, they would march east, and thereby prevent 
the garrison of Harper's Ferry escaping west or northwest. 
The main body of the army has meanwhile moved along 
Loudon valley; at Aldie Gapabout 100,000 pass through 
it; the remainder (some 40,000) move to Berlin; a detach- 
ment takes Loudon Heights ; 1 0,000 men move to Frederick- 
town, and the remaining 30,000 march into Pleasant Valley, 
take Maryland Heights, and force the garrison of Harper's 
Ferry once more to surrendier. Immediately after the surren- 
der, and if in the meanwhile Washington has been captured, 
the entire corps moves toward Chambersburg, for an inva- 
sion of the North ; if Washington has not been captured, then 



248 PRINCIPLES OP STRATEGY. 

it moves against Baltimore. The main body having passed 
through Aldie Gap, advances to Con's Ferry, crosses the 
Potomac, and immediately proceeds toward Washington, 
which place ought to be attacked simultaneously, on the 
right bank of the Potomac by the 30,000 Ptebels coming 
from Centreville, and by the 100,000 coming from Con's 
Ferry on the left bank. One or two forts carried on the 
left bank would open the way into the city, and this once 
occupied, the garrison in the forts on the right would prob- 
ably be obliged to surrender. 

This short expose will show that the Rebels, by taking to 
grand offensive operations under the present circumstances ; 
by defeating first the smaller Union bodies, and then by 
concentrating all their forces for the last decisive struggle ; 
by leaving the Union armies in the West, far away from the 
decisive point, perfectly free to capture cotton plantations, 
and open Western rivers to Northern navigation, while they 
(the Rebels) are dealing decisive blows, and capturing large 
Union cities in the East, might finish the war to their own 
advantage, and this simply in consequence of the wrong 
plan of conquest followed by the Northern troops. 

Grand operations, however, as we have just described 
them, demand for their execution more than ordinary 
talents in the leader ; and the question would be, have the 
Confederates a general able to execute such movements and 
manoeuvres ? Supposing they have not, and supposing they 
keep strictly on the defensive, (which, in their case, is ob- 
viously a mistake,) and that the defense is conducted accord- 
ing to the rules of military science, even then they might 



CAMPAIGN OF 1863. 249 

protract the war, and perhaps prevent any decisive result 
being obtained by the North. 

The whole course of our imaginary campaign was based 
on two preliminary successes — the destruction of the Cum- 
berland and the Newb.ern armies. If once those gaps were 
made in the immense front of operation of the Union armies, 
the remainder of this front must break' to pieces. In a 
purely defensive campaign, the Rebels would be satisfied 
with repulsing the Union armies, instetid of destroying 
them. 

The army of the Potomac, in its advance, would have to 
contend with exactly the same difficulties, and perhaps even 
with more, if the Virginia army.should not have been weak- 
ened by strong detachments, as we have supposed in our 
imaginary campaign. Arrived before Richmond, the same 
difficulties about the line of communication and base of oper- 
ation, that we have discussed, would occur. The Rebels, 
receiving a few reinforcements from Tennessee, Yicksburg, 
and Charleston, would be able to take tlie off'eusive. Acting 
according to the position of the Union army, as we have 
shown above, the final retreat of the army of the Potomac 
can scarcely be doubted, if the defense is anything like cor- 
rectly and vigorously conducted. As soon as the Potomac 
army retreats, the Rebels would send reinforcements to the 
West, to push back the Union armies which have meanwhile 
advanced. 

The army of the Cumberland, after the bloody battle of 
Murfreesborough, might advance. It finds its enemy in line 
of battle at TuUahoma. Another victory and another ad- 
• 22 



250 PRINCIPLES OF STKATEay. 

vance only find the enemy once more in line of battle 
behind the Tennessee. A third victory, and General Rose- 
crans might find himself in the situation of Pyrrhus, when, 
after his victory over the Romans, he said, " One more 
victory like this, and I am undone. ^^ 

The armies of the Mississippi may take Vicksburg ; but 
what is gained, what is achieved if they do ? Another post 
which must be occupied by Union troops ; a blessing for the 
Rebels, who obtain by it some 40,000 or 50,000 men free 
for action elsewhere. But, by opening the Mississippi, the 
whole right zone will be separated from the rest of the 
theater of war. The Rebels cannot draw thence any more 
reinforcements and provisions, and we have often been told 
that the rebellion, in that case, is bound to fall. This as- 
sertion, before being credited, requires proof. It is but 
an assertion. The capture of Yicksburg would give the 
Rebels some 40,000 to 50,01)0 men, who might immediately 
be brought to the Tennessee to join the Rebel army there, 
and defeat the Cumberland army. The Mississippi Union 
armies would perhaps advance into the State of Mississippi ; 
this would be another chance for the two united Rebel armies 
to gain a victory. 

The army at Newbern, what can it achieve besides some 
annoyance to the Rebels ? March to Raleigh ? This might 
prove disastrous, at least it ought to do so ; and even if it 
does not, after awhile the Union army would be obliged to 
retreat. Capture Wilmington ? Be it so ; but what would 
be gained by taking this town, beyond the necessity of send- 
ing another detachment to hold it ? The conquest of the 
South is not one inch advanced by it. 



CAMPAIGN OF 1863. 251 

Finally, let us suppose Richmond carried, Raleigh taken, 
Charleston occupied, Chattanooga seized, and the Union 
armies from the West advanced to the Tombigbee River ; 
but the Rebel armies still existing, and still holding their 
interior lines, which become the more valuable and the 
more effective the more the Union armies approach, what 
prevents them from uniting all their forces nearly in one, 
gaining thereby a decisive superi.ority over every one of the 
surrounding Federal armies, defeating the Cumberland army 
first, the Newbern army next, and the army of the Potomac 
last, and regaining in a few weeks all they have lost the last 
few months ? 

It is like the work of Penelope, done by day and undone 
by night ; only with this difference, that we do it in the 
spring, and the Rebels undo it in the fall. 

In war sometimes accidents happen, accidents above 
human power to prevent ; they are like the interfering of 
Providence. Napoleon, after the battle of Dresden, was 
the victim of one of these accidents. The Allies had 
crowned all the blunders they had committed before and 
in the battle of Dresden, in 1813, by a retreat against all 
military rules and even against all common sense. The 
destruction of nearly half their army would have been the 
consequence, had Napoleon not been taken ill by a violent 
attack of fever, compelling him to go home after the battle. 
The pursuit was badly conducted, and not only obtained no 
advantageous results, but ended even in the disaster of Culm, 
where nearly an entire corps of Napoleon's army was de- 
stroyed. It is difficult to say what turn events would have 



252 PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY. 

taken had Napoleon not been prostrated by disease, and had 
half the allied army been desti'oyed. 

It is to be hoped that Providence may interfere in a simi- 
lar way for the Union, as with the present plan of invasion 
— that is to say, the plan of invasion which is indicated by 
the position of the tJnion armies at the present moment (the 
middle of January) — it is difficult to see how any really de- 
cisive results are to be obtained, so long as the Rebels act on 
the defensive correctly, and are not so exhausted as they are 
rcjfbrted to be. 



THE END. 



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